Hi Ludwig,
Basically, to bring the features that EAP has into IoT.
Such as:
- Well known protocol thas provides flexible authentication with
diffrent methods and counting.
- It integrates well with AAA.
- It has a standard and very well known Key Management Framework.
With regards to the overhead EAP brings, it is a small price to pay
having into account this benefits. In fact, our work is all about using
CoAP so the EAP transport is lightweight and we think is worth the effort.
Best Regards,
Dan.
El 22/01/2021 a las 16:17, Seitz Ludwig escribió:
I’d like to second the question Mohit assumes Michael is asking:
What is the benefit, in the context of IoT, to add the overhead of EAP
to say TLS?
/Ludwig
*From:*Ace <ace-boun...@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Mohit Sethi M
*Sent:* den 22 januari 2021 15:37
*To:* Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca>; Ace Wg <ace@ietf.org>
*Subject:* [EXTERNAL] Re: [Ace] call for adoption for
draft-marin-ace-wg-coap-eap
Hi Michael,
I guess the question you are asking is: what is the benefit of adding
the overhead of EAP. For EAP-TLS, you could directly use TLS. For
EAP-pwd (which is a PAKE) one could use any PAKE without the EAP
encapsulation overhead?
Is your concern only in the context of IoT or do you think in general
we are better off using protocols directly without the EAP framework
overhead?
--Mohit
On 1/21/21 5:26 PM, Michael Richardson wrote:
I reviewed the document before, and my concerns were not really answered.
I can not understand what the applicability is.
The document starts off with:
The goal of this document is to describe an authentication service
that uses the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748].
The authentication service is built on top of the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] and ALLOWS AUTHENTICATING TWO
CoAP endpoints by using EAP without the need of ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
TO BOOTSTRAP A SECURITY ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THEM.
...
The assumption is that the EAP method transported in CoAP MUST
generate cryptographic material [RFC5247]
This implies use of one of the many EAP-TLS modes, some EAP PAKE
mode, or maybe, in theory some EAP-SIM/AKA mode.
1) TLS modes could just use TLS, or DTLS and omit the extra EAP
bytes. If saving those bytes are not important, then
the use of PANA seems to do the same thing.
2) The EAP PAKE modes could just TLS with some PSK or PAKE
authentication.
3) The EAP-SIM/AKA modes are not realistic, as they generally depend upon
being able to talk to a database of SIM/AKA secrets.
So, which modes that generate cryptographic material are envisioned?
The document goes on to say:
The CoAP client MAY contact
with a backend AAA infrastructure to complete the EAP negotiation as
described in the EAP specification [RFC3748].
which is a third party, when the intro told me that no third party was
required. Even figure 1 show three parties.
And section 5 says there might be five parties, again including an AAA
server.
I believe that this entire proposal goes against the ACE architecture,
and should not be adopted by this WG.
This work seems to duplicate the work in LAKE, as well as cTLS, while not
bringing any clear advantage over existing protocols.
If adopted, I don't review the document.
--
] Never tell me the odds! | ipv6 mesh
networks [
] Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works | IoT architect
[
]m...@sandelman.ca <mailto:m...@sandelman.ca> http://www.sandelman.ca/
<http://www.sandelman.ca/> | ruby on rails [
--
Michael Richardson<mcr+i...@sandelman.ca> <mailto:mcr+i...@sandelman.ca>
. o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
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