On 9/20/2023 7:15 PM, Parav Pandit wrote:
Random words like malicious SW to describe an attack do not make sense.
this is not random wording, "malicious" used a lot in the papers,
you can search in google scholar
Refer the patches and series and usage model to describe the sw attack
if any.
I disagree and I will not repeat all the points anymore.
don't only say you disagree, please provide why it is not an attacking
surface.
The problem still exist:
What if a malicious SW dump guest memory through admin vq LM facility?
I think this is end of this discussion.
If you have comments in [1], please reply in [1].
Series [1] clearly describes the usage model at least for one widely
used OS = Linux.
[1]
https://lore.kernel.org/virtio-comment/20230909142911.524407-7-pa...@nvidia.com/T/#md9fcfa1ba997463de8c7fb8c6d1786b224b0bead
*From:* Zhu, Lingshan <lingshan....@intel.com>
*Sent:* Wednesday, September 20, 2023 4:41 PM
*To:* Parav Pandit <pa...@nvidia.com>; Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com>
*Cc:* virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org; Jason Wang <jasow...@redhat.com>
*Subject:* Re: [virtio-dev] Re: [PATCH 0/5] virtio: introduce SUSPEND
bit and vq state
On 9/20/2023 5:52 PM, Parav Pandit wrote:
Hi Lingshan,
Last two email replies in non-next format are getting hard to follow.
Can you please revert back to have text-based emails?
When one wants to use PF for the live migration in trusted
hypervisor, PF is in the trust zone.
even without live migration, it can be an attacking surface while
guest running.
As repeated for many times, it can be used by malicious SW to dump
guest memory
In future when hypervisor is not trusted, the task of LM will be
delegated to other infrastructure TVM.
Ravi at Intel already explained this a year ago using migration TD.
This fits very well without bifurcating the member device which is
extremely hard.
TD, TDX or TDX-IO are more complex topics, and we should
focus on our live migration solution, not CC.
My point is: using bar cap as a proxy for admin vq based LM is still
problematic.
Maybe we can close this.
Parav
*From:* Zhu, Lingshan <lingshan....@intel.com>
<mailto:lingshan....@intel.com>
*Sent:* Wednesday, September 20, 2023 3:15 PM
*To:* Parav Pandit <pa...@nvidia.com> <mailto:pa...@nvidia.com>;
Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com> <mailto:m...@redhat.com>
*Cc:* virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org; Jason Wang
<jasow...@redhat.com> <mailto:jasow...@redhat.com>
*Subject:* Re: [virtio-dev] Re: [PATCH 0/5] virtio: introduce
SUSPEND bit and vq state
On 9/20/2023 4:34 PM, Parav Pandit wrote:
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> There can be malicious SW on the host, and the host may be
hacked and compromised.
> For example:
> 1) SUSPEND the a running guest by admin vq
> 2) dumping guest memory through admin vq dirty page tracking.
No. hypervisor is trusted entity who is hosting the VM.
The PF may not owned by the hypervisor and the host can be hacked
and computerized.
The device migration is initiated by the hypervisor.
I am omitting the TDISP question for now as talked before.
TDISP spec will evolve for hypercalls when we get there.
Confidential computing is out of the spec, as we discussed and agreed.
This is to demonstrate why even using a bar cap as proxy for admin
vq LM is still problematic.
TDISP gives examples of the attacking models, and admin vq based LM
conforms to the models.
*From:*virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org
<virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org>
<mailto:virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org> *On Behalf Of *Zhu,
Lingshan
*Sent:* Wednesday, September 20, 2023 12:01 PM
*To:* Parav Pandit <pa...@nvidia.com>
<mailto:pa...@nvidia.com>; Michael S. Tsirkin <m...@redhat.com>
<mailto:m...@redhat.com>
*Cc:* virtio-dev@lists.oasis-open.org; Jason Wang
<jasow...@redhat.com> <mailto:jasow...@redhat.com>
*Subject:* Re: [virtio-dev] Re: [PATCH 0/5] virtio: introduce
SUSPEND bit and vq state
On 9/20/2023 2:08 PM, Parav Pandit wrote:
From: Zhu, Lingshan<lingshan....@intel.com>
<mailto:lingshan....@intel.com>
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2023 11:36 AM
On 9/19/2023 2:49 AM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
On Mon, Sep 18, 2023 at 06:41:55PM +0000, Parav Pandit
wrote:
Please refer to the code for setting FEATURES_OK.
It wont work when one needs to suspend the device.
There is no point of doing such work over registers as
fundamental
framework is over the AQ.
Well not really. It's over admin commands. When these were
built the
intent always was that it's possible to use admin commands
through
another interface, other than admin queue. Is there a
problem
implementing admin commands over a memory BAR? For example,
I can see
an "admin command" capability pointing at a BAR where
commands are
supplied, and using a new group type referring to device
itself.
I am not sure, if a bar cap would be implemented as a proxy for
the admin vq
based live migration. then the problems of admin vq LM that we
have discussed
still exist. the bar is only a proxy, doesn't fix anything. and
even larger side
channel attacking surface: vf-->pf-->vf
AQ LM using PF has no side channel attack as hypervisor and owner
device is trusted entity as already discussed.
I believe we have discussed this for many times, and I even
provide you some examples.
Let me repeat for the last time.
There can be malicious SW on the host, and the host may be
hacked and compromised.
For example:
1) SUSPEND the a running guest by admin vq
2) dumping guest memory through admin vq dirty page tracking.
These above can happen right?
You made TDISP as an example, but have you really read the
TDISP spec?
In the spec:
Device Security Architecture - Administrative interfaces
(e.g., a PF) may be
used to influence the security properties of the TDI used by
the TVM.
TEE-I/O requires the device to organize its hardware/software
interfaces such that the PF cannot
be used to affect the security of a TDI when it is in use by a TVM
Clear?
