Random words like malicious SW to describe an attack do not make sense. Refer the patches and series and usage model to describe the sw attack if any. I disagree and I will not repeat all the points anymore. If you have comments in [1], please reply in [1].
Series [1] clearly describes the usage model at least for one widely used OS = Linux. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/virtio-comment/20230909142911.524407-7-pa...@nvidia.com/T/#md9fcfa1ba997463de8c7fb8c6d1786b224b0bead From: Zhu, Lingshan <lingshan....@intel.com> Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2023 4:41 PM To: Parav Pandit <pa...@nvidia.com>; Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com> Cc: virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org; Jason Wang <jasow...@redhat.com> Subject: Re: [virtio-dev] Re: [PATCH 0/5] virtio: introduce SUSPEND bit and vq state On 9/20/2023 5:52 PM, Parav Pandit wrote: Hi Lingshan, Last two email replies in non-next format are getting hard to follow. Can you please revert back to have text-based emails? When one wants to use PF for the live migration in trusted hypervisor, PF is in the trust zone. even without live migration, it can be an attacking surface while guest running. As repeated for many times, it can be used by malicious SW to dump guest memory In future when hypervisor is not trusted, the task of LM will be delegated to other infrastructure TVM. Ravi at Intel already explained this a year ago using migration TD. This fits very well without bifurcating the member device which is extremely hard. TD, TDX or TDX-IO are more complex topics, and we should focus on our live migration solution, not CC. My point is: using bar cap as a proxy for admin vq based LM is still problematic. Maybe we can close this. Parav From: Zhu, Lingshan <lingshan....@intel.com><mailto:lingshan....@intel.com> Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2023 3:15 PM To: Parav Pandit <pa...@nvidia.com><mailto:pa...@nvidia.com>; Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com><mailto:m...@redhat.com> Cc: virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org<mailto:virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org>; Jason Wang <jasow...@redhat.com><mailto:jasow...@redhat.com> Subject: Re: [virtio-dev] Re: [PATCH 0/5] virtio: introduce SUSPEND bit and vq state On 9/20/2023 4:34 PM, Parav Pandit wrote: @font-face {font-family:"Cambria Math"; panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}@font-face {font-family:Calibri; panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}@font-face {font-family:Consolas; panose-1:2 11 6 9 2 2 4 3 2 4;}p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal {margin:0in; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;}a:link, span.MsoHyperlink {mso-style-priority:99; color:blue; text-decoration:underline;}pre {mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-link:"HTML Preformatted Char"; margin:0in; margin-bottom:.0001pt; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Courier New";}span.HTMLPreformattedChar {mso-style-name:"HTML Preformatted Char"; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-link:"HTML Preformatted"; font-family:Consolas;}span.fontstyle0 {mso-style-name:fontstyle0;}span.EmailStyle21 {mso-style-type:personal-reply; font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif; color:windowtext;}.MsoChpDefault {mso-style-type:export-only; font-size:10.0pt; mso-ligatures:none;}div.WordSection1 {page:WordSection1;} > There can be malicious SW on the host, and the host may be hacked and > compromised. > For example: > 1) SUSPEND the a running guest by admin vq > 2) dumping guest memory through admin vq dirty page tracking. No. hypervisor is trusted entity who is hosting the VM. The PF may not owned by the hypervisor and the host can be hacked and computerized. The device migration is initiated by the hypervisor. I am omitting the TDISP question for now as talked before. TDISP spec will evolve for hypercalls when we get there. Confidential computing is out of the spec, as we discussed and agreed. This is to demonstrate why even using a bar cap as proxy for admin vq LM is still problematic. TDISP gives examples of the attacking models, and admin vq based LM conforms to the models. From: virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org<mailto:virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org> <virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org><mailto:virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org> On Behalf Of Zhu, Lingshan Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2023 12:01 PM To: Parav Pandit <pa...@nvidia.com><mailto:pa...@nvidia.com>; Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com><mailto:m...@redhat.com> Cc: virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org<mailto:virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org>; Jason Wang <jasow...@redhat.com><mailto:jasow...@redhat.com> Subject: Re: [virtio-dev] Re: [PATCH 0/5] virtio: introduce SUSPEND bit and vq state On 9/20/2023 2:08 PM, Parav Pandit wrote: From: Zhu, Lingshan <lingshan....@intel.com><mailto:lingshan....@intel.com> Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2023 11:36 AM On 9/19/2023 2:49 AM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: On Mon, Sep 18, 2023 at 06:41:55PM +0000, Parav Pandit wrote: Please refer to the code for setting FEATURES_OK. It wont work when one needs to suspend the device. There is no point of doing such work over registers as fundamental framework is over the AQ. Well not really. It's over admin commands. When these were built the intent always was that it's possible to use admin commands through another interface, other than admin queue. Is there a problem implementing admin commands over a memory BAR? For example, I can see an "admin command" capability pointing at a BAR where commands are supplied, and using a new group type referring to device itself. I am not sure, if a bar cap would be implemented as a proxy for the admin vq based live migration. then the problems of admin vq LM that we have discussed still exist. the bar is only a proxy, doesn't fix anything. and even larger side channel attacking surface: vf-->pf-->vf AQ LM using PF has no side channel attack as hypervisor and owner device is trusted entity as already discussed. I believe we have discussed this for many times, and I even provide you some examples. Let me repeat for the last time. There can be malicious SW on the host, and the host may be hacked and compromised. For example: 1) SUSPEND the a running guest by admin vq 2) dumping guest memory through admin vq dirty page tracking. These above can happen right? You made TDISP as an example, but have you really read the TDISP spec? In the spec: Device Security Architecture - Administrative interfaces (e.g., a PF) may be used to influence the security properties of the TDI used by the TVM. TEE-I/O requires the device to organize its hardware/software interfaces such that the PF cannot be used to affect the security of a TDI when it is in use by a TVM Clear?
