I wrote: "For example, [Wittgenstein] does not seem aware here that in abruptly using the word 'purpose' he could be stirring all sorts of very different notion in the minds of his readers."
Kate then observed: "Particularly since Zweck doesn't seem to mean only purpose, but purpose which determines form. In section 2 the words are cues for defined actions. Kate Sullivan" I'm not sure what Kate has in mind with 'form', but she's right on point when she says "cues for defined actions". The "actions" here are quite specific: When the builder says, "Slab!", he wants the assistant to pick up a slab and bring it to the builder. Back up. Focus on LW's bad phrase, "Is that the purpose of the word?" It's bad because it fuses the builder and the builder's utterance. We may say people have purposes - they can have goals in mind they want, things they intend to accomplish. "Words" are insensate and inert. They don't/can't want or intend anything. They don't do anything on (their own) purpose." We, the people, frequently use "tools" to help us accomplish our purpose. It is typical of our slurring minds that we soon ascribe the "purpose" to the tool. (Our readiness to do this is no doubt increased when we invent/fabricate the tool to help us in achieving our purpose. "The purpose of this special hammer is tob&") But a hammer, dumb, insensate, inert thing that it is, cannot have a purpose - only the hammerer can. The special wrench does not intend to tighten nuts in hard-to-reach places. That is not a "goal" in the wrench's mind. I'M the one who "means" to tighten the nut, not the wrench. It's MY goal, my purpose, and yet we'll say, "The purpose of this wrench isb&" One of the tools we regularly use to accomplish an intended end, a purpose, is words, "language". Our purpose in using words is to convey "what we have in mind". "What we have in mind" is always "notional", in a broad sense of that term. Our goal in speaking is to stir in the listener's mind a notion that's as close to ours as possible (assuming we aren't trying to deceive). We tend to call that notion OUR "meaning". "What I mean isb&" Note: again, as with 'fight' or 'link', we use the same word - 'meaning' - whether we have in mind the action of "meaning" something, or the notion "meant". In typical slurring fashion, we soon ascribe that purpose, that "meaning", to the word. WE are the ones doing the "meaning", WE are the ones who have in mind the notion that is "meant" - and yet, because it is the tool we're using, we soon find ourselves saying the WORD "means", and "its meaning" isb&" On to Kate's observation that in the specific instance of when the builder says, "Slab!" to his assistant, it is a cue for a "defined action". The "action" is quite specific: the assistant is to pick up a slab and bring it to the builder. I claim LW's assertion that "THE meaning of a word" is "its use in the community" is, one, unpersuasive, two, an arbitrary stipulation, and, three, an instance of fuzzy reification of an unnecessary entity. Unpersuasive: The builder used 'slab' in his community. Therefore, acc ording to LW, that "use" is "THE meaning of 'slab' in the builder's community." I reject the implication that "pick up a slab and bring it to me" is "THE meaning of" 'slab' whenever "slab" is uttered in the builder's community. E.g. this might be a community conversation: "Harry was hurt when part of the building fell on him." "Oh? What part - a pillar or a slab?" "Slab.") I.e. LW's phrasing suggests a uniformity of intent in all members of the community, and that's obviously not the case. There is no single "its" use. Arbitrary: The mayor of the community speaks to LW: "No, no, no - your suggested meaning of 'the meaning of a word' is unacceptable to me because it's unpersuasive, and it's just an arbitrary stipulation by you. I stipulate that the meaning of a word in this community is the notion that arises in my mind whenever I look the word up in my OED. You may say that is arbitrary, but I am the mayor, and whatever I say goes!" Both the mayor and LW are arbitrary stipulators. Reifying and unnecessary: Everything the builder intends, the accomplishment of his goal, is entirely accounted for by a collection of actions and entities, none of which is yet another entity, "THE meaning of" the word 'slab'. He wants his assistant to bring him a slab. That desire - whether we think of the "desire" as a notion in his mind (his desire), or an action in his mind (also "his desire") -- it is mental, notional. His utterance, "Slab!" is a noise he intentionally creates. The noise, when heard by the assistant, stir's notion in the assistant's mind. That notion is the memory of earlier "ostensive teaching" by the builder, the "association" that LW himself acknowledges takes place. The builder had repeatedly trained the assistant by pointing at slabs and saying "Slab", and then showing the assistant how to pick one up, carry it to the ladder, and hand it up to the builder. When we ponder the two different phrases -- "the meaning of the word for the assistant" and "THE meaning of the word" -- two importantly different notions arise in our mind. We think of "the meaning of the word for the assistant" as solely notion in his mind - memories associated with the word. But the phrase "THE meaning of the word" suggests something more than merely recollections in the assistant's mind; it blurrily suggests there exists an entity that is somehow mind-independent, something that "is what it is" regardless of anyone's idiosyncratic conditioned mental responses. "Yeah, well that may be what comes to YOUR mind, Bo, but that's not the meaning of the word!" But since everything that we think of as happening when we speak of "communication" can be accounted for without ever resorting to a "THE meaning of", I'd agree with Ockham who I believe would say - 'the meaning of' is unnecessary, and an entity as chimerical as gremlins, and it should be deleted. LW was basically confused. The following is okay in the kitchen, but not in philosophy: "'Apelsin' means 'orange' in Swedish." What do you say to someone who claims, "I woke up one morning, and all of my stuff had been stolen and replaced by exact duplicates." It's not the philosopher's job to "prove negatives" - i.e. that gremlins, angels and non-material, non-notional, "THE meanings of" DON'T exist. It's the job of the guy who includes a genus of entity in his ontology to prove they DO exist. Actually, neither is likely to prove much. Their only realistic goal is to PERSUADE.
