On Fri, 2004-01-23 at 10:02, Ross Werner wrote: > On Fri, 23 Jan 2004, Bryan Murdock wrote: > > > On Fri, 2004-01-23 at 09:17, Ross Werner wrote: > > > The only possible way to do this is to have a completely unbroken chain of > > > closed, DRM'd technology all the way up to the display. But even then, > > > you run the risk of (a) reverse engineering, and (b) I can still take a > > > photograph of the screen, if it's that important. (And if it were the sort > > > of situation as at Los Alamos, it would be that important.) > > > > Good point. I rescind my previous post. Security in general is a pipe > > dream. If it's that important, don't connect your computer to the > > internet, don't show it to anyone else, lock your doors, and plan on it > > getting out anyway. > > It's an entirely different ballpark, Bryan. With Security (whether with > cars or computers) you _don't_ want people without the "key" to be able to > get in. So you make the strength of the lock directly proportional to the > amount that others want to get in. (Which is why in South Africa, it's a > lot harder to break into a car.)
But you do want someone to see it, even if it's only yourself, and that's why it's exactly why the same principles apply. Otherwise you'd just rip out your computer's power supply and weld your car doors shut. > > With DRM, however, you _want_ the person to be able to _see_ the data, but > not to be able to _copy_ it. And when you think about it, that's simply > ridiculous. Yes, you can make it more difficult for them to copy it, but > you can't make it impossible--and the nature of information is that once > it's successfully copied once, it can be copied a million times with ease. Just like, you can make your computer harder to crack, but not impossible, unless you don't want anyone to be able to use it. I don't see the difference. Sure, you will be exposing the protected data much more, and that is why DRM is going to be a difficult thing to manage, as you rightly point out, but I don't think it's going to be as laughably inneffective as you make it out to be. > Note that this is very different from "you can make it more difficult for > people to hack through the security on my system, but you can't make it > impossible". While this is also true, DRM'd products _always_ have to be > available to my immediate senses for them to have any value whatsoever--I > have to be able to read a DRM'd book, or listen to DRM'd audio, or watch a > DRM'd movie. And any time that happens, it's available for a camera, a > tape recorder, or a camcorder to capture the information. There's no way > you can stop that, period. Let's take an e-book for an example. Let's say some company, lets call them Clay, starts selling e-books with DRM meant only for Palm pilots. Joe Nongeek buys the latest Stephen King thriller e-book and decides he'd like to make a copy for his friend. Is the DRM going to deter him? Aboslutely. What's he going to do, take a picture of his palm for every page of the book? Maybe he'll re-type the whole thing himself? Probably not, so here you go, DRM has worked for Clay, and that is why it'll work good enough for most everyone. Is it something geeks like us will every want to use? Well, we password protect our web-pages, and we are staunch protectors of our privacy, so I think we might. Will it work for Los Alamos? Well, you do make a good point that for that sort of secrecy, with stakes that high, it probably won't work at all. Bryan ____________________ BYU Unix Users Group http://uug.byu.edu/ ___________________________________________________________________ List Info: http://uug.byu.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/uug-list
