The End of Poverty: An Interview with Jeffrey Sachs
  By Onnesha Roychoudhuri 

  One of the world's top economists offers a blueprint for 
transforming the developing world. 
  
  Mother Jones | May 6, 2005 
  http://www.motherjones.com/news/qa/2005/05/jeffrey_sachs.html 


In February of this year, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
remarked: "We will not defeat terrorism unless we also tackle the 
causes of conflict and misgovernment in developing countries. And we 
will not defeat poverty so long as trade and investment in any major 
part of the world are inhibited by fear of violence or instability." 
The point was that a broader global security strategy needed to go 
hand in hand with a poverty reduction strategy. To that end, the UN 
set about drawing up its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Adopted by all member countries in 2000, the MDGs aim to achieve 
everything from eradicating extreme poverty to ensuring universal 
primary education and basic health care access, all by the year 2015.

In order to figure out how to reach these goals, Annan organized a 
panel of over 250 development experts to lay out practical 
strategies for promoting rapid development. Headed by economist 
Jeffrey Sachs, the panel published their final report in January of 
2005. The report calls for both an increase in aid from Western 
countries and a reallocation of funding priorities in the developing 
countries themselves. The report also calls for more aid to be given 
on a local level. By bypassing governments, the UN hopes to spark 
more immediate and effective development. For instance, in one test 
case conducted in Kenya, UN funding went straight to the village of 
Sauri, where the schools were able to provide much-needed food for 
their students, and hence jumped in ranking from 68th to 7th in the 
district.

Shortly after the release of the UN report came the publication of 
Sachs' book, The End of Poverty, in which he laid out his own 
strategies for eradicating poverty by 2025. Sachs, who gained renown 
for advising Latin American and Asian governments on economic 
reform, has gained popularity as "can-do" economist amidst a 
cacophony of naysayers on development. But his optimistic attitude 
has also attracted quite a bit of skepticism. Why is it that decades 
of development economics haven't achieved the elimination of 
poverty? What makes Sachs' proposals so special? Is eradicating 
poverty a feasible goal to achieve in our lifetime? Sachs recently 
sat down with Mother Jones to discuss these issues.

Mother Jones: What makes your plan to end poverty so different from 
the development efforts that were tried in the 1950s and 60s? Why 
hasn't five decades worth of development work been very successful 
thus far?

Jeffrey Sachs: I think so far there's been a lack of appropriate 
effort, which includes many things. For development to work, rich 
countries need to help poor countries make certain practical 
investments that are often really very basic. Once you get your head 
around development issues and realize how solvable many of them are, 
there are tremendous things that can be done. But for decades we 
just haven't tried to do many of these basic things. For instance, 
one issue that has been tragically neglected for decades now is 
malaria. That's a disease that kills up to 3 million people every 
year. It's a disease that could be controlled quite dramatically and 
easily if we just put in the effort. It's truly hard for me to 
understand why we aren't. 

MJ: What do you say to critics who argue that it's a waste to put 
more money into a development system that hasn't used that money 
very effectively thus far?

JS: Well, we have to be smart about whatever we're doing. But I'm 
quite convinced that, broadly speaking, economic development works. 
The main arguments of the Millennium Project Report, and the main 
argument of my book is that there are certain places on the planet 
that, because of various circumstances�geographical isolation, 
burden of disease, climate, or soil�these countries just can't quite 
get started. So it's a matter of helping them get started, whether 
to grow more food or to fight malaria or to handle recurring 
droughts. Then, once they're on the first rung of the ladder of 
development, they'll start climbing just like the rest of the world.

MJ: So do you believe that past efforts, to get these less-developed 
countries on the "first rung," haven't been pragmatic enough?

JS: Part of it is that many of these countries are invisible places, 
neglected by us politically, neglected by our business firms, by 
international markets, and by trade. We tend to focus on these 
countries only when they're in such extraordinary crises that they 
get shown on CNN because they're in a deep drought or a massive war, 
which is something that impoverished countries are much more prone 
to falling to. There haven't been too many stories in our press 
about Senegal, Ghana, Tanzania, Malawi, or Ethiopia, other than when 
the disasters hit. And yet these are places that are in very deep 
trouble all of the time, but with largely solvable problems. And 
those are the kinds of the places that I'm talking about as being 
stuck in extreme poverty.

MJ: If there's been no real effort to draw the world's attention to 
those places, is there any hope that funding will go there?

JS: The world got side-tracked from development issues during the 
post-9/11 crisis period. During the war in Iraq there were bitter 
divisions in the world community, and the idea of being able to 
focus on the problems of extreme poverty or malaria or drought and 
chronic hunger in Africa were just not at the top of the world's 
debate. 

But I think the tsunami in the Indian Ocean last December, in which 
we could all see the scope of the devastation on our television 
screens, shifted discussion towards the plight of the world's poor. 
So now there are some positive signs. Tony Blair has pushed for an 
Africa Commission which just produced a report in March that focuses 
on poorest of the poor in Africa. There will be a UN poverty summit 
this September which is predicted to be the largest gathering of 
world leaders in history. And I'm traveling extensively around the 
world talking about these issues. So I think that even in our 
country, there is a growing discussion. 

MJ: I know that former World Bank employee and economist William 
Easterly has criticized your proposals and called for what he terms 
a "piecemeal reform" approach in which development efforts are 
carried out one step at a time, with subsequent evaluation. What is 
your response to this? 

JS: Basically, I don't think that we should be choosing between 
whether a young girl has immunizations or water, or between whether 
her mother and father are alive, because they have access of 
treatment for AIDS, or whether she has a meal at school, or whether 
her father and mother, who are farmers, are able to grow enough food 
to feed their family and earn some income. Those all strike me as 
quite doable and practical things that can be done at once. 

I make the analogy that farmers, to grow their food, need good soil, 
sunshine, proper rain, and heat. If you don't one of those, even if 
you have the other three, your crop is still not going to grow. A 
lot of life in a poor village is like that. If you have a clinic but 
you don't have safe drinking water, or if you have safe drinking 
water and a clinic, but you don't have bed nets to fight malaria, 
you just don't get the kind of needs met and the basic quality of 
life that gives you a chance. I think that Bill Easterly 
misunderstands what I propose. I'm not proposing a single global 
plan dictated by some UN central command. Quite the opposite, I'm 
proposing that we help people help themselves. This can be done 
without legions of people rushing over to these countries to build 
houses and schools. This is what people in their own communities can 
do if we give them the resources to do it.

MJ: Part of Easterly's argument is that if you implement different 
strategies all at once, it will be difficult to isolate and 
understand which strategies worked effectively, and which did not. 
Do you share this concern?

JS: I have been working with over 250 of my colleagues on the 
Millennium Development Report. Everybody here is an expert on a 
different thing. The soil scientists really know a lot about how to 
improve soil nutrients and the doctors really know a lot about how 
to keep children alive. The malariologists really know how to 
control malaria and the hydrologists really know how to get safe 
drinking water in a community. One doesn't have to test whether it's 
good to have more food production, or malaria bed nets or doctors or 
teachers. These are proven technologies. If we were introducing 
something new, that would be different, but ours is not an approach 
based on new discoveries, this is an approach based on the best of 
proven technologies. 

MJ: Some critics have expressed concern that the Millennium Goals 
may set unrealistic targets for certain countries. What if those 
countries fail to meet the specified level of development and then 
disillusioned donors decide to lower their funding? 

JS: First, it should be understood that the goals in most cases are 
set proportionate to a given country's situation. So we'll reduce by 
2/3 the child mortality rate, or by 3/4 the maternal mortality rate. 
We're not aiming at the same absolute standard in every country. I 
think that the other thing that is really important to understand is 
that as I have been working with the UN on this for the last 3 years 
and meeting leaders all over the world. What I've found is that 
their concern isn't that the goals are too high. Exactly the 
opposite: They actually want these UN goals, they want them to be 
ambitious, and they want to be held to account. And they want their 
development partners, the developed world, to be held to account on 
following through on commitments. Again, this all goes towards 
pressuring rich nations to set aside 0.7 percent of GNP for 
development aid. That is not a goal that I set, or that the UN set, 
this is a goal that was adopted 35 years ago by the world community 
and the goal that was set again in the Monterrey consensus signed by 
the U.S. in 2002.

MJ: What about aid being sent to countries that have a serious 
problem with corruption? Some have argued that large amounts of aid 
will merely prop up those regimes. Can poverty be eradicated while 
corrupt politicians are in office?

JS: My experience is that there's corruption everywhere: in the 
U.S., in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa. It's a bit like infectious 
disease�you can control it, but it's very hard to eradicate it. And 
yes, there are some cases where the corruption is so massive that 
unless you are really, really clever and come up with some radically 
new approach to the issue, you're going to have a hard time 
accomplishing many development goals. It's quite hard in a place 
like Zimbabwe, now, where the current government, in a quite 
despicable way, clings to power. Or, in a country where there is 
absolutely no transparency or where you have a family ruling 
violently to stay in power. It's very hard to do a lot of the things 
that really need to be done to build an effective school system, a 
health system, and so on. I don't have any magic solution for those 
situations.

But, let me note that the world successfully eradicated small pox, 
and not just in countries that scored high on a governance index but 
in all parts of the world. This was an international effort which 
targeted a specific outcome undertaken by professionals using a 
proven technology and a very extensive monitoring system. And that's 
the general model for our aid proposals. Nothing is done on trust. 
Everything should be done on a basis of measurement and monitoring. 
When you really focus, there are so many ways to be clever about how 
to do this to make it work better. Don't just send money; send bed 
nets, send in auditors, make targets quantitative. There are a lot 
of tricks, a lot of ways, that if one is practical about this, one 
can get results. 

But what happens is that everyone's wringing their hands about 
corruption without trying to solve practical problems. And right 
now, we're not even helping the well-governed places, the places 
where we are capable of finding absolutely practical and effective 
approaches to turning help into real success on the ground. The 
basic issue is not to lecture about morality and governance. The 
basic issue is, is there a way for us to help to fight AIDS, TB, 
malaria, and other killers which are taking an incredible number of 
lives? I've seen these children dying, each time I visit these 
clinics. And these are absolutely preventable deaths.

MJ: Now you suggest in your book that we need to assess ailing 
economies just as doctors assess patients. You call it "clinical 
economics." Does the current academic curriculum for development 
economics provide a sufficient framework for educating people to 
ensure that the MDGs will be achieved by future economists?

JS: No it doesn't. I realized 10 or 15 years ago that the students 
in economics departments write dissertations about countries that 
they never stepped foot in because their advisor gives them a 
database from Nigeria or Kenya or some place else, and they do their 
thesis that way. That's like becoming a doctor without ever seeing a 
patient. We don't do case studies. We don't train students to 
understand the differences across countries. There are a tremendous 
number of loose generalizations made all the time

Similarly, people aren't trained in the practical experiences of 
being operational. Sometimes people say, "We teach academic things, 
we don't teach operational things." But, frankly, to do development 
right, you have to do something that's more like going through 
medical school and having a clinical hospital where you actually 
learn about different cases, and do case analyses. When something 
goes wrong, you study it. There are what are called "M&M rounds" in 
hospitals�morbidity and mortality rounds. When something doesn't 
work, when a patient dies or doesn't get better, the doctors get 
together to discuss the case. We don't do that in academic 
economics. For me, the field is not properly organized right now to 
really take on these challenges adequately and I'm hoping that the 
field will become more like a clinical science.

MJ: In your book, you recount some of your experiences in developing 
countries. In one passage you note, "One day in Goni's office we 
were brainstorming and hit on the idea of establishing an emergency 
social fund that would direct money to the poorest communities to 
help finance local infrastructure like water harvesting, or 
irrigation, or road improvements. I picked up the phone and called 
the World Bank. Katherine Marshall, the head of the Bolivia team at 
the Bank immediately responded, "You're right, let's do this." Why 
is it that a whole World Bank team specializing in Bolivia hadn't 
come up with the idea that you had? 

JS: Well, sometimes they have ideas, sometimes I have ideas. It just 
so happened in this case that the idea came from me. But I do feel 
that in Washington over the last 25 years, especially during this 
era called "the structural adjustment era," there hasn't been a lot 
of actual problem-solving. There has been a lot of concern about 
budget-saving on the part of the rich countries. A lot of what was 
really happening in Washington had a subtext: "Keep poor people away 
from our taxpayers, tell them to tighten their belts, tell them to 
solve their own problems, tell them to keep sending their debt 
payments to us." 

It was, in my view, a very unhappy and unsatisfactory period and 
there were, no doubt, a lot of creative people that were prepared to 
do a lot of things but they weren't given assignments to do that. I 
was absolutely shocked and aghast when I learned that in the late 
1990s the World Bank and other donors weren't paying a penny to help 
treat people dying of AIDS.

Rarely do rich countries say, "Look, we're just not prepared to 
spend money to save poor people's lives." Instead, you get a lot of 
skepticism. "You can't do this, this is impossible. We're doing 
everything we can after all. We've tried everything. Let's go 
slowly. Let's do one thing at a time." I don't buy those arguments. 
I think that they all essentially stem from a vision that has been 
forced on the professional staff of these agencies because they have 
no money to spend. And they have no money to spend because in the 
end, the United States and other rich countries aren't giving them 
the resources to enable them to think ambitiously enough. One of the 
reasons why that is, is because the American people think we're 
doing everything we can be doing and frankly because they're told 
that there's nothing more we can do.

MJ: Do you think the U.S. will ever agree to dedicate 0.7 percent of 
its GNP to development aid? 

JS: I don't think that any leading politician believes we're going 
to do that right now. It's not the conventional wisdom. The way it's 
going to happen is if the public tells the politicians, "Yes, we 
want to do this, we want to follow through on our word, it's good 
for us, and it's good for the world."

I've found in talks and discussion about the Millennium Project that 
people are very surprised to find out what the U.S. is and is not 
doing vis-�-vis the world's poor. Opinion surveys show, and I find 
this verified in audiences, e-mails, and discussion groups, that 
people tend to overestimate U.S. assistance efforts, usually by a 
factor of about 25 or 30. People think that we give several percent 
of our annual income and several percent, maybe even a quarter of 
budget to foreign aid and they're shocked to find out that it's 
actually much less than 1 percent of our budget. They're shocked to 
find that throughout Africa, the kind of practical investments that 
I'm talking about run to about 1 penny out of every $100 of our GNP. 
They can't believe it, but that's the unfortunate situation. When 
they find that out, and they see that we're spending $500 billion on 
the military and only about $1 to $2 billion on investments in 
Africa, they're concerned because I think that they feel this is 
probably not the best choice for America.

MJ: What do you think of two recent proposed strategies�President 
Bush's Millennium Challenge Accounts (MCA), and Britain's 
International Financing Fund (IFF), proposed by Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown�as means of promoting global development?

JS: They're both good ideas. But by now, the MCA was supposed to 
have dispersed $1.7 billion dollars, $3.3 billion in the second 
year, and $5 billion in the third year. It has missed all its 
targets. In three years, it's only committed about $100 million 
dollars to one project. It has not yet been turned into a reality. 

Brown's is also a very good idea. Unfortunately the U.S. basically 
said "no" to participation in that. I think the European countries 
will undertake the IFF, but not with any U.S. support. But the IFF 
is a very good concept�the idea is that Britain and six other 
countries have announced a timetable to reach a goal of dedicating 
0.7 percent of their GNP to development by the year 2015. So what 
this would do is allow them actually to borrow against the rising 
trend so that they could frontload some of the money. 

What the Africa Commission, the Millennium Development Report, the 
World Bank and IMF have all found is that right now poor countries 
could usefully absorb a tremendous increase of money and use it 
properly. The IMF and World Bank recently released a report called 
the Global Monitoring Report which said that aid should be doubled. 
There is a professional understanding that the money is needed to 
break the poverty trap and save lives and that the money can be 
effectively used.

o o o o o 
Onnesha Roychoudhuri is an editorial fellow at Mother Jones. 






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