Yesterday at 11:30pm, Ryan Cox said: >Why would enabling reverse DNS for NATed dorm connections be a security >issue? (Just to clarify, I'm talking about the external IP address of >the gateways, not dorm computers)
Unless they're intentionally trying to _break_ stuff that checks that you have a valid RDNS, or an RDNS that matches your forward DNS, there's no security issue. It is just part of the way the internet is supposed to work. Every IP space that is in use should have an RDNS that tells you the domain name for the owner of the IP space. The only other reason I can think of _not_ to want one is if you want to make it harder for people to track down whodunnit when your IP addresses are involved in something they shouldn't be. In this case, they probably could just have a single entry that covers the entire [set of] IP block[s] assigned to byu.edu and be done with it. It sounds like you ought to ask _them_ what _they_ think the security issue is, and then show them how they're wrong. Or, you could get an off-campus shell account somewhere, that would have valid RDNS, then you could run your stuff through there when it wouldn't work directly. Mac -- Mac Newbold MNE - Mac Newbold Enterprises, LLC [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.macnewbold.com/ ____________________ BYU Unix Users Group http://uug.byu.edu/ ___________________________________________________________________ List Info: http://uug.byu.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/uug-list
