Book Review: THE END OF POVERTY 
Economic Possibilities for Our Time, By Jeffrey D. Sachs

Reviewed by William Easterly
Washington Post | March 13, 2005
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25562-2005Mar10.html?sub=
new

 
Jeffrey D. Sachs's guided tour to the poorest regions of the Earth is
enthralling and maddening at the same time -- enthralling, because his
eloquence and compassion make you care about some very desperate people;
maddening, because he offers solutions that range all the way from
practical to absurd. It's a shame that Sachs's prescriptions are
unconvincing because he is resoundingly right about the tragedy of world
poverty. As he puts it, newspapers should (but don't) report every
morning, "More than 20,000 people perished yesterday of extreme
poverty." 

That appalling toll has given Sachs his life's mission. Two themes recur
in his long career of advising heads of state in poor nations, which he
chronicles in fascinating detail in this book. First is his favored
approach of "shock therapy" (a term he dislikes but has found impossible
to shake): a comprehensive package of economic reforms that attempts to
fix all problems simultaneously and quickly. Second is his conviction
that the West should always give a lot of money to support these
packages. These two themes unify a book that sometimes seems like a
disparate collection of Sachs's adventures in Bolivia, Poland, Russia
and Africa on issues ranging from stopping high inflation, leaping from
communism to capitalism, canceling Third World debt, curing malaria and
AIDS, and now eliminating poverty in Africa and everywhere else. 

Over the past two decades, Sachs has simply been the world's greatest
economic reformer. It's perhaps fitting that he has enlisted Bono, the
lead singer of U2 and development activist, to pen an introduction: the
rock star as economist meets the economist as rock star. Perhaps someone
so gifted and hardworking can be forgiven if his narrative is a little
self-serving -- for instance, when he portrays his plans as responsible
for early successes in Bolivia and Poland. At the same time, he prefers
a more complicated analysis for the failures in which he was involved,
like the chaos in Russia, later stagnation in Bolivia and Africa's
perpetual crisis (their geography was bad, they didn't follow his
advice, the West didn't give them enough aid, etc.). 

The climax of The End of Poverty is Sachs's far-reaching plan to end
world poverty -- a sort of Great Leap Forward. His characteristically
comprehensive approach to eliminating world poverty derives from his
conviction that everything depends on everything else -- that, for
instance, you cannot cure poverty in Africa without beating AIDS, which
requires infrastructure, which requires stable government, and so forth.


Social reformers have found two ways to respond to this complexity; Karl
Popper summed them up best a half-century ago as "utopian social
engineering" versus "piecemeal democratic reform." Sachs is the
intellectual leader of the utopian camp. To end world poverty once and
for all, he offers a detailed Big Plan that covers just about
everything, in mind-numbing technical jargon, from planting
nitrogen-fixing leguminous trees to replenish soil fertility, to
antiretroviral therapy for AIDS, to specially programmed cell phones to
provide real-time data to health planners, to rainwater harvesting, to
battery-charging stations and so on. Sachs proposes that the U.N.
secretary general personally run the overall plan, coordinating the
actions of thousands of officials in six U.N. agencies, U.N. country
teams, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Sachs's Big
Plan would launch poor countries out of a "poverty trap" and end world
poverty by 2025, as the book's title advertises. The world's rich
countries would pay for a large share of the Big Plan -- somehow doing
an exact financial "Needs Assessment," seeing how much poor country
governments can pay and then having rich donors pay the rest. The donors
will fill what he calls the "financing gap" by doubling donor-nation
foreign aid in 2006, then nearly doubling it again by 2015. 

What's the alternative? The piecemeal reform approach (which his book
opposes) would humbly acknowledge that nobody can fully grasp the
complexity of the political, social, technological, ecological and
economic systems that underlie poverty. It would eschew the arrogance
that "we" know exactly how to fix "them." It would shy away from the
hubris of what he labels the "breathtaking opportunity" that "we" have
to spread democracy, technology, prosperity and perpetual peace to the
entire planet. Large-scale crash programs, especially by outsiders,
often produce unintended consequences. The simple dreams at the top run
afoul of insufficient knowledge of the complex realities at the bottom.
The Big Plans are impossible to evaluate scientifically afterward. Nor
can you hold any specific agency accountable for their success or
failure. Piecemeal reform, by contrast, motivates specific actors to
take small steps, one at a time, then tests whether that small step made
poor people better off, holds accountable the agency that implemented
the small step, and considers the next small step. 

What's the evidence on how well the two approaches work? Sachs pays
surprisingly little attention to the history of aid approaches and
results. He seems unaware that his Big Plan is strikingly similar to the
early ideas that inspired foreign aid in the 1950s and '60s. Just like
Sachs, development planners then identified countries caught in a
"poverty trap," did an assessment of how much they would need to make a
"big push" out of poverty and into growth, and called upon foreign aid
to fill the "financing gap" between countries' own resources and needs.
This legacy has influenced the bureaucratic approach to economic
development that's been followed ever since -- albeit with some lip
service to free markets -- by the World Bank, regional development
banks, national aid agencies like USAID and the U.N. development
agencies. Spending $2.3 trillion (measured in today's dollars) in aid
over the past five decades has left the most aid-intensive regions, like
Africa, wallowing in continued stagnation; it's fair to say this
approach has not been a great success. (By the way, utopian social
engineering does not just fail for the left; in Iraq, it's not working
too well now for the right either.) 

Meanwhile, some piecemeal interventions have brought success.
Vaccination campaigns, oral rehydration therapy to prevent diarrhea and
other aid-financed health programs have likely contributed to a fall in
infant mortality in every region, including Africa. Aid projects have
probably helped increase access to primary and secondary education,
clean water and sanitation. Perhaps it is also easier to hold aid
agencies accountable for results in these tangible areas. (Many of
Sachs's specific recommendations might make sense as piecemeal reforms
-- i.e., if done one at a time in small steps, with subsequent
evaluation and accountability.) 

Indeed, the broader development successes of recent decades, most of
them in Asia, happened without the Big Plan -- and without significant
foreign aid as a proportion of the recipient country's income. Gradual
free market reforms in China and India in the 1980s and '90s (which
Sachs implausibly argues were shock therapy in disguise) have brought
rapid growth. Moreover, the West itself achieved gradual success through
piecemeal democratic and market reforms over many centuries, not through
top-down Big Plans offered by outsiders. Do we try out shock therapy
only on the powerless poor? 

"Success in ending the poverty trap," Sachs writes, "will be much easier
than it appears." Really? If it's so easy, why haven't five decades of
effort gotten the job done? Sachs should redirect some of his outrage at
the question of why the previous $2.3 trillion didn't reach the poor so
that the next $2.3 trillion does. In fact, ending poverty is not easy at
all. In those five decades, poverty researchers have learned a great
deal about the complexity of toxic politics, bad history (including
exploitative or inept colonialism), ethnic and regional conflicts,
elites' manipulation of politics and institutions, official corruption,
dysfunctional public services, malevolent police forces and armies, the
difficulty of honoring contracts and property rights, unaccountable and
excessively bureaucratic donors and many other issues. Sachs, however,
sees these factors as relatively unimportant. Indeed, he seems deaf to
the babble and bungling of the U.N. agencies he calls upon to run the
Big Plan, not to mention other unaccountable and ineffectual aid
agencies. 

So, in Sachs's eyes, what does matter in producing poverty? His book
blames the perception of bad government in Africa on racial prejudice in
the West, an insult to the many courageous Africans who have protested
against their often appalling rulers. To Sachs, poverty reduction is
mostly a scientific and technological issue (hence the technical jargon
above), in which aid dollars can buy cheap interventions to fix
development problems. 

But that's too neat. What about the World Bank studies in Guinea,
Cameroon, Uganda and Tanzania, which estimated that 30 to 70 percent of
government drugs disappeared into the black market rather than reaching
the patients? Sachs calls for huge increases in aid to his favorite
countries, like Malawi and Ethiopia, overlooking inconvenient factors
such as the worsening of Malawi's famine because corrupt officials sold
off its strategic grain reserves and because autocratic Ethiopian rulers
have favored their own minority Tigrean ethnic group. Sachs is right
that bad government is not disproportionately an African problem;
democracy has been making progress in Africa, while rulers in
Azerbaijan, Cambodia and Turkmenistan make some African autocrats look
like Thomas Jefferson. But Sachs's anti-poverty prescriptions rest
heavily on the kindness of some pretty dysfunctional regimes, not to
mention the famously inefficient international aid bureaucracy. 

Perhaps we can excuse these allegedly easy-to-achieve dreams as the
tactics of a fundraiser for the poor -- someone who's out to galvanize
public opinion to back dramatically higher aid abroad. Sachs was born to
play the role of fundraiser. And it's easier to feel good about his
sometimes simplistic sales pitch for foreign aid if it leads to spending
more dollars on desperately poor people, as opposed to, say, wasteful
weapons systems. 

The danger is that when the utopian dreams fail (as they will again),
the rich-country public will get even more disillusioned about foreign
aid. Sachs rightly notes that we need not worry whether the pathetic
amount of current U.S. foreign aid -- little more than a 10th of a penny
for every dollar of U.S. income -- is wasted. Foreign aid's prospects
will brighten only if aid agencies become more accountable for results,
and demonstrate to the public that some piecemeal interventions improve
the lives of desperate people. So yes, do read Sachs's eloquent
descriptions of poverty and his compelling ethical case for the rich to
help the poor. Just say no to the Big Plan.

------------------------------
William Easterly, a professor of economics at New York University, is
the author of "The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and
Misadventures in the Tropics."





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