"Normal" people make it onto it by doing technically saavy things like plugging the Ethernet from the wall into the LAN ports on their wireless router that doesn't have a WEP key on it so everyone in the complex A) hooks up to their wireless signal on accident because they also have a wireless router with a very unique SSID of "NETGEAR" or "default". or B) sends a DHCP request through the wired network and before byu's DHCP servers can respond the "normal" user's router steps in and throws out a 192.168 address which puts the entire complex on a logically separate and disconnected network.
I would guess most people on this wouldn't be guilty of the first paragraph, but we all know that MOST computer users aren't CS majors and actually DO things like that... Probably because this list isn't a "normal" computer user list? The other way to get on it is let's say the hub you are connected to has an infected computer (or they are file-sharing) and it's bringing the hub down. Now it's already been mentioned that all you need is the user's IP and MAC address and you can block them and the network will go right back to normal. Easy right? Well, when the hub is so wasted it can barely respond, it makes it rather hard to do troubleshooting and figure out exactly which of those 24-ports is the one that's causing all the traffic and needs to be disabled. So OIT is stuck with either A) letting the entire group of people be offline until that one discourteous user gets a virus scanner or stops sharing files, or B) pulling the plug on one person at a time and watching to see which port is loading the hub. It's very spotty troubleshooting, but really the only shot they have because they don't know how long their connection to that hub will be open. My point is this: sometimes it's not the easiest to get the exact users ip and mac under those situations, and I have seen analysts mistakenly disable a port. I've even been guilty of it. In both cases, the port shouldn't be disabled until OIT has tried calling the user under their land-line phone number and tries to find a resolution with the user, a practice I always adhere to. Brian -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Andrew McNabb Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 4:18 PM To: BYU Unix Users Group Subject: Re: [uug] BYU net authentication. On Sat, Dec 03, 2005 at 04:08:41PM -0700, Brian Phillips wrote: > >No, OIT's poor connection most of this semester and excessive port blocking > >they decided to do last summer already do that for me. ;) > > Sounds like you made it onto "the naughty list" once or twice eh? :P > What's "the naughty list" and why are normal people making it onto it? -- Andrew McNabb http://www.mcnabbs.org/andrew/ PGP Fingerprint: 8A17 B57C 6879 1863 DE55 8012 AB4D 6098 8826 6868 -------------------- BYU Unix Users Group http://uug.byu.edu/ The opinions expressed in this message are the responsibility of their author. They are not endorsed by BYU, the BYU CS Department or BYU-UUG. ___________________________________________________________________ List Info: http://uug.byu.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/uug-list
