Democracy's drawbacks
  Sustained growth in India would be all the more impressive if the 
government could pass its reforms. But the road is blocked by 
politics

  By Corresponents in DELHI AND KOLKATA 
  The Economist | Oct 27th 2005
  For related pixs and graphs please visit
  http://www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=5081267 

IN CITY after city, India is booming. Visit Delhi or Mumbai or 
Hyderabad, and they are full of shining new office towers and 
American-educated MBAs. The suburb of Palm Meadows (pictured) 
outside Bangalore, the home of high-tech and outsourcing, looks like 
the richer blocks of Los Angeles. The stockmarket has risen by more 
than 20% this year (see chart 1), though it slipped back a bit this 
month. In the second quarter, India's GDP grew by 8.1% compared with 
the same period last year. After annual growth of around 7% in 2003 
and 2004 (see chart 2), the country is on course, many economists 
think, to repeat the trick this year and next.

India's IT companies are world-beaters. Firms such as Tata 
Consultancy Services, Infosys and Wipro, which owe their success to 
large, co-operative software-development projects for companies in 
America, are now beginning to compete directly with the big IT 
multinationals for large consultancy contracts. Out of this IT 
infrastructure has grown a huge business in "outsourcing" almost any 
business process that can be performed remotely, from answering a 
call in a help centre to interpreting an X-ray. The largest 
outsourcing firm relaunched itself in September as Genpact, 
partially disguising its origins as the Indian back-office of 
General Electric, and expects to exceed $1 billion in annual sales 
by 2008.

These service businesses have thrived because they have capitalised 
on India's strengths—computer skills, fluency in English—and are not 
hostage to its weaknesses. Yet those weaknesses are all too obvious, 
and are the reason why India on many counts still lags behind its 
neighbour-rival, China. India has lousy infrastructure, bumbling and 
burdensome regulation and restrictive labour laws. And economic 
reform now appears to have stalled in political recriminations. 

Last year's election gave no party a clear majority. A delicate 
arrangement allowed Manmohan Singh, of the left-of-centre Congress 
party, to take office as prime minister, while a committee was set 
up to negotiate policy between Congress and its coalition partners 
(together called the United Progressive Alliance or UPA) on the one 
side, and the Left Front of Communists and other left-wing parties 
on the other. The committee, however, has not managed to meet since 
June, though on October 26th there were rumours that it was about 
to. Meanwhile, the Communists—without whom the coalition has no 
majority in Parliament—are getting truculent. They staged a four-
month boycott of the co-ordination committee to press their policies 
and then, in concert with the trade unions, called a one-day general 
strike on September 29th. It was ignored in many places, but the 
banks, along with the Communist stronghold of Kolkata (Calcutta), 
were paralysed. 

When Mr Singh was finance minister, in the 1990s, it was he who 
pushed through the measures that kick-started reform in India. 
Without the support of the Left Front, however, he can do nothing 
more. His most significant legislative achievement to date has been 
a law that guarantees 100 days' employment to every household in 
India's 200 poorest districts. Though the Left Front loves it, many 
economists reckon that much of the money—as much as 1% of GDP, by 
some estimates—will be wasted or stolen.

The list of what Mr Singh has been prevented from doing is much 
longer. Completely ruled out has been any progress on liberalising 
India's notoriously rigid labour laws. The key battleground is a 
rule preventing any company with more than 100 employees from making 
redundancies without obtaining approval from local labour boards. 
According to the Left Front, this protects workers from unscrupulous 
employers. In fact, it makes employers wary of taking on new staff, 
opening new factories or, in the case of smaller companies, growing 
beyond the threshold of 100. It protects unionised labour, in short, 
at the expense of those not in work. 

The Left Front, which draws most of its support from organised 
labour, does not greatly care. Its eyes are on state elections due 
next year in West Bengal (whose capital is Kolkata) and Kerala, the 
two biggest states where the Communists are strong. Those who are 
losing out from unreformed labour laws are hundreds of millions of 
people now marginally employed in the countryside. These people need 
jobs in manufacturing if India is to improve its record on poverty, 
as well as growth. Jobs could be found in the labour-hungry textile 
industry, especially now that, with the ending of the developed 
world's protectionist Multi-Fibre Arrangement, India's textile 
exports are booming. As it is, a jobless boom is going on in 
manufacturing, which is growing at 7% annually, but without 
increasing employment. 

Touches of xenophobia
India's antiquated laws are not only preventing it from exploiting 
the textile boom as successfully as China (whose textile businesses 
are so successful that they provoke retaliation). They are also 
pushing it far behind China in terms of foreign direct investment. 
FDI has been the most important driver of China's growth, not just 
because of the money involved (more than $60 billion last year) but 
also because of the technology, expertise, marketing relationships 
and much else that this money represents. India's showing has been 
far less impressive: about an eleventh of China's haul last year 
(see chart 3). 

One chief reason for the discrepancy is that India imposes caps on 
FDI in a host of economically important, or politically sensitive, 
sectors: insurance, aviation, coal-mining, media and much else. 
Chief among these is retailing. Though franchise operations are 
allowed, foreign direct ownership is banned, which explains why even 
Delhi's smartest shopping areas are scruffy and chaotic places with 
limited stock. 

Mr Singh's government would like to raise the caps, and had some 
success at first. It proposed in February, for example, that the cap 
for telecoms investment should be lifted from 49% to 74%, and this 
has just, at last, been approved. But the Left Front is violently 
opposed to any tinkering with the rules for FDI in retailing. Its 
leaders appear to accept that the advent of, say, Wal-Mart would 
generate many jobs, since much of what the company sold would be 
domestically produced (Wal-Mart spends $15 billion a year in China). 
But they worry that millions of small retailers would be put out of 
work. For those who want to move out of farm work, a small shop is 
often their first choice. 

Mr Singh remains optimistic, but on slender grounds. With the Left 
Front so adamant, nothing is likely to happen. And the same is true 
of privatisation, or its younger sibling, disinvestment, the selling 
of minority stakes in state-controlled companies. From the very 
start of its tenure, the government was forced by the Left Front to 
agree not to privatise nine so-called "crown jewels", or leading 
state-owned companies. But the Left has taken advantage of its 
position to go beyond what was originally agreed. When, in June, the 
government announced plans to sell a 10% stake in Bharat Heavy 
Electricals, an engineering firm, the Left Front vigorously 
objected. Although the sale does not require legislation, and so 
could be enacted by the minority government, the government shows no 
stomach for doing so. 

Another disappointment—though the word is perhaps inappropriate, 
since no one ever expected a Congress government to have the 
necessary courage—is the failure even to attempt to do anything 
about the mountain of subsidies that distort the Indian economy. 
Often badly targeted, benefiting middle-class people more than the 
poorest, they consume a shocking 14-15% of GDP.

Worst of all, Indian politics may actually be retreating to its 
bureaucratic past. Take oil pricing, a complex statist rigmarole 
that had been moving from the hands of government to those of a 
regulator. Under Mr Singh, price decisions are again being taken by 
the government. 

The prime minister's instincts are sometimes depressingly 
bureaucratic. Faced with obvious and longstanding problems, he 
commissions a study on them. The latest strategy document appeared 
in September from a specially convened National Manufacturing 
Competitiveness Council. It listed the most pernicious difficulties 
for manufacturers: power shortages, taxes and the "inspector raj". 
No one was surprised by these, or felt much hope they would be 
fixed. 

Removing the brake
It may seem odd, if reform is so important, that the economy is 
doing so well without it. There are a number of reasons. The biggest 
is that the Indian economy is so strong, structurally and 
cyclically, that it can ride out a period of wobbly policy. India's 
young population gives it a fast-growing workforce and a declining 
proportion of dependants. Over the next few decades, that will be 
good for savings and investment. Industry, meanwhile, has recovered 
from a splurge of over-investment in the mid-1990s. It has improved 
efficiency and is now both reaping the benefits and investing again 
in new capacity.

The government started to get out of business's way in the 1980s 
and, especially, after a balance-of-payments crisis in 1991. At that 
point Mr Singh, as finance minister, was given the freedom to bring 
in reforms by an unexpectedly brave prime minister, Narasimha Rao. 
Since then, government has been unable to put an absolute crimp on 
growth. Many important reforms—especially trade liberalisation, but 
also the dismantling of the "licence raj" of bureaucratic obstacles 
to enterprise—are well in train and not in reverse.

Almost every budget since 1991, including this year's, has cut 
import tariffs and freed more industries from "reservation" for 
small firms, a big hindrance to competitiveness in businesses that 
might benefit from economies of scale. This year, moreover, saw the 
introduction of one long-planned reform, a standardised value-added 
tax imposed at state level. Typically, politics meant that not all 
states fell into line, and implementation has been patchy. Yet the 
tax may eventually not only bring new fiscal stability, but also 
reduce the burden of cascading excise and sales taxes that is one of 
the biggest handicaps facing manufacturers. Modest, piecemeal 
reform, in other words, is not quite dead.

The government's priorities—investment in infrastructure, 
agriculture, basic education and primary health care—are also right, 
given that the big macroeconomic stuff was mostly done in the 1990s. 
But they all need money, and that requires fixing the budget. 
India's fiscal deficit is now 8% or so of GDP if both state and 
central governments are counted—an improvement after six years of 
double-digit deficits, but still too high. Public finances have been 
in a mess for so long that it seems almost impolite in government 
circles to mention them. 

The deficit, which goes largely on interest payments (40% of 
recurrent spending), defence, subsidies and civil-service wages and 
pensions, leaves little room for big capital investments. Some new 
airports, ports and roads are being built, and the "Golden 
Quadrilateral" highway, linking India's four biggest cities, is 
being expanded to six lanes. But Mr Singh wants a good deal more. 
Improving India's infrastructure, he says, is his top priority. 
Hence his government's zeal for "public-private partnerships" to 
finance and construct it. 

A standard concession agreement is to be produced soon, modelled on 
successes with toll roads, where concessionaires have put in 
competitive bids for government grants. For some projects, the 
government does not need parliamentary approval and can proceed 
anyway. Other projects, however, such as airports, will run into 
objections from the left. It is therefore hard to see these 
partnerships making much of a dent in what Montek Singh Ahluwalia, 
the prime minister's chief planner, calls India's "infrastructure 
deficit".

Might the left-wing parties ever become less obstreperous, and 
realise that reforms like these are of benefit to all Indians? It is 
possible. Jairam Ramesh, a Congress member of parliament who played 
a big role in writing the "common minimum programme" that defines 
relations between the UPA and the Left Front, floats the interesting 
theory that, now that Congress has enacted the Employment Guarantee 
Act that the Left was so keen on, the Left may prove a little keener 
on asset sales. They would, after all, be a way of paying for all 
those jobs.

>From the Left Front come faint signs of accommodation. Prakash 
Karat, the general secretary of the CPI (M), the most important 
party within the group, is, like Mr Ramesh, adamant that full-scale 
privatisation of profitable public enterprises is not on the agenda. 
But he says the party is "ready for a discussion" on how to raise 
resources for spending on the poor. 

Among the most eloquent advocates of a re-think is, in fact, a 
senior Communist, Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee, chief minister of West 
Bengal, a state of 82m people run for 28 years by the Communists and 
their allies. On September 30th, the day after Communist-affiliated 
trade unions had brought his capital, Kolkata to a halt, he could 
scarcely conceal his exasperation. He told The Economist that the 
trade unions—and many of his party comrades—had become "one-
dimensional", representing only the interests of the 30m or so 
workers in India's "organised" sector.

Mr Bhattarcharjee concedes that some of his colleagues in Delhi do 
not seem to grasp that economic reform could benefit a much bigger 
number of workers than those who belong to unions. If they do, they 
perhaps see political benefits in ignoring it. But "Here, we are 
running a government. We have to fulfil the aspirations of the 
people." To that end, he is trying to turn Kolkata into a hub for 
the information-technology industry by declaring it a "public 
utility" where strikes are banned, and has started going abroad to 
bang the drum for inward investment. 

Jobs for the poor
Such enthusiasm may start to shift the political balance back 
towards reform, but it looks unlikely. For the foreseeable future, 
both left-wing intransigence and lack of decent infrastructure—in 
particular, a chronic shortage of electricity—will constrain India's 
growth. An average annual rate of 6-7%, as in the past decade, does 
not seem a tall order. But a gear-shift to a durable growth rate of 
8-10% still seems out of reach. 

Without it, that burgeoning workforce may seem less of an advantage. 
Shankar Acharya, a former government economist now at a Delhi think-
tank, worries that between now and 2051 nearly 60% of India's 
population increase will come from four "populous, poor, slow-
growing northern states with weak infrastructure, education systems 
and governance".

China has sucked surplus agricultural labour into factories by the 
tens of millions. India's manufacturing industries, by contrast, 
have progressed by becoming more productive. They are still not a 
big source of rural employment. As a good liberal economist, Mr 
Singh says he does not believe in having an "industrial policy" or 
picking favourites. Create decent infrastructure, and industry will 
come—and he sees huge potential, as do many others, in food-
processing. His finance minister has spoken of 12m new jobs in the 
textile sector alone in the next five years. 

They are sorely needed. India's information-technology firms are 
world-beaters, but the entire IT and office-service industry employs 
only about 1m people. None of the Asian tigers, not even Singapore, 
managed its rapid climb into the ranks of middle-income and rich 
countries without a boom in export-oriented manufacturing. India is 
unlikely to be different. 

When he speaks of following the "Chinese model", Mr Singh seems to 
admit this. But it remains sadly true that the free market that has 
helped the tigers so much often works better in Communist China than 
in India—not least thanks to India's own democratically elected 
Communist politicians.







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