Frances continues to assume that art objects have qualifying attributes that we find interesting or boring, etc. I insist that this is a manner of speaking and not a correct statement. Art objects, like anything else do not have such affective qualities. They simply are of such and such material, for such and such purpose, and so on. Any qualities, such as interesting or boring, are projected by perceivers and are only make-believe, as-if they belonged to the object. Thus it's ridiculous to say that an abstract painting (or anything at all) can be boring, or interesting, or good or bad, or meaningful. When we say that we are saying they are metaphors of our subjective regard.
Artworks are nothing but objects. They attain the status of art objects through our own projections, personal and cultural. Worringer is quite clear about this. Again and again he refers to abstraction and empathy as subjective states and art objects as (at best) symptoms of those states. Today, I believe he would say metaphor instead of symptom. wc --- On Mon, 7/6/09, Frances Kelly <[email protected]> wrote: > From: Frances Kelly <[email protected]> > Subject: RE: Worringer: Abstraction and Empathy > To: [email protected] > Date: Monday, July 6, 2009, 12:02 AM > Frances to Boris and others... > Some good instances of abstraction actually entail a degree > of > iconic similarity. When a small microscopic section of an > object > or work is cropped and isolated and then telescopically > enlarged, > as was superbly done with the photographed marks of > paintings in > a recent post, then the exciting result can be held solely > alone > as a final abstract artifact in its own right. The degree > of > iconicity in such a case however can be very vague, so that > the > original distant source has little similarity or > familiarity to > the new picture. Any pure abstract artwork made from > scratch by > an artist would of course not be directly or > microscopically > derived as a section from another distant source, but the > artwork > would nonetheless entail a degree of iconicity, because its > form > would in the least be similar to some quality of feeling. > In any > event, it is likely that what makes any good abstraction > great is > at least partly found in its "beautiful" formal quality, > yet it > is agreed that what makes it mainly nice or good or great > or art > is not by way of its form alone, but is by way of something > else > other than its form. My standing guess is that the > something else > other than form alone will be found in the "power" the form > bears > or has that enables it to reflect worthy aesthetic values > of a > natural and cultural kind, and to evoke intense aesthetic > experiences of an emotional or practical or intellectual > kind, > that are furthermore worthwhile both individually and > communally. > > > You wrote... > To me the strongest and unique point in Worringer's thesis > that > it lays with its account of abstraction in art. In my > thesis > level of pure abstraction has nothing to do with the > formalist > element, but a degree of artistic greatness.
