The best book I have ever read on language is 'Language, Thought, and Logic (Rethinking Theory)' by John Ellis. Among other things, his book shows that the different major theories of language are only partial solutions at best. He offers a kind of synthesis but even if you don't agree with him, his book is excellent. I am always amazed that it is referred to so seldom. Possibly because he isn't a disciple of any particular school of thought - always a serious error.
DA -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, 24 March 2008 8:40 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: "Signs", "meanings", and associations The time when children acquire language is endlessly fascinating, and I wish I knew -- when my kids were doing it -- what I know now. For a fascinating example, consider the way they pick up notions of "classes objects". When I took my son out I'd point at a large variety of different kinds of dogs and say "doggy". I'd do the same with other animals -- pigeons look a lot different from sparrows, but I'd cry, "Bird!" I knew it would give him a giggle, and it did, when I pointed at a large four-legged creature and said, "Doggy!" and he was able to correct me: "No! Horsey!" He'd acquired the "concept" of different classes. Alas, though such notions are useful, in time -- especially when we try to parse them philosophically -- we are over-matched, and we resort to polysyllabic foggery to hide our confusion from ourselves. For example: beware of what the adoption of a term like "referent" can do to your thinking about language. In a message dated 3/23/08 10:35:27 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > I'm not sure I agree entirely with anyone here about this issue. Semiotics > appears to be a model, but of what? Is semiotics supposed to represent the > way signs work within a system of logical notation or in our mind/brain? > > If semiotics is supposed to model the way signs work in our mind/brain then > the only process, it seems to me, that we have to work with is one of > association. > > Through repetition or some other form of acquisition we learn to associate a > word (say "doggy") with a particular taxonomical class of objects (say > domesticated canine mammals). At first the young language learner > associates the word with the referent (a live tail wagging dog). A later > development in the acquisition of language is the insertion of a general > idea or "signified" between the word (signifier) and referent. This step > transforms language from an attempt to name the things of the world to a > system of organizing the things of the world. > > Back to the mind. The qualia which comes to mind through the process of > association is a function of the structure of the brain/mind and the > experience of the language user. This is true for the signifier, signified > and the referent. > > 1. The word "doggy" must be distinguished from other signifiers, such as > "soggy", "dopey" or "sloppy". Our ability to perceive the word correctly > and distinguish it from other words is a function of both our senses and our > experience with the language. > > 2. The idea or signified which is associated when a language user hears the > word "doggy" is dependant upon both the user's experience with domesticated > canine mammals and the way those objects have been compared or contrasted > with other objects. Depending on the experience of the user, the idea or > notion signified by "doggy" may or may not include: work dogs, wild dogs, > house dogs, hot dogs or dead dogs. But, when a language user hears the term > "doggy" they are not likely to associate the rules for set > inclusion/exclusion for domesticated canine mammals. Rather, the qualia > would more likely be a token "doggy" such as a memory of a domesticated > canine mammal from the user's past or metonymical image such as the such as > the image of a "petting a fuzzy white lap dog". It would not be surprising > for a person to experience a cluster of related associations when hearing > the term. Only in confusing or ambiguous cases would the relational rules > be associated. I believe it is also true that two language users could have > different relational rules for a signified concept and without appreciating > that their understanding varies from other users. > > 3. The only available mental process for a signified concept to represent > or refer to a particular object in the world (physical, abstract or > imaginary) is through association. Associations are to some extent > predictable, but they are not yet understood as necessary. Even a > conditioned reflex will merely increase the probability that a particular > association will result. I would say that a term ("signified") represents > an object ("referent") if and only if a non-distracted and experienced > language user will probably experience the term as a request to focus her > attention on the object. > > Mike Mallory > > > ************** Create a Home Theater Like the Pros. Watch the video on AOL Home. (http://home.aol.com/diy/home-improvement-eric-stromer?video=15?ncid=aolhom0 0 030000000001) -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG. Version: 7.5.519 / Virus Database: 269.21.8/1340 - Release Date: 23/03/2008 6:50 PM
