Craig A. Berry wrote:
At 7:38 AM -0400 10/6/05, John E. Malmberg wrote:
On VMS, it is possible logical names that are not in the EXEC or
higher privileged mode should be considered tainted, and ones that in
the EXEC mode or higher should not be, if I understand what tainting is
>> supposed to do.
I do not think that Perl on VMS is making that distinction now, and
I do not know how to implement such a change.
If you hunt on the word "secure" in vms/vms.c:Perl_vmsstrenv() you'll
see that something very much like what you describe is already in
place. There are various configure-time options controlling this as
well.
I will look at that.
Also the underlying C library still trusts the logicals names that
could be tainted, unless the Perl interpreter is installed with
privilege and attempts to dynamically load another image. In that
case logical names that could be modified by non-privileged users
are ignored.
The first thing Perl does when it starts up on VMS is disable image
privileges.
It has no way of removing the implied SYSPRV privilege when run from a
system group account. This means that a child process will still have it.
I have not yet done much testing of Perl under a privileged account. It
looks like a number of the network tests are being skipped because they
require privileges to run.
-John
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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