On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:12 AM Clint Wilson via Servercert-wg < servercert-wg@cabforum.org> wrote:
> In other words, I believe it satisfactory to establish a constrained set > of Debian weak keys which CAs must block (rather than leaving the > requirement fully open-ended), but I don’t believe that should obviate the > need for a CA to check uncommon key sizes — which are otherwise in the key > size ranges of that constrained set’s key sizes — should a CA allow those > uncommon key sizes. > I completely concur. I don't think that either of your Set 1 / Set 2 proposals quite hits the mark for me, for one reason: they both contain the phrase "CAs must not issue certificates containing Debian weak keys". As long as that statement exists, the requirement is "evaluate everything yourself, and if new sets of weak keys come to light, you're already behind" -- the existence of the github repo is just a nicety. Instead, I would phrase the requirement as "In the case of [list of common RSA and ECDSA key sizes] Debian Weak Keys, the CA SHALL reject keys identified by [link to CABF repository]. For other key sizes, the CA SHALL reject Debian Weak Keys." In other words -- for these common key sizes, the repository is the source of truth. Every key in it is considered compromised and must be blocked, but you don't need to waste time replicating the work of generating all of these keys to prove to yourself that it has been done correctly. If you want to issue for other key sizes, then the onus is on you to do the relevant due diligence. Aaron
_______________________________________________ Servercert-wg mailing list Servercert-wg@cabforum.org https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
