You mistake progress, Mr. Allen, for *Linear progress:* I.e. a development that's cumulative and transitive, and which makes previous moments obselete. Hegel's aesthetics doesn't appeal to any of these notions. hence it's not linear. There's progress, to be sure, but not the kind you are attributing (especially since symbolic, classical and romantic art, perdure after their apparent demise, which would be impossible if Hegel was thinking linearly) So, I'll chalk your remarks here up to being written in haste, rather than signaling something a little more troublesome. But, this aside, there is NOTHING Hegelian about Benjamin. So, in any event, your comparison doesn't hold in the first place.
Apropos your second remark, "Er ... what about the rest of world art? And what on earth has Schopenhauer to do with the present discussion?" I can only say you're focusing on the wrong element. Schopenhauer is an instance of a mistake, namely Orientialism, not something that enters into the discussion directly. The problem is orientialism, not Schopenehauer. I thought this was clear; my mistake. Next, I have in mind a number of claims of yours, which you haven't argued explicitly. I still don't know, for instance, why you think 'aura' is an inscrutible concept, why you think Benjamin doesn't consider the history of art (especially since he discusses it), or why you think he has a linear conception of history. I know you've made these claims, but I haven't seen anything past assertions. The assertions are problematic, it seems to me, hence they need explication, and defense. As for the rest of your response, I can only say that I am a reader of history, and art history -- as were Hegel, and Benjamin -- and I do not ban anything from aesthetics. My point, moderate as I think it is, is that there are better ways of using history than to complain that a particular theory doesn't explicitly treat of a particular art form or geographical region. That wolud be like complaining that Greek drama should be thrown out because of its depictions and attitudes towards women and slavery, or that Aristotle and Plato are useless because they only discuss Greek material, or that Japanese aesthetics is myopic because it does not embrace the larger filed of art in the west, etc etc. These are unhelpful claims in every sense possible. Finally, an arbitrary gesture is one where someone makes a remark, which can be leveled against any number of positions, from any number of historical periods, from any number of geographical regions in an indiscriminant, unhelpful, and unenlightening way. That is to say, both the position being critiqued, the mode of criticism, and the content elaborated are all arbitrary. On Sat, Jul 5, 2008 at 11:04 AM, Derek Allan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > RE:L "As for Derek Allen's claims about Benjamin's (and Hegel's) view > of history, > nothing could be farther from the truth. Neither of them have a linear > conception of historical progression. " > > You truly *have* to be joking. What could be more quintessentially > linear than Hegels' view of the history of art - in its three stages - > what are they? - symbolic, Classical and Romantic - and then art's > demise? Benjamin's is just a sketchy version of something similar. > > R: ' And, although it's true that > > Benjamin is only considering Western art -- thereby avoiding the pitfalls > of > > an Orientialism that begins with Schopenhauer -" > > Er ... what about the rest of world art? And what on earth has > Schopenhauer to do with the present discussion? > > Re"The burden of critique, as > > Saul Ostrow has pointed out, rests on Allen: he must demonstrate his > claim, > > not merely assert it." > > Which "claim" *precisely* did you have in mind that I haven't argued? > (Saul keeps repeating this in a vague non-specific way - and at the > same time carefully avoids adresssing my arguments. I hope you are > not about to do the same...) > > RE: > (though we may now consider african masks, or the paleographs at > Lascaux > > 'art,' it's not clear that they were initially considered art by their > > makers, nor is it clear that simply accepting them as art now isn't an > > arbitrary retrospective gesture on our part). " > > It is quite clear that African masks were *not* considered art by > their makers. We know nothing at all of Lascaux, as you must surely > realise. (Why on earth is there this resistance to reading history, > anthopology and archeology in aesthetcis? One would think it was > banned literature or something!!) > > And what exactly is an "arbitrary retrospective gesture"? The fact > that we now consider so many magnificent African masks, pieces of > Buddhist sculpture, Mesoamerican figurines, Chinese wash drawings, etc > etc etc as art? If so should we expel them from our art museums, > close down the Musee du Quai Branly, for example, and throw all the > stuff on the scrap heap, and just tell people they are being > 'arbitrary' to admire it? After all, art begins with Duchamp doesn't > it? (Or is it Warhol?) Judging by the queues at the Branly we might > have a bit of persuading to do. But I suppose we could tell them it > was all a ghastly mistake, and that they could still go to the > Louvre.. > > DA > http://www.home.netspeed.com.au/derek.allan/default.htm > > On Sat, Jul 5, 2008 at 6:10 PM, imago Asthetik <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I'm very late to this discussion, but I would nonetheless like to add a > few > > comments. > > > > First off, I think Kate Sullivan is right to point out that prints are > works > > of art, and not, even in Benjamin's sense, reproductions. That is, as > > Sullivan points out, they still have an 'aura' (whatever that turns out > to > > be -- the place to start a serious discussion of this notion would be > > Benjamin's little history of photography). One of Benjamin's goals, if I > > may speak for him, is precisely to show the progressive, 'emancipatory' > > potential of new technical modes of production (in this sense he is > picking > > up on Bourdieu's constant critique of 'formal equality,' which masks a > > substantive inequality: everyone can visit the museum to see auratic > works > > of art, just as everyone can go to university, but this formal equality > > masks the very real fact that the Uni and the Museum require a set of > > background skills which are not readily available to low-income, > > non-bourgeois families). Aura, then, is a manner of thematizing the > > difference between formal equality and real inequality via the 'entrance > > requirements' of contemporary art, which is functionally identical to the > > relationship Benjamin wishes to draw out between 'cult value' and > 'exchange > > value' > > > > Now, the reason film, for instance, has no aura is due to the fact that > > there is no qualitative distinction to be made between the 'original' and > > the reproductions:' no matter where you see the film (in Berlin, New > York, > > Buenes Ares, etc) it's the same. That is to say, the experiences > generated > > by a particular work of art are no longer tied to a unique physical > > location, or a particular object. Auratic works, then, are ones which > > maintain a kind of qualitative distance from the observer (they are, as > > Hermeneuticists like to say, a 'Thou' to my 'I' rather than mere > equipment > > [zuhanden] within a particular context of activity). this distance > between > > means and ends thus becomes the qualitative difference that > differentiates > > the 'proletariat disadvantage' I've outlined above. > > > > As for Derek Allen's claims about Benjamin's (and Hegel's) view of > history, > > nothing could be farther from the truth. Neither of them have a linear > > conception of historical progression. That's fairly obvious (Benjamin's > > notion of 'now-time' and the 'now of recognizability', are poised > directly > > against such a conception of history). And, although it's true that > > Benjamin is only considering Western art -- thereby avoiding the pitfalls > of > > an Orientialism that begins with Schopenhauer -- I take it that his point > > about the origins of art in magic and state power is just about right, > > especially when considered in the light of Benjamin's theory of mimesis. > I > > see no problem here, since to call something that wasn't initially > > considered to be art as art is something that Allen does all the time > > (though we may now consider african masks, or the paleographs at Lascaux > > 'art,' it's not clear that they were initially considered art by their > > makers, nor is it clear that simply accepting them as art now isn't an > > arbitrary retrospective gesture on our part). The burden of critique, as > > Saul Ostrow has pointed out, rests on Allen: he must demonstrate his > claim, > > not merely assert it. > > > > As Hegel would say, everything that appears to us as being in-itself is > > implicitly something for-us; the trick us to unpack the for-us in order
