Danger of Hedge Funds
 
  FII Inflows and Regulatory Helplessness 
 
  Our political establishment is taking grave risks in allowing 
unrestricted FII inflows without appropriate disclosure and 
scrutiny. We cannot afford the luxury of waiting indefinitely till 
good sense dawns on the US regulatory and political establishments. 
We should therefore take the lead for concerted action by the 
developing countries, for in the coming months it is the currencies 
of these countries and some of their major corporate players that 
could be the obvious targets of hedge funds. The barbarians have 
crossed the gate and are inside our arena. Where is our strategy to 
discipline them? 
 
  By DN Ghosh  
  Economic and Political Weekly : August 20, 2005
  http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.php?
root=2005&leaf=08&filename=9007&filetype=html


It was last January that Reserve Bank of India governor Y V Reddy 
hinted, though somewhat indirectly, at the dangers of an 
unrestricted flow of foreign funds into our market and wondered 
whether imposition of quantitative restrictions was one of the 
options that should be explored in the interest of market stability. 
Finance minister P Chidambaram immediately reacted, ruling out any 
possibility of placing restrictions on inflows. This was to be 
expected. The dull, stodgy and incestuous clubs of politicians of 
yesteryears are now transformed institutions. They feel that they 
are well-equipped to handle vast sums pouring in from abroad. A 
talking point for our ruling politicians is that the country has at 
long last emerged as one of the preferred destinations for hard 
headed international fund managers.

Are the regulators comfortable with the large inflow of funds? The 
surge of money can be a source of endless worry about macroeconomic 
stability. Two kinds of concerns about the possible impact on the 
stock market are apparent. First, what kind of money are the global 
players bringing in? The world over regulators are deeply concerned 
about the recycling and redeployment of huge funds which originate 
from activities that threaten the roots of society. Second, what 
kind of investors are they? What are the objectives and strategies 
of these global players? Some of them, particularly hedge funds, are 
extremely secretive and opaque in their operations; that is their 
trade mark. As more and more hedge funds choose to enter the new 
markets that are gradually opening up, regulators are caught in a 
crippling dilemma: Should they allow these funds to come in freely, 
accepting implicitly the regulatory judgment of the countries in 
which these are domiciled, and remain content to be passive 
spectators? Or should they dare to go against the flow of the market?

Recently, M Damodaran, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Board 
of India (SEBI) spoke in general terms about the operations of hedge 
funds in our market. While hedge funds induce an element of 
volatility, "they also bring in liquidity that the market needs. And 
they have the money of the category of investors who are prepared to 
take that extra risk. For regulators, it's a question of getting 
more players into the market and being comfortable with who the 
players are. You need to know the origin of money. In our context it 
is really `know your investor requirement'…I think all regulators 
are comfortable with regulated entities and hedge funds are largely 
unregulated." [Business World, July 25, 2005, emphasis added]

The SEBI chief has chosen his words carefully. As hedge funds, 
mostly of Wall Street origin, are virtually unregulated, what would 
be his concerns? Prima facie, going by the judgment of the guardian 
angel of Wall Street, he should have no worry. Alan Greenspan, 
chairman of the US Federal Reserve, lauds the basic objective of 
hedge fund strategy. Though they make extensive use of short 
positions, leverage and derivatives, they would normally be involved 
in an arbitrage strategy where when they are selling a stock, they 
are buying another. In the process they do an excellent job in 
identifying overvalued and undervalued stocks and selling or buying 
them accordingly. "Hedge funds have become main contributors to the 
flexibility of the financial system. A development that proved 
essential to our ability to absorb so many economic shocks in recent 
years." 

Hedge Fund Concerns 

All this is well but such a regulatory stance does not enjoy 
universal acclaim. There are four sets of concerns. First, the 
structure of today's equity market. This is highly polarised, with 
the behaviour of a few shaping the fortunes of many. A substantial 
volume of assets is held in pure index-tracking portfolios; with the 
hedge fund handling a small segment of the total, as little as 2 per 
cent. The significance of hedge funds, however, far outstrips their 
size. In May, in its latest report on global financial security, the 
International Monetary Fund found that hedge funds might account for 
80 per cent to 90 per cent of all participants in these markets. In 
the US and UK, for example, their activity accounts for about 40 per 
cent and sometimes as much as 70 per cent of daily trading in equity 
markets. With a phenomenal growth in size, number and capital, hedge 
funds are nearly double of what they were in 1998, at the time of 
the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) debacle: more that one 
trillion dollars in capital, about 8,500 hedge funds and 1,500 funds 
of hedge funds themselves. The scale of their activities, 
supplemented by the proprietary trading desks of investment banks, 
has become too big for comfort. 

Second, their leverage is alarmingly high. Figures of bank lending 
to Cayman Islands where many hedge funds are domiciled, hint at a 
big increase in leverage since 1998. There are also indications that 
with margins in traditional banking business squeezed, big banks are 
falling over themselves to provide extensive credit facilities to 
hedge funds. Apart from risks inherent in borrowing leverage, we 
have to reckon with economic leverage that includes risks arising 
from derivatives and other complex arrangements. Economic leverage 
can be high even when borrowing or balance sheet leverage is 
moderate. A study in 2003 by the Centre for International Securities 
and Derivatives Markets found balance sheet leverage at hedge funds 
25 times their capital. This is an average and the variations among 
the hedge funds may widely vary. Also, hedge funds can shift 
positions or increase leverage almost instantaneously and static 
information may turn out to be deceptive. And true economic leverage 
may be impossible to understand without the full disclosure of all 
of a hedge fund's commitments. In LTCM, fund managers were found 
subsequently to have taken the leverage to as high as 250. Even if 
we take leverage at an average of 25, we get a strike force of 
enormous dimensions in the hands of the managers of these entities 
at the very heart of the US financial system. Completely 
unregulated, nobody has the complete picture.

Third, the dramatic growth in the derivatives market. Currently, the 
notional value of outstanding derivatives held by US banks is about 
$ 84 trillion, of which credit derivatives are about $ 4.5 trillion. 
There is a high degree of concentration in the holding of these 
derivatives by the US banks. The largest five US banks hold 95 per 
cent of the total stock of derivatives. JP Morgan Chase holds more 
than half of the total stock. With so much of the derivatives 
concentrated in a few, there is a risk that any attempt to reduce 
exposure in the face of a shock could magnify rather than diminish 
the shock. Credit derivatives permit risks to be unbundled and 
transferred to those players in the financial market best able to 
absorb them, a `new paradigm' of credit management, as Greenspan 
describes it. But the real worry is that risks are being transferred 
to where they are least visible and least supervised. Moreover, 
where financial instruments are new, risk can be easily mispriced 
and if it is on a large scale, there can be systemic consequences. 
Timothy Geithner of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has 
warned, "The models used to assess risks in the more novel areas of 
finance are, by definition, less grounded in experience and less 
valuable in anticipating how prices and correlations change in 
conditions of stress." 

Fourth, there are concerns about the kind of incentives that drive 
fund managers to achieve returns that are much higher than those 
obtained by mainstream managers. The incentive to take risks with 
all that money is huge. A typical fee structure called `2 and 20' 
gives managers 2 per cent of the assets under management and 20 per 
cent of gains realised by the fund. The market gossip is that at 
large funds a single year's earnings can set up the managers for 
life. Some market observers call these "perverse incentives" 
tempting managers to find new and riskier ways to maintain their 
spectacular returns.

In a global financial market getting progressively integrated, we 
are witnessing the highly concentrated power of a class of financial 
elite, driven to make profit on a short-term time horizon, playing 
about with massive leveraged finance, building up complex trading 
positions all over the globe for all kinds of products, commodities 
and services and unwinding them with no less alacrity. There is 
nothing on the horizon to assure us that the activities of these 
perennial breeders of systemic risks are under proper surveillance. 
The LTCM debacle gave Wall Street an opportunity to the regulators, 
but the entire political establishment, backed by the Federal 
Reserve chairman, side-stepped the issue on the ground that such 
regulation would be inconsistent with the commitment to preserve and 
nourish the creativity of the free market. (This has been discussed 
in `Hedge Fund Terrorism and Regulatory Inertia', EPW, January 16-
23, 1999.)

Discomfort about such permissiveness has continued to haunt the 
regulators. Let us hear what the last incumbent of the US Securities 
Exchange Commission, William Donaldson, had to say. In a press 
conference on June 1, announcing his early resignation, Donaldson 
made it clear that he was being forced to leave and that the primary 
issue of contention was his effort to regulate hedge funds. He 
observed that few of the hedge funds were actually hedged; these 
were virtually "pooled vehicles that you can do anything you want 
with … It would be almost impossible for me to conceive of a 
Securities and Exchange Commission that didn't recognise an industry 
that was at a $ 3 trillion level and wasn't being regulated at all. 
And we set about to regulate that industry in a rather benign way, 
simply to get the most fundamental knowledge about the hedge fund 
industry. Who is running the money? What is their investment record? 
What is their track record as far as infractions of the law? How do 
they do their accounting? This was the simplest kind of thing that 
will pertain to anybody that runs money. And, of course, the other 
part is that this kind of knowledge will help us, I believe, 
understand better what impact the hedge funds are having on the 
other side of the market." Donaldson had difficulty even in 
introducing a small rule change, requiring the hedge funds to 
register with SEC and submit to regular audit and inspection. 

The industry is now up in arms. They will accept no regulation. They 
want the securities regulator to understand that hedge funds are a 
form of mutual funds for the super rich, and if they are engaged in 
aggressive speculative activities prohibited to ordinary mutual 
funds, are not the rich investors themselves bearing the risks? And 
so why these regulatory jitters? A legalistic rollback seems to be 
on the cards. The new SEC appointee Christopher Cox, an anti-
regulation fanatic, has assured the funds that there would be 
virtually no government regulations in the securities industry.

Our Approach 

Wall Street regulators claim that they set standards for others to 
follow. For corporate sector governance, they have stringent 
parameters; for banks, strict capital adequacy requirements for 
their risk exposure. And, for mutual funds, compliance requirements 
are back-breaking. And, here we are, with the logic reversed for the 
hedge fund industry. While Greenspan talks of dispersion of risk and 
flexibility as the benefits flowing from hedge fund operations, he 
keeps silent over the `obfuscation issue' which many others see as 
inbuilt risk of the highest order. Recent research by the London 
Stock Exchange has brought out that almost half of all listed UK 
companies have gaps in their knowledge of the identity of their 
shareholders. (Financial Times, August 9, 2005). 

If hedge funds have been operating without any kind of regulation in 
Wall Street, would we be comfortable in allowing them unrestricted 
entry into India? The argument that risks are being borne by the 
super rich investors of hedge funds does not wash. In an open 
financial market, it is the unintended systemic consequences of 
their market operations, their exposure and investment strategies, 
that are worrying. Can we forget too easily the audacious bets that 
hedge fund managers were found to have taken in several episodes 
over the last decade? Take the south Asian crisis in 1997: a single 
hedge fund had reportedly taken an exposure of about 20 per cent of 
the official reserves of Thailand. 

Should our regulators allow such kind of permissiveness? We do not 
possess the kind of resilience that the US economy has. As the 
regulator in the nerve centre of the global financial world seems 
reluctant to take any initiative, we have to explore ways as to how 
to protect our system from operators that some have described 
as `locusts' and, some others as `financial terrorists'. Whenever a 
crisis, originating from any hedge fund exposure, hits a country, 
Wall Street takes the view, somewhat routinely and nonchalantly, 
that their targets – countries or corporates – are the victims of 
their own follies. In recent months several hedge funds have played 
pivotal roles in high profile takeover bids: the ousting of the head 
of the Deutsche exchange and the forced sale of Wyevale, the garden 
centre group. No wonder, panicked calls have now started emanating 
even from developed markets in Europe. A few weeks ago, Jochen 
Sanio, president of the German financial supervision agency BaFin, 
referred to hedge funds as "black holes of the international 
financial system".

We cannot remain passive spectators. The SEBI chairman has recently 
observed, "Regulating hedge funds is an issue before most of the 
financial regulators globally. This has to be addressed globally" 
(The Economic Times, August 2, 2005). This is complacency. The 
episode where a particular fund refused to divulge details should 
not be taken lightly. Secrecy is the stock in trade of these 
operators and they will and can muster political clout from the US 
political establishment. Look how quickly they succeeded in removing 
the powerful SEC chief who was found to be just toying with the idea 
of setting up a structure of regulation. 

Our political establishment is taking grave risks in allowing 
unrestricted FII inflows without appropriate disclosure and 
scrutiny. We cannot afford the luxury of waiting indefinitely till 
good sense dawns on the American regulatory and political 
establishments. In any event, in the near future, with the change in 
guard at the SEC, there is little likelihood of any move towards an 
effective global forum. We should therefore take the lead for 
concerted action by the developing countries, for in the coming 
months it is the currencies of these countries and some of their 
major corporate players that could be the obvious targets of hedge 
funds. The barbarians have crossed the gate and are inside our 
arena. Where is our strategy to discipline them?

 o o o o
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 








------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> 
Get fast access to your favorite Yahoo! Groups. Make Yahoo! your home page
http://us.click.yahoo.com/dpRU5A/wUILAA/yQLSAA/NJYolB/TM
--------------------------------------------------------------------~-> 

«¤»¥«¤»§«¤»¥«¤»§«¤»¥«¤»§«¤»¥«¤»§«¤»¥«¤»§«¤»¥««¤»¥«¤»§«¤»
This is ZESTEconomics. Post economics-related articles and event info to 
[email protected]

If you got this mail as a forward, subscribe to ZESTEconomics by sending a 
blank mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] OR, if you have a Yahoo! ID, visit 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTEconomics/join

==theZESTcommunity======================================

[1] ZESTCurrent: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTCurrent/
[2] ZESTEconomics: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTEconomics/
[3] ZESTGlobal: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTGlobal/
[4] ZESTMedia: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTMedia/
[5] ZESTPoets: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTPoets/
[6] ZESTCaste: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTCaste/
[7] ZESTAlternative: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTAlternative/
[8] TalkZEST: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TalkZEST/ 
Yahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ZESTEconomics/

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    [EMAIL PROTECTED]

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
 



Reply via email to