William wrote:

I can't agree with Michael. His argument asserts that whatever an artist consciously makes as art is art (without qualitative ranking). That reduces art to intention in the sense that if the artist intends to make art, the result of intention is art even if it can't be ranked qualitatively until some consensus occurs or recurs.


Ah, I see my lapse, which I didn't notice until Miller agreed with me, a neurological jolt so severe I had to go back to see what provoked him.

I said--or thought I had conveyed, but apparently an ellipsis or two caught me up--I meant to say that when an artist is making an artwork-- the thing on the easel, on the plinth, on the copper plate, litho stone, etc.--he sets out to produce a thing that is (a) a representation of some kind, and (b) does not have to pass an external truth test. He sets out with the *telos* of art, true--in fact, with all the three other causes of art in mind. The artist does intend to make art, but his intention does not make it art; it only guides his actions.

More:

(a) The thing has to be a representation of some kind: a photograph, a map, a statue or macquette, a puppet, a word or song, etc. It stands first and foremost as a proxy for something else, somehow. By contrast, utilitarian things are made primarily to function in a certain way. Their stylishness is subordinate to their operation. "Beauty is as beauty does." All industrial or product design is an expression of this relationship between outward appearance and functional efficacy.

(b) The artistic representation doesn't have to be that way. The artist can paint the figure any color he chooses, or elongate the limbs, or add extra appendages, etc. The police crime scene investigator can embellish the drawing of a scene by adding or taking away a detail here or there, but that would impair the drawing's reliability at trial. The biologist can add cutesy little cilia to a drawing of some microbe, but that would ruin its value as a scientific record. Such a priori limitations on the investigator's or scientist's drawings govern how the works are made: no adding fanciful things, no taking away things, *because the work will be evaluated by comparing it to an outside standard*, i.e., a "truth test." A work of art does not fall under that jurisdiction. The artist can make it any way he pleases--and must be prepared to hear objections that a face shouldn't have a green stripe in the nose, or those naked women look so gross with all those wrinkles and cast shadows, or no such animal as a man- horse.

More:

If a thing of a certain quality is called "art," how can we speak of "bad art"? Isn't that a contradiction, an oxymoron? Or at least ambiguous: "It's art, but it's not very good."


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Michael Brady
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