Anyone with rights to get to mess with any domain controller in a forest can compromise the forest, again a domain is not a security boundary. Someone may not have the knowledge which appears to be the case here (and I am not going to give that knowledge out), but it is possible just the same.
This falls in line with something I said earlier to another post... Just because someone doesn't know how to get around certain security precautions doesn't mean others don't. A domain controller is a very special device on a network, if compromised, you could have a forest wide issue. The number of domain admins in a forest honestly should equal the number of enterprise admins in the forest. That number should be small. Less than 10 at the largest. Less than 5 is much better. They should also all be under the same management chain and even better sit within walking distance of each other so everyone is on the same page. I often hear.... that can't be done... Sure it can. I've done it in a rather large globally distributed company. The delegation model is very strong in AD, most people should have delegated rights. Just takes work. joe -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Kern, Tom Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2004 9:16 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] A root dc question 1. what do you mean by "an admin in any domain has the power of being an Entrprise admin"? i, being a domain admin of a child domain, do not have the power to put myself into the Enterprise admins group. A domain or enterprise admin in the root domain would have to do that for me. Also, as a domain admin in a child domain, i'm kinda limited to the damage i could do to the forest, no?I mean, i could screw up my domain royally, but i can't really do anything to screw up the forest( and completly hosing my domain would only cause replication errors generated in event logs and some repointing of exchange servers to different GC's). i can't modify the schema or install an app that does it for me. i can't link a wrong headed GPO to a site or create one on the root or any other domain. i can't create a site or subnet. And if a crashed and burned all my DC's wouldn't AD remove them permantely after 60 days? I'm sorry to belabour the point here and waste your time, but i really want to make a good case for our IT dept to have enterprise admin access and show why multiple seperate domain admins for multiple domains is not a good idea. as well as further my knowldge of what can and can't be done and what can and can't be screwed up. i'd like to convince everyone that playing nice is in our best interest. thanks, and again, i apologize for rehashing old posts. -----Original Message----- From: joe [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2004 8:34 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: [ActiveDir] A root dc question Wow this is like déjà vu, I swear we went through this whole thought process a month or two ago on here.... The quick summary (no I will not spout the whole thing, it should be in the archives) of what I recall 1. An admin in any domain has the power of being an Enterprise Admin, domains ARE NOT security boundaries. Each child domain should not have different admins because that can result in chaos and possible danger to the entire forest. 2. You can not do DR testing with just a child domain. 3. Either your corp IT has to be involved with your DR testing or you should redesign into multiple forests. -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Kern, Tom Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 4:37 PM To: ActiveDir (E-mail) Subject: [ActiveDir] A root dc question My apologies if this seems basic and/or silly. Aside from creating new domains or modifying the schema, why would an admin need access to the root dc of a forest(the schema, domain namming master)? furthermore, why would an admin in a child domain need enterprise admin privilges? I only ask because we had issues with our test DR run wherein we didn't have access to the root domain and/or a test root domain vmware'd on a laptop and it ended miserably. i am in the process of convincing the higher ups in my corp of letting our IT dept have enterpise admin access. i'd like to make a case for us as to why we would need this accont with concrete examples(aside from the DR one). ones that a semi tech aware CIO could relate to. What other compelling reasons would one need these rights for in day to day(or not so day to day) AD administration? we are a multi-domain(14) win2k forest in mixed mode with exchange2k in native mode. Thank you in advance for any assitance. 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