> On Mar 5, 2018, at 3:50 PM, Felipe Gasper <fel...@felipegasper.com> wrote:
> 
> 
>> On Mar 5, 2018, at 1:13 PM, Matthew D. Hardeman <mharde...@ipifony.com> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Especially with CT logging being a pragmatic requirement, time-to-delivery 
>> for certificates is likely to increase (slightly) rather than decrease.
> 
> Quick point: the alleviation of polling would go for authz status as well as 
> to certificate delivery.
> 
> A certificate order that has 10 domains needs to poll for the status of all 
> 10 of those domains’ authorizations as well as the certificate issuance. 
> “ACME/bidi” would remove all 11 of those needs to poll.
> 

While it eliminates the need for those 11 targets to poll for, it adds the not 
insignificant infrastructure cost of nailing up a stateful connection.  It’s 
worth mention that the past decade has seen massive improvements in the network 
stack from the low layer up through application layer apis as it would pertain 
to handling a great many of these connections, but there is still some cost to 
nailing up large numbers of concurrent connections.

As others note, h2 offers numerous models under which you could achieve the 
same benefits of getting asynchronous return of results over a single TCP 
session.

I would think that even if you have a clear, consistent, bidirectional 
communication channel that it would still make sense for the individual message 
content to remain unchanged.  (Not optimizing out replay-nonce, etc.)  As a 
general matter, protocols dealing with security and integrity probably achieve 
better and stronger implementations in the field when variability and supported 
cases are reduced to the minimum required to achieve the protocol’s goals.  
Where possible, I would think removal of edge cases, exceptions, and different 
handling for different messaging protocols would be a positive value.
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