Hi,
   
  After rereading posts, it now makes sense to me that the ACEs are managed by 
the local LSA, and not by AD LSA....
   
  So now if i consider that a group or user is deleted from AD and that object 
is set on an AD object ACLs (not share or ntfs permission), that object will be 
definitively disappear with no sid remaining from the ACLs, because the update 
is done by the "local LSA" (DC) where the deletion occurs, that is to say AD 
itself...
   
   
  Yann
   
  
joe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
      Not sure why this suprises you. The ACLs are not maintained by AD nor the 
SAM where the user accounts exist which means you either get to poll or put 
some form of notification system in process. Consider also the case of trusted 
security principals, systems don't get a notification when a trusted system 
deletes a security principal. 
   
  Here are just a couple of the bad things that could happen if the machines 
were responsible for cleaning up those SIDs
   
  1. Overhead. Do you know the sheer number of Security Descriptors that are on 
any given system? You are just thinking of file Security Descriptors but there 
are Security Descriptors on many many different securable objects. I have 
published the list of items I at least know about to this list on a couple of 
occasions and the different types of objects alone is double digits let alone 
the actual instants of those objects. Consider a file system with hundreds of 
thousands or millions of Security Descriptors with really long ACL chains. You 
could have a scavenger thread running 24x7 in idle mode (you wouldn't want it 
higher as it would eat up CPU and that would be a different complaint) just 
constantly walking the ACLs and verifying them. 
   
  2. Mistakes. Since we don't have a change notification capability for deleted 
security principals, and quite honestly you wouldn't (could you imagine 300,000 
machines registering with every domain in your forest for change notifications 
of security principal changes) so that leaves polling and lets say you have a 
tempory network glitch that makes a SID unresolvable to a friendly name... Do 
you then just start stripping the SIDs from the ACLs because a name can't be 
resolved once, twice, three times? What about when an account gets undeleted or 
restored because it was accidently deleted for an hour?
   
  I can think of even more bad things but don't have the time to write about 
them. If you want to, think through how you would build an application to do 
what you are suggesting. It is always a good thought exercise before being 
surprised at what MSFT has done. Keep in mind they are a collection of really 
bright programmers that often have to work in committee, they aren't 
necessarily miracle workers.
   
  Could this be done? Maybe. I think could visualize mechanisms to possibly 
help here but would really have to think it through even more than I have and I 
have thought a lot about things like this... But it would take serious rework 
with how security is implemented on Windows and I would be quite fearful of the 
scaling capabilities. The Windows security system is difficult to work with and 
can be quite a pain but it is extremely flexible and powerful at the same time. 
I have started and stopped several times to write all inclusive security 
tracking tools, it is a big big deal and if done wrong will really make someone 
have a bad day.
   
  As someone else mentioned, use groups. Don't use users. When you go to delete 
a group, make it a point to clean up where that group has been used. If you 
don't know where it has been used, that is a process issue and one of the 
reasons why I am not a fan of universal and global groups because the scope of 
use is huge. Alternately write your own tools to scan all of the various ACLs 
looking for unresolvable SIDs and clean them up, but I would be shy on how 
agressive you are with the cleanup. You can easily screw yourself up.
   
    joe
   
    --
  O'Reilly Active Directory Third Edition - http://www.joeware.net/win/ad3e.htm 
   

   

    
---------------------------------
  From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Yann
Sent: Thursday, January 04, 2007 5:35 AM
To: ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org
Subject: RE : RE: [ActiveDir] SID Deleted users remains in NTS permission.


  
  Thanks for replying.
   
  You say that it is normal that the sid still remains in file & directory ACLs 
after the deletion of the corresponding group ??
   
  I always thought that sids *HAVE TO* disapear dynamically on all existing 
ACLs set on file server.
  I'm a bit surprise that the system (AD<->file server) leave this dirty sid 
and that there is no synchronisation that updates the "link" between the AD 
object and the ACE....
   
  What is the reason ? could this behavior be altering ?
   
  I'd like sid disappears after deletion of the corresponding group in AD in 
order to not have this dirty SIDs...
   
  Thanks.
   
  Yann
  

"Akomolafe, Deji" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
      It's "normal". You should be permissioning your resources with groups 
instead of directly with user accounts. Groups tend to last longer, so you 
don't have to deal with the horrible SIDs.
   

      
Sincerely, 
   _____                                
  (, /  |  /)               /)     /)   
    /---| (/_  ______   ___// _   //  _ 
 ) /    |_/(__(_) // (_(_)(/_(_(_/(__(/_
(_/                             /)      
                               (/       
Microsoft MVP - Directory Services
www.akomolafe.com - we know IT
-5.75, -3.23
Do you now realize that Today is the Tomorrow you were worried about Yesterday? 
-anon


  
  
---------------------------------
  From: Yann
Sent: Thu 1/4/2007 1:52 AM
To: ActiveDir@mail.activedir.org
Subject: [ActiveDir] SID Deleted users remains in NTS permission.


    Hello all & Happy new year ! :)
   
  AD 2k3 sp1 in FFL mode.
   
  When i delete a user or group from AD, and these objects have permissions on 
ntfs permissions, i usually see their sids remaining in those file & directory 
ACLs.
   
  Is this normal ? If not,what could be the reason(s) & how to investigate this 
issue ?
   
  Thanks,
   
  Yann
   
   
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