Hi Wayne, I think this does seem like it could be a tractable solution, however I’d like to understand why one of the proposals I’ve brought up a couple times on the calls isn’t also a suitable option. From what I can gather, they’re nearly identical in practical impact, but one provides a much more defined boundary for relying parties.
Option 1: The CA/BF creates or mirrors a repository of pre-computed Debian Weak keys for the following key sizes (representing those most commonly issued against): RSA 2048, 3072, 4096, 8192; ECC 256, 384, 521. The TBRs stipulate that CAs must not issue certificates containing keys in this repository. Option 2: The CA/BF creates or mirrors a repository of pre-computed Debian Weak keys for the following key sizes (representing those most commonly issued against): RSA 2048, 3072, 4096, 8192; ECC 256, 384, 521. The TBRs stipulate that CAs must not issue certificates containing weak keys, with a pointer to the repository of the most common key sizes of Debian Weak keys among other similar/relevant pointers for other vulnerabilities. The reason these 2 proposals are so nearly identical in practice is that there are only a very tiny number of certificates issued against key sizes that are not RSA 2048, 3072, 4096, or 8192; or ECC 256, 384, or 521. By my count, somewhere around 80 certificates out of roughly 750 million (though I really only took a quick glance, so perhaps this is off to an extent… but probably not by huge quantities). Under Option 2, if a CA wants to allow for Certificate requests containing a key size other than these 7, they’re fully free to do so; they must merely ensure the key is not a Debian Weak key. For every other CA, they can limit the accepted key sizes to those in the repository and the result is functionally the same as Option 1, but without the possibility of “certificates can be issued that are weak and CAs are under no obligation to prevent that if it’s not one of 7 key sizes”. Concretely, is there a reason Option 2 is intractable for CAs? If so, I would greatly appreciate help understanding how that approach meaningfully differs from Option 1. Thanks, -Clint > On Apr 9, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Rob Stradling via Servercert-wg > <servercert-wg@cabforum.org> wrote: > > > * Aaron Gable commented in the PR with a suggestion that we require CAs to > > reject any key found in Hanno Bock's repository at > > https://github.com/badkeys/debianopenssl. This includes RSA > > 1024/2048/3072/4096 and EC P256/P384 keys. > > Some of the EC key files in Hanno's repository have ASN.1 encoding issues > (see > https://www.mail-archive.com/dev-security-policy@mozilla.org/msg00911.html); > whereas the equivalent files inhttps://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/private_keys > are correctly encoded. > > > * Roman Fischer suggested that we limit the requirement to check Debian > > weak keys only with sizes up to RSA 4096 under the logic that no one would > > “accidentally” create an 8192 bit RSA key on a system vulnerable to Debian > > Weak keys > > FWIW, https://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/private_keys already has all of the > possible 8192-bit RSA Debian weak keys. > > From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-boun...@cabforum.org > <mailto:servercert-wg-boun...@cabforum.org>> on behalf of Wayne Thayer via > Servercert-wg <servercert-wg@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org>> > Sent: 05 April 2024 23:47 > To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List > <servercert-wg@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org>> > Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] Compromised/Weak Keys Ballot Proposal > > CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click > links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the > content is safe. > > Two new alternatives have been proposed in addition to the one I proposed > below: > > * Aaron Gable commented in the PR with a suggestion that we require CAs to > reject any key found in Hanno Bock's repository > athttps://github.com/badkeys/debianopenssl. This includes RSA > 1024/2048/3072/4096 and EC P256/P384 keys. We might prefer to reference a > clone in the CAB Forum GitHub org (or some other source of the actual > generated weak keys) but that's a detail we can work out if others like this > approach. > * Roman Fischer suggested that we limit the requirement to check Debian weak > keys only with sizes up to RSA 4096 under the logic that no one would > “accidentally” create an 8192 bit RSA key on a system vulnerable to Debian > Weak keys > > Each of these methods has the benefit of adding clarity to the Debian > requirement rather than just maintaining the existing language, but they also > [arguably] allow CAs to issue certs containing abnormally sized Debian weak > keys. > > I would like to hear from other members (especially Apple) if you prefer or > object to either of these alternatives? > > Thanks, > > Wayne > > On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 4:13 PM Wayne Thayer via Servercert-wg > <servercert-wg@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org>> wrote: > There was further discussion of this ballot proposal on today's > teleconference. It was suggested that rather than omitting any reference to > Debian weak keys, the ballot should retain the current language. > Unfortunately, the ballot restructures the language in such a way that this > is challenging. My new proposal is that TLS BR Section 6.1.1.3(5) be updated > to read as follows (https://github.com/wthayer/servercert/pull/1/files): > ===== > 5. The Public Key corresponds to an industry-demonstrated weak Private Key. > For requests submitted on or after November 15, 2024, at least the following > precautions SHALL be implemented: > 1. The CA SHALL reject Debian weak keys (https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys). > 2. In the case of ROCA vulnerability, the CA SHALL reject keys identified > by the tools available at https://github.com/crocs-muni/roca or equivalent. > 3. In the case of Close Primes vulnerability > (https://fermatattack.secvuln.info/), the CA SHALL reject weak keys which can > be factored within 100 rounds using Fermat’s factorization method. > > Suggested tools for checking for weak keys can be found here: > https://cabforum.org/resources/tools/ > ===== > I would greatly appreciate feedback from any member that finds this language > unacceptable, or that has suggestions to improve it. > > Thanks, > > Wayne > > > On Fri, Mar 15, 2024 at 11:19 AM Wayne Thayer via Servercert-wg > <servercert-wg@cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org>> wrote: > On yesterday's SCWG teleconference, Mads suggested that a way forward would > be to leave the existing requirements in place for Debian weak keys. I've > interpreted that to mean that we would just remove references to Debian, > resulting in this: https://github.com/wthayer/servercert/pull/1/files > > I'm not satisfied by this approach because it doesn't achieve the clarity > intended to result from the original weak keys ballot and will seemingly > result in CAs continuing to have varying interpretations of the specific > requirements for rejecting Debian weak keys, but perhaps this is the best we > can all agree to. > > What do others think? Should we proceed with this approach? > > Thanks, > > Wayne > > On Sat, Mar 9, 2024 at 9:15 AM Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via > Servercert-wg <servercert-wg@cabforum.org > <mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org>> wrote: > FWIW, I think in the recent years, it was mostly security researchers that > attempted to request certificates with Debian weak keys to test if a CA was > properly blocking them. > > If an Applicant uses an outdated OS that generates weak keys, imagine the > actual web server or other software that runs on that server, putting Relying > Parties at risk. CAs don't have control over that but they could have control > over a common set of weak keys using common parameters/algorithms which could > be enforced by all CAs. > > Dimitris. > > On 9/3/2024 12:05 π.μ., Wayne Thayer via Servercert-wg wrote: > Hi Clint, > > Thank you for your response. Unfortunately, it leads me to the conclusion > that there is not a path forward and we're stuck with the status quo. Having > said that, I'll reply to a few of your points below and encourage others to > do the same if there is a desire to move forward with an update to our weak > keys requirements. > > On Thu, Mar 7, 2024 at 12:59 AM Clint Wilson <cli...@apple.com > <mailto:cli...@apple.com>> wrote: > Hi Wayne, > > Thank you for carrying this work item forward. I have a few concerns > regarding the proposed removal of Debian weak key checking, outlined below. > > I don’t believe there has been sufficient explanation or data presented to > justify the removal of the requirement to check for Debian weak keys. It > seems to me there are feasible methods for CAs to continue performing this > check. Similar to what Martijn has pointed out, the reasoning provided is > lacking (hasty generalization, fallacy of composition, etc.). > > The argument that I find compelling is that any system capable of generating > a Debian weak key in 2024 is also riddled with a decade of vulnerabilities, > so preventing the use of said weak key in a certificate is security theater. > In what scenario do you envision the rejection of a Debian weak key having a > meaningful impact on the security of a service that relies on it? It's just > not obvious to me that these checks continue to provide any practical value > at this point in time. > > I don’t believe a compromise where Debian weak keys only need be checked for > specific key sizes addresses the core issue, unless tied together with a > restriction from accepting key sizes which are not included in such a list > (which I do see as reasonable and something I’m under the impression is > already being done by some CAs). > > My understanding is that the objections some CAs had to the original ballot > was the requirement to maintain a sizable database of Debian weak keys for > every key size they support. Limiting the requirement to the most popular key > sizes would resolve that issue and be more inline with my understanding of > some current practices. This approach would also greatly reduce the threat of > the accidental use of a Debian weak key. > > The removal of this check seems to shift a burden currently placed on CAs to > a risk (long assumed resolved) for Relying Parties and Subscribers. From my > reading of the ballot, the requirement that a CA revoke Certificates with > Debian weak keys remains in effect, serving only to remove the pre-issuance > “blocking” requirement, but retaining an expectation that certificates are > checked post-issuance based on the CA’s awareness of this method of > compromising a Private Key; this generally seems a significantly worse > experience for Subscribers. Have I missed something regarding the intent of > the changes in this regard? > > This is a great point. It makes no sense to allow a CA to issue a cert that > is then immediately subject to a revocation requirement. I am open to either > exempting Debian weak keys from BR 4.9.1.1(4) or for CAs to be required to > revoke a certificate containing a Debian weak key only if they are "made > aware" using the mechanism specified in 4.9.3. > > Thanks, > > Wayne > > > There have been incidents involving certificates issued to Debian weak keys > in recent years; some CAs have indicated that they don’t receive Debian weak > keys in requests, but evidence exists to the contrary for the ecosystem as a > whole. > > Thank you! > -Clint > > > > _______________________________________________ > Servercert-wg mailing list > Servercert-wg@cabforum.org <mailto:Servercert-wg@cabforum.org> > https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg > > _______________________________________________ > Servercert-wg mailing list > Servercert-wg@cabforum.org <mailto:Servercert-wg@cabforum.org> > https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg > _______________________________________________ > Servercert-wg mailing list > Servercert-wg@cabforum.org <mailto:Servercert-wg@cabforum.org> > https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg > _______________________________________________ > Servercert-wg mailing list > Servercert-wg@cabforum.org <mailto:Servercert-wg@cabforum.org> > https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg > _______________________________________________ > Servercert-wg mailing list > Servercert-wg@cabforum.org <mailto:Servercert-wg@cabforum.org> > https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
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