Your comments are a simplification of my comments and seek approval from Michael. I don't think you've read what I've said at all. It seems pointless to go further, to be more and more redundant in pointing out what I said in so many posts re fiction. You don't get it or you are unable to give up an ego position.
Further, I'll insist that you do indeed have a reference in mind for "floobus". The brain will automatically make some some associative "explanation" for the term. It may be vague, it may begin with the bus part and then offer some reasonable or irrational association for floo. It may be unique to you, but I claim that you can't avoid an associative image. The again, maybe you just can't do this. That's what Cheerskep says to me when I disagree with him. WC --- On Thu, 1/1/09, Geoff <[email protected]> wrote: > From: Geoff <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: Malcolm Gladwell and beliefs) > To: [email protected] > Date: Thursday, January 1, 2009, 6:27 PM > Michael: I wrote: "I agree that our perceptions are > constructed." You wrote: > "Every conscious thought is a construction or > representation from some > source, either immediate sensory perceptions or memories of > some kind." > Difference being: conscious thoughts versus perceptions. > Perhaps we're > getting close here. > I can have a conscious thought of a "floobus". I > claim that you haven't much > association to a "floobus" but it's a > conscious thought of some kind in your > mind, now that I've introduced it. I don't know > what it is but you claim > that this too is based on/derives from my perceptual > experience while I > claim that I've never heard of or considered a > "floobus" before. Small > point. > > You wrote: "Truth is the aspect of a thing's > representation that supports > the reliability of the representation." Again, I > think that we're getting > somewhere. Particularly if you would allow that > truthfulness is not an > either-or phenomenon - that there are degrees of > truthfulness (in our > constructions/construals). Cheerskep is well able to > speak/write for himself > ... but I do think that he was endeavouring to establish > that "fictions" are > not unitary or univalent. At any rate, some of my point is > that claims made > here have overlooked the truth, efficacy, efficiency > differences among > fictions held. Presumably the process of learning involves > acquiring > valuable "fictions" and discarding ones which > complicate life. I would claim > that the valuable 'fictions" are the ones which > further ones goals. All > memories are beliefs and all beliefs are fictional > is as true as all presidents are good. > Geoff C > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Michael Brady" > <[email protected]> > To: <[email protected]> > Sent: Thursday, January 01, 2009 4:35 PM > Subject: Re: Malcolm Gladwell and beliefs) > > > > On Jan 1, 2009, at 3:57 PM, Geoff wrote: > > > >> Michael: I agree that our perceptions are > constructed. I don't agree > >> that fictitious is understood by most persons to > equate to truthful. > > > > I didn't say that. The way we hold thoughts in our > mind (the "fiction" > > that William talks about) is different from its > truthfulness. Indeed, the > > notion of truth is involved in how we evaluate the > thought and act on it, > > not on the original thought itself. (This reminds me > of the Catholic > > teaching about not entertaining a temptation or sinful > thought: to think > > of the sin is to entertain the sinful thought behind > the words. Man, all > > those dirty thoughts when I was a young 'un and I > tried not to think of > > them! Sinning by not being able to cast out the > thought of the sin I was > > resisting. PS: if you weren't raised Catholic, > this will surely be > > unfamiliar!) > > > >> We may equally construe fictional/imagined persons > or verifiably > >> existent persons. Let us not confuse the process > (construction/ > >> construal) with the object > (fictional/made-believed) with the valid. > > > >c > > Thus, all of these are fictitious, that is, they are > formed or contrived > > to represent some exterior experience. It is at the > next step that the > > notion of verifiability--noumenal, phenomenal, or > epiphenomenal--enters. > > Do I "believe" the interior representation? > Truth is the aspect of a > > thing's representation that supports the > reliability of the > > representation. > > > > If it's a question of believing what I'm > seeing, it comes down to tacitly > > accepting the premise that my perception coincides > with the object or > > event causing the perception. (Something's out > there and I'm perceiving > > it without any distortion or deficiency.) > > > > If it's a question of something I am thinking > about, it comes down to > > evaluating how reliable is my awareness to hold > thoughts in my mind and > > perform cognitive transformations on those thoughts. > (Do I have the > > information I need? Have I compiled it and analyzed it > properly? Etc.) > > > > If it's a question of perceiving an external > representation, say, a book > > or television program, it come down to evaluating the > composition of the > > representation, as well as my perceptions of the > source and my thinking > > about it. (Did Snow White really exist? Did Paul > Newman? How does their > > independent existence affect what and how I think > about what I know of > > them?) > > > > One of the definitive characteristics of how > schizophrenia affects a > > person is that the person cannot distinguish between > hallucinations and > > delusional thoughts, on one hand, and external > reality. The mental > > mechanisms that you and I use to distinguish between a > fantasy (for > > example, my being able to fly like I remember from a > very vivid dream) > > and reality itself (nope, can't do that) is > impaired or absent in a > > person who experiences schizophrenic delusions. The > person just cannot > > distinguish between the delusion and reality. Thus, > entirely and wholly > > invented memories or experiences are received with the > same sense of > > believability as ordinary, day to day experiences. A > person with > > schizophrenia does in fact confuse the process of > constructing the > > thought with the verifiable validity of it. > > > > Delusions and hallucinations show us that the > "truthfulness" of an > > internal representation itself is independent of the > person's > > experiencing the delusion. The person thinks the > delusion is real and > > acts accordingly.
