Frances, interesting post, thank you. "Against" ? No, they complement each other. It was certainly not my intention to oppose them - did I ?
I believe many scientists from Europe and the USA have demonstrated that the amputed limb is "in the brain" (see cortical activated, neuroplasticity etc..). By saying that I do not imply that the brain is not in the body, or that the brain doesn't map the body. We could consider pain as a result of the brain mapping the body. There is a lot of litterature about pain (does it exist?, where is it?) Yes indeed, I use phenomenal in the phenomenological sense (Merleau-Ponty et al). Nothing to do with kantian phenomena. Franco-european phenomenology as you put it has a large audience in the US. I am not sure that what you described is "angloamerican phenomenology", unless you consider "angloamerican philosophy of idealist realism and its naturalist pragmatism" beeing angloamerican phenomenology. I am kind of lost with this analogy - if it is one. For many years I have argued for indirect realism (look at afterimages, phosphenes, illusions, hallucinations and many other stuff, for example), and for the non-concetual. I also believe sensing is non-epistemic while perceiving is. I think there is no contracdiction here with beeing a phenomenologist. It seems we come from different traditions, which makes it interesting. Geoff, as for comparing amputed limb with a broken leg, well, that won't do. Best, Luc --- On Sat, 10/4/08, Frances Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: Frances Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: RE: Consciousness Assayed > To: [email protected] > Date: Saturday, October 4, 2008, 11:24 PM > France to Luc Delannoy and others... > Pitting the "physical" against the "phenomenal" may not be useful > here, unless your use of "phenomenal" differs > from the realist uses of the concept that are more familiar to me. Under the > angloamerican philosophy of idealist realism and its > naturalist pragmatism it posits that all things in the world which are > felt or sensed or known are done so as phenomena, and then such > things must be sensed only as phenomenal objects that really > exist. All objects therefore merely "seem" to be as they are > via the use of moderating signs in the quasi mind or mind and there by a > process of interpretation, all of which is due to the say sensory > limits of biotic organisms in their ability to feel or sense or > know.The umbrella hence is metaphysical or phenomenal under > which falls stuff as the mystical or phanerical (phantoms and > fantasies), and the material of physical, and the mental or > psychical. Within this scheme the physical is as phenomenal > as is the psychical. If some phenomenal object is felt sensed > other than one that is concretely actual, or if some > "menal" thing is felt sensed other than one that is really phenomenal, then > that stuff is felt sensed via iconic signs that act analogously. > Nothing in the world hence can be sensed directly, but must > be interpreted indirectly by the moderation of phenomenal > objects acting as signs. This approach suggests for example that > any pain consciously felt is seemingly what it is, whether the > existent phenomenal object given uncontrolled to sense as pain is > abstractly possible or concretely actual or discretely > agreeable. Now, if francoeuropean phenomenology differs from > angloamerican phenomenology in some substantive way from this position, > it would be illuminating to flesh it out.
