Frances to Boris and William and others... Clarifying the relation between the objective artwork and the subjective psyche of any artist or percipient is the task at hand. If artworks are virtually or actually symptoms of their signers as makers and takers, then this cathartic expression is akin to indicated vomit or blood or genes or imprints, and is thus an objective phenomenal construct that is merely given uncontrolled to sense. The subject is thus merely related to the object. There is no good reason to hold that all aspects of the artistic entity are a subjective phenomenal construct either intrinsically or independently or exclusively. The very being of stuff in the world proves this.
If the instrumental laws of science are discovered accidentally by philosophers and technicians and scientists as the disposed habitual tendencies they seem to be, then the formal qualities of art may equally be found fortuitously by artists and artisans or aesthetes and aestheticians as the same inclined bents they seems to be. This does not mean that some laws or facts or qualities and forms cannot be arbitrarily invented or deliberately created by humans as subjective mental constructs, but that they are all derived from the same original causes and sources, which continue to exist as objective phenomenal constructs. For example, when the sun gives of its nice energy freely to a frolicking animal in the act of playful fun with some other animals, all for the purposive goal of thriving, then that quality of material energy is felt by the animal as an objective phenomenal fact that exists independent of all the animals. The qualities of materiality and energy and continuity and purity for example are objective properties of the sun, that can furthermore be felt by any phaneron or phanerism that is dead or alive, however some qualities of solar energy like shine or warmth or weight may indeed be determined subjectively by the recipient in the instance and occurrence of their contextual environment. The technical aspects of the material are contextual are relative to a degree. For example, the northern waters of the open ocean in summer are cold and fatal to unprotected humans, but warm and fatal to penguins, thus the quality and property of temperature is relative to the subject, but not other qualities and properties of the water. Now, when any singular object is sensed by a normal individual percipient, then two properties are actually sensed together simultaneously in the given form of that existent object, an ideal general quality and a real special fact. For example, when sensing a human it will be humanness and that human that is sensed, or when sensing an artwork it will be artiness and that artwork that is sensed. The ideal general quality is an embedded or engrained property that exists objectively within the object. It is a tone or mark that comes with the token. The tonal ideality is the tonal continuity of a world full of token objects. Pragmatism and its finding of idealism posits that the world is one of ongoing continuity. This ideal quality of continuity is at least one property that is given uncontrolled to sense, and that is accidently found in all objects. Pragmatism and its finding of realism posits that the ongoing continuous world is one of brute action. The blending of the ideal continua and the real existent will form combinatory phenomena that cannot be separated. All that other phenomena like humans can do is feel the qualitative tone in the token fact, and take what is given to them. The point to this rant of mine is that qualities are the properties of stuff given to sense, and some of those properties are objective constructs, while some of those properties are subjective constructs, but that not all of those properties are subjective constructs. All the qualities as properties are nonetheless originally from objective phenomenal sources, but whether they are determined to be mainly objective or subjective in particular contexts will depend on the relation of sense to them. The subject after all is also an object, as the subjective mental mind is of the objective material brain. In my opinion, the Worringer theory of abstraction and empathy in art therefore is only partly correct, because it places too much priority on the subject. Boris wrote... William insists that "Art objects, like anything else do not have such affective qualities. They simply are of such and such material, for such and such purpose, and so on. Any qualities, such as interesting or boring, are projected by perceivers..." "Artworks are nothing but objects. They attain the status of art objects through our own projections, personal and cultural". Projection is one way process. If it only in play we don't need art object at all. I think the main thing is a Reflection by an exposed one to the info in an art work and a projection is just a part of individual imagination. Art is not "nothing but object". It is highly organized human created structure. William wrote... Frances continues to assume that art objects have qualifying attributes that we find interesting or boring, etc. I insist that this is a manner of speaking and not a correct statement. Art objects, like anything else do not have such affective qualities. They simply are of such and such material, for such and such purpose, and so on. Any qualities, such as interesting or boring, are projected by perceivers and are only make-believe, as-if they belonged to the object. Thus it's ridiculous to say that an abstract painting (or anything at all) can be boring, or interesting, or good or bad, or meaningful. When we say that we are saying they are metaphors of our subjective regard. Artworks are nothing but objects. They attain the status of art objects through our own projections, personal and cultural. Worringer is quite clear about this. Again and again he refers to abstraction and empathy as subjective states and art objects as (at best) symptoms of those states. Today, I believe he would say metaphor instead of symptom.
