BusinessDay.gif

 

Medupi mess is result of Numsa strategy

 

 

Albert Wocke, Business Day, Johannesburg, 16 August 2013

 

THE roots of the Medupi mess are to be found in a strategy by the National
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) and its "stage management" of
Eskom. The effect has been to undermine and almost nullify normal
employer-employee relations. The result is labour strife that began in 2010
and has been largely continuous since last September. Numsa has put pressure
on Eskom to squeeze concessions out of the contractors and ensure striking
workers experience few consequences for unprotected industrial action. All
the while, Numsa's power grows.

 

The problem lies in an agreement initially signed in December 2008. The
parties signed another, reviewed, version in 2010. The agreement deals with
the specific terms and conditions of employment at the Medupi project, to
which all employees there are bound, as well as the way certain disputes
should be resolved. As the agreement is intended to promote stability and
orderly interactions, a party cannot raise a demand independently of it.
Essentially, it was intended to guide all labour issues at Medupi, except
those related to salaries and conditions of service, as it was agreed the
workers would be subject to industry agreements. Despite this, the unions
and some employees have made demands and engaged in unprotected strikes.
Crucially, the role of Eskom was not clear as it was neither a signatory nor
party to the agreement.

 

The agreement was immediately undermined and ignored by Numsa members, who
have subsequently engaged in unprotected strike action almost weekly. Strike
action at Medupi has followed a familiar pattern over the past year: a
wildcat strike begins at one of the contractors about an issue that should
have been dealt with in terms of the agreement. While the contractor tries
to resolve the matter, the strike spreads to Numsa members who are employed
by other contractors, and the whole site is affected. If the whole site
cannot be mobilised to join the strike, the employees use violence or
threats and destruction of property, which in turn leads to Eskom shutting
down the site for safety reasons. The strike usually ends when Eskom
intervenes and an agreement is reached in which Eskom requires contractors
to suspend disciplinary procedures. In some cases it has also led to the
payment of bonuses to get employees back to work.

 

The strategy is frighteningly simple and effective in shifting the normal
employer-trade union relationship to favour Numsa. It requires a pliable
Eskom management willing to intervene between the contractor and employee.
The continued success of the strategy also requires disputes, even minor
ones, to be escalated across the site and for the site to be regularly shut
down. In this way, Numsa forces Eskom to put pressure on the contractors to
concede to its demands. Contractors are on occasion prevented from
dismissing workers and have to pay amounts agreed by Eskom to get the people
back to work.

 

One would have thought Eskom and the contractors would have identified this
strategy by now, but it is clear they have not. In fact, the employers,
under pressure from Eskom management, are formalising the way things are
done at Medupi (and Kusile). The contractors, trade unions and Eskom have
replaced the agreement with a "final partnership agreement", which now
includes Eskom. It also says employees at the sites are covered by
industry-agreed wages and conditions of service, but sets up site-wide
forums for further collective bargaining and consultation. This time,
Eskom's role is unambiguous because Eskom manages the process.

 

Thus, Numsa's strategy is formalised, creating another two forums in which
it is able to press Eskom but, more directly, to squeeze concessions out of
the contractors. In addition, the new structures virtually guarantee that
disputes become site-wide. As a result, contractors are in a situation where
they no longer have an employer-employee relationship with their staff and
have to operate with the continued threat of interference.

 

The influence and bargaining power of Numsa depends on bypassing the
contractors completely and putting pressure on Eskom directly. The battles
between the National Union of Mineworkers and Numsa for membership in Eskom
and the construction of Medupi and Kusile will add to the already complex
environment. This is a management headache that will only get worse if
political will and management fortitude are missing.

 

.        Wocke is an associate professor at the University of Pretoria's
Gordon Institute of Business Science.

 

From:
http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/08/16/medupi-mess-is-result-of-numsa-st
rategy#
<http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/08/16/medupi-mess-is-result-of-numsa-s
trategy> 

 

 

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