Geoff writes:
"By golly, we can agree "perception precedes ... cognition/perception".
Confusin', ain't it?
I'll try again.
In this posting only, by perceiving/perception' I shall mean solely the act
by which we pick up sense data;
And by 'words' I shall mean certain ink on paper, certain sounds, gestures,
etc -- even certain aromas, tasteable particles, and occasions for tactile
sensation. In fact every object I just mentioned is an "occasion" for
sensation,
but sensation ensues only when we contemplate the object. (By 'contemplate' I
don't mean the usual sense of "study"; I mean merely "perceive".)
And by 'sense data' I shall mean the raw sensations occasioned by "words" and
delivered via the eyes, ears etc.
Given this, I might rewrite your. . .
">"So, perhaps we might say that perceived and understood words lead
>to/elicit
>associations or responses, of course, mediated by our minds."
. . .this way:
"So, perhaps we might say that the perception of words precedes the
processing action of the apparatus within our mind (or brain) that retrieves
associated
notion (or linked neural dispositions) and generates subsequent notion (or
neural dispositions and actions). The perception must be "strong" enough to
command enough attention to make us "notice". I see or overhear many occasions
for
sense data too pallid to push my inner apparatus to do much processing. "Yes,
I saw Ralph, but I can't honestly say I noticed his shirt.""
(Recall: my primary reason for recasting Geoff's line was to remove its
suggestion that words act.)
By 'mind' I mean all things notional as distinguished from material (e.g.
neural)
By 'brain' I mean the neural tissues and their dispositions including the
neural apparatus of link-pursuit.
In a subsequent posting I'll try to convey why I've been at pains in this
posting to maintain a distinction between "notional" and "neural".
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