On 22.12.2025 17:37, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
> --- a/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/sbi.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/sbi.h
> @@ -14,6 +14,13 @@
>
> #include <xen/cpumask.h>
>
> +/* Xen-controlled SBI version reported to guests */
> +#define XEN_SBI_VER_MAJOR 0
> +#define XEN_SBI_VER_MINOR 2
Are these going to gain a 2nd use, justifying their placement here?
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/vsbi/base-extension.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
> +
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +
> +#include <xen/lib.h>
> +#include <xen/sched.h>
> +#include <xen/version.h>
> +
> +#include <asm/processor.h>
> +#include <asm/sbi.h>
> +#include <asm/vsbi.h>
> +
> +static int vsbi_base_ecall_handler(unsigned long eid, unsigned long fid,
> + struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
> +{
> + int ret = 0;
> + struct sbiret sbi_ret;
> +
> + ASSERT(eid == SBI_EXT_BASE);
> +
> + switch ( fid )
> + {
> + case SBI_EXT_BASE_GET_SPEC_VERSION:
> + regs->a1 = MASK_INSR(XEN_SBI_VER_MAJOR, SBI_SPEC_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK)
> |
> + XEN_SBI_VER_MINOR;
> + break;
> +
> + case SBI_EXT_BASE_GET_IMP_ID:
> + regs->a1 = SBI_XEN_IMPID;
> + break;
> +
> + case SBI_EXT_BASE_GET_IMP_VERSION:
> + regs->a1 = (xen_major_version() << 16) | xen_minor_version();
> + break;
> +
> + case SBI_EXT_BASE_GET_MVENDORID:
> + case SBI_EXT_BASE_GET_MARCHID:
> + case SBI_EXT_BASE_GET_MIMPID:
> + if ( is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
> + {
> + sbi_ret = sbi_ecall(SBI_EXT_BASE, fid, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
> + ret = sbi_ret.error;
> + regs->a1 = sbi_ret.value;
> + }
> + else
> + /*
> + * vSBI should present a consistent, virtualized view to guests.
> + * In particular, DomU-visible data must remain stable across
> + * migration and must not expose hardware-specific details.
> + *
> + * These register(s) must be readable in any implementation,
> + * but a value of 0 can be returned to indicate the field
> + * is not implemented.
> + */
> + regs->a1 = 0;
> +
> + break;
> +
> + case SBI_EXT_BASE_PROBE_EXT:
> + regs->a1 = vsbi_find_extension(regs->a0) ? 1 : 0;
> + break;
> +
> + default:
> + /*
> + * TODO: domain_crash() is acceptable here while things are still
> under
> + * development.
> + * It shouldn't stay like this in the end though: guests should not
> + * be punished like this for something Xen hasn't implemented.
> + */
> + domain_crash(current->domain,
> + "%s: Unsupported ecall: FID: #%lx, EID: #%lx\n",
Same remark here as for patch 2.
Jan
