Imago writes:

"I am not sure I understand your criticism of Wittgenstein .   From what I 
can
surmise from the passage you quoted (i do not have the Investigations at
hand), he is arguing precisely against the kind of position you hold."

I don't think LW is rejecting the entire Augustinian view of 
language-learning. LW's position is that that view is all right as far as it 
goes, but it 
doesn't go far enough - it leaves too much unaccounted for; language is 
often used with an intent in the user's mind that is beyond simply hoping to 
stir a simple image in the listener's mind. I'll quote from your translation of 
LW: 

"One can say that this ostensive teaching of words creates an associative 
connection between word and thing.   But what is that?   Well, it may mean 
different things, but one can certainly conceive that an image of the thing 
passes before the mind's eye of the child, when the child hears the right 
word.   But if that now occurs, is that the GOAL of the word? Of course it CAN 
be, and I can imagine such a use of words (series of sounds)." 

You write:


"Wittgensteins remarks do seem to offer a fair characterization of your 
position, and a criticism
of it.   What exactly do you think is wrong here?   What does he say that 
misses your point?"

In my last posting I tried to suggest some ways I feel LW went wrong -- 
e.g. attributing the speaker's purpose/goal to the tool he uses to achieve the 
goal. I'd love to go through LW's PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS line by line, 
agreeing and disagreeing, but I know I don't have the time. It would take a 
book to do that.   And since I think his most basic positions are flatly 
wrong, I don't feel too guilty about passing over him. I'd rather spend my 
time doing what I'll megalomaniacally term "creative" work. Like every other 
deluded philosopher before me, I think I'm on the right track, but I'm aware 
there's a lot of track in front of me. 

For example, LW (and Michael Brady and you) have expressed doubts about how 
my "it's all association" theory can account for conceiving of and 
communicating abstract "bits of consciousness". I hinted at this by pointing 
out how 
a young child eventually "gets your abstract idea" when you say "No!" or 
"Good boy!", but there's lots more to do.

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