On 5/2/23 07:00, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
On Tue, May 02, 2023 at 06:43:33AM -0400, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
On 5/2/23 03:17, Jan Beulich wrote:
Unlike for XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo, where the XSM check is intended to
cause the operation to fail, in the loop here it ought to merely
determine whether information for the domain at hand may be reported
back. Therefore if on the last iteration the hook results in denial,
this should not affect the sub-op's return value.
Fixes: d046f361dc93 ("Xen Security Modules: XSM")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com>
---
The hook being able to deny access to data for certain domains means
that no caller can assume to have a system-wide picture when holding the
results.
Wouldn't it make sense to permit the function to merely "count" domains?
While racy in general (including in its present, "normal" mode of
operation), within a tool stack this could be used as long as creation
of new domains is suppressed between obtaining the count and then using
it.
In XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo2 said commit had introduced a 2nd such
issue, but luckily that sub-op and xsm_getpageframeinfo() are long gone.
I understand there is a larger issue at play here but neutering the security
control/XSM check is not the answer. This literally changes the way a FLASK
policy that people currently have would be enforced, as well as contrary to
how they understand the access control that it provides. Even though the
code path does not fall under XSM maintainer, I would NACK this patch. IMHO,
it is better to find a solution that does not abuse, misuse, or invalidate
the purpose of the XSM calls.
On a side note, I am a little concern that only one person thought to
include the XSM maintainer, or any of the XSM reviewers, onto a patch and
the discussion around a patch that clearly relates to XSM for us to gauge
the consequences of the patch. I am not assuming intentions here, only
wanting to raise the concern.
So for what it is worth, NACK.
I assume the NACK is to the remarks after the '---'?
The patch itself doesn't change the enforcement of the XSM checks,
just prevents returning an error when the information from the last
domain in the loop can not be fetched.
Am I missing something?
Actually, I should have finished my first cup of tea and looked closer
at the patch in the larger context instead of the description, as the
two do not align. You are correct, and provided I am not wrong here, the
change is a no-op formatting change that removes an intermediate
variable. I do not see how directly checking the return in an if versus
checking the return stored in a variable. Additionally, the claim is
that this occurs when XSM is enabled, which is also incorrect. The only
difference at this location in code between not having XSM enabled and
having it enabled is that for the latter, xsm_getdomaininfo() is an
in-lined version versus a function call. In either case, both will
return 0 unless you are using FLASK and have a policy blocking the
domain from making the call.
V/r,
Daniel P. Smith
