The unravelling of Bretton Woods - II
  By Manas Chakravarthy,
  Business Standard | March 28, 2005
  http://www.business-standard.com/common/storypage.php?
storyflag=y&leftnm=lmnu5&leftindx=5&lselect=2&chklogin=N&autono=18453
5

Asian central banks are diversifying away from the dollar.  
  
Foreign institutional inflows have risen sharply after the Union 
Budget. Emerging Portfolio Fund Research says that equity flows to 
emerging markets in February have been the highest in a month ever 
since they started tracking fund flows in 1995.  
  
Even among emerging markets, portfolio flows to India have been very 
high, thanks to large bets being placed on the structural 
transformation of the Indian economy. That rosy scenario for 
emerging markets may now be in danger, with rising US interest 
rates, slowing fund flows and a stronger dollar.  
  
Foreign institutional investor (FII) flows have also had an enormous 
influence on the debt and currency market. The dollar inflows have 
resulted in upward pressure on the rupee, and the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI) has had to buy dollars hand over fist in an effort to 
keep the rupee down.  
  
This has in turn led not only to a rapid increase in forex reserves, 
but also to higher liquidity in the money markets, as the dollar 
buying by the RBI releases rupees into the system. The upshot has 
been a cap on interest rates, in spite of record credit offtake.  
  
It is not just the equity markets that will be affected should the 
foreign inflows slow down. We all know what happened in January, 
when a sudden strengthening of the dollar was enough to spook the 
market.  
  
So what can spoil the party? Many economists, Morgan Stanley's 
Stephen Roach among them, have for long been pointing to the 
mounting global imbalances, with the bloated US current account 
deficit being the main point of concern.  
  
The argument is simple � central banks in Asia, notably those of 
Japan and China, have been financing the US current account deficit 
and losing money in the bargain, because the dollar has been 
falling.  
  
There will come a time, so warn these economists, that Asians will 
no longer be willing to recycle their dollars to the US. The dollar 
will then plunge, US interest rates will rise, the overextended 
mortgage market in the US will collapse, and the US economy will 
slump.  
  
Needless to say, risky assets like emerging market equity and debt 
will be dumped. And since America has been the engine of the world's 
economy, the rest of the world will then follow the US into an 
economic Armageddon.  
  
Bretton Woods -- II 
That argument seemed very logical, but when years passed without the 
feared meltdown, people started wondering whether things were 
different this time. In a seminal paper in 2003, economists Michael 
Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber said that the present 
system was a second Bretton Woods, a system that allowed the 
emerging economies to develop.  
  
They pointed to the parallels with Bretton Woods, when Europe and 
Japan maintained undervalued currencies and controls on capital 
movements and built up forex reserves from their exports to the US, 
while the US maintained open markets.  
  
These economists point out that the Asian central banks, by funding 
the US current account deficit, are essentially ensuring export 
markets for their countries.  
  
Of course, Asian central banks may be making losses on their dollar 
holdings, but, according to Dooley, Landau and Garber, "it has been 
a successful development strategy to subordinate the objective of 
maximising the value of reserve assets in order to subsidise and 
build a domestic capital stock capable of competing in international 
markets."  
  
If the strategy is so rational, will the limits of such a build up 
of forex reserves ever be reached? Yes, it will, but far in the 
future, when these emerging economies are no longer part of 
the "periphery" but have graduated to the centre, just like Europe 
and Japan before them. Bretton Woods Two is, according to these 
economists, a rational development strategy in the age of 
globalisation.  
  
Dumping the dollar 
But the proof of the pudding lies in the eating. Recent data 
released by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) point out 
that deposits placed abroad by Asian banks have been "increasingly 
denominated in currencies other than the US dollar".  
  
For the region as a whole, the share of dollar-denominated deposits 
fell from 81 per cent in the third quarter of 2001 to 67 per cent in 
the third quarter of 2004.  
  
This shift was most evident for Indian banks, whose share of dollar-
denominated deposits to their total deposits fell from 68 to 43 per 
cent in the last three years, while China's share fell from 83 to 68 
per cent, remaining more or less around 68 per cent since the third 
quarter of 2002. An earlier BIS report had pointed out that dollar-
denominated deposits of west Asian banks had also declined 
significantly in the last three years.  
  
Nevertheless, the BIS emphasises that "dollar-denominated deposits 
placed by banks in the region continue to rise in absolute terms 
suggesting, at most, that the currency shift described above is 
taking place at the margin." It's also worth remembering the data 
doesn't include Japan, which has the world's largest forex reserves. 
Nor does it include Hong Kong and Singapore.  
  
The BIS report also says that Asian currencies no longer form a 
dollar bloc. Academics who supported the Bretton Woods Two argument 
had said that effectively the east Asian currencies constituted a 
dollar bloc because of their interest in pegging their currencies to 
the dollar, in order to keep their exports to the US competitive.  
  
The BIS, however, finds that turnover in Asian currencies has been 
rising in recent years and intra-regional trade too is increasing. 
Consequently, "a broad-basket effective exchange rate orientation 
may be gaining prominence". Putting it simply, the dollar is no 
longer quite as important as it used to be in Asia.  
  
Also, US treasury data for December 2004 showed that official net 
purchases of US securities fell to a mere $10.3 billion, down from $ 
27.9 billion in the previous month. Net private purchases in 
December, however, at $72.6 billion, were at more or less the same 
level as in the previous month.  
  
But then, although foreign official (read central bank) purchase of 
US securities was low in December, it had been even lower in July 
and had bounced back. One month does not a trend make. What's more, 
net private foreign purchases were much higher than in most months 
during 2004. Total net purchases, at $82.9 billion in December, 
although lower than November's $100.7 billion, were substantially 
higher than in July, August, September and October.  
  
Moreover, despite a steadily declining dollar, net US securities 
purchased by foreigners in 2004 amounted to $915.8 billion, well 
above 2003's $745.9 billion or 2002's $ 547.6 billion. The data, at 
least, do not show any strong aversion for US assets among 
foreigners.  
  
That's corroborated by the latest Treasury data for January, which 
shows foreign purchases of US securities at $92.5 billion, with both 
private flows as well as official flows well above the December 
level. While the inflows are more than enough to finance January's 
$58.3 billion trade deficit, much of the inflows have been by hedge 
funds, which is no prescription for stability.  
  
While the BIS data show the trend in diversification away from the 
dollar over the past three years, and explains the fall in the value 
of the dollar over the period, the numbers from the US Treasury do 
show a deceleration in the accretion of foreign holdings by Asian 
central banks. This deceleration has speeded up the dollar decline.  
  
Diversification 
That is backed up by plenty of talk by central banking authorities 
throughout Asia. China has drawn down its forex reserves to 
recapitalise its banks, Thailand has drawn up a plan to fund 
infrastructure using forex reserves, as has India.  
  
The South Korean central bank inadvertently made public its plan for 
diversifying its reserves out of the dollar, a plan which it was, 
however, quick to deny when the dollar plunged. The Chinese 
authorities too have frequently said that they need to do the same.  
  
On Thursday, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's assertion that Japan 
will diversify its assets away from the dollar sparked a sell-off in 
the greenback. What's more, bond yields, and mortgage rates, have 
started moving up in the US.  
  
Of course, there are also many forces holding up the dollar. The 
strength of the US economy could once again lure private investors 
back to the US, and the January Treasury data do in fact show strong 
private inflows.  
  
Rising US interest rates could also prop up the greenback. And 
finally, every central bank has a vested interest in a soft landing 
for the world's reserve currency � as the Bretton Woods Two 
proponents point out, Asian countries derive strong benefits from 
the present system.  
  
Perhaps all that will happen is a gradual depreciation of the 
dollar, which will continue to be positive for emerging market 
assets, till higher US interest rates finally bite. But there are 
now more and more signs that Bretton Woods Two is slowly but surely 
unravelling.  









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