----- Original Message ----
From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Sent: Sat, May 19, 2012 4:46:47 PM
Subject: Re: On Roy Harris 2 0f 2

William writes:

"It seems to
me that the game is over when a critique begins with disparaging remarks 
about a
highly recognized scholar."

The game isn't over at that point; the next round has just begun. 
Philosophy has its unlovely aspects. In other subjects you triumph by adding 
something new. In philosophy, triumph entails slaying someone old, proving them 
wrong. In the history of philosophy, the arrival of a new, considerable voice 
almost always begins with the citation of a prior philosopher's position and 
an explanation of why it is inadequate - and then the new voice proclaims its 
own novel insights, which themselves will be superseded in due time. 
  
William writes:
"For Harris, I think he means that language is indeed a faculty in that it 
exists as a language when it is being used and not independently."

Your locution here comes closer than anything Harris says, but it's still 
unclear. When people of a decent education are talking about powers of the 
mind, the notion they usually have in mind when they say "faculty" is, 
roughly, of an "ability" at a certain kind of action - e.g. memorizing, 
recalling, 

recognizing, visualizing, speaking, improvising. It's frequently used 
synonymously with 'knack': "She has a knack for learning languages." "He has a 
faculty for improvising poetry with rhymes." I maintain that usefully clear 
thinking honors a distinction between the knack and the languages, the faculty 
and the poetry. Harris does not seem consistently to maintain such a 
distinction.   And yet, in trying to ascribe the knack, I don't think he would 
say, 

"She has a language for learning languages." A similar obliviousness to 
distinctions recurs throughout his writings. 

reply: Yoiu're doing here exactly what Harris says is wrong according to his 
theory.  You're assuming that words like faculty and ability and knack have 
rather stable meanings, that they are signs independent of a determining 
context.  I think it's a very specious leap to first ignore what Harris claims 
as a first principle and to then imply he's not well educated (a sure thing 
ad-hominem) because he does not agree with your more traditional view --- 
again, 
the very view he's attacking.

William writes:
"That resolves your possible assumption that language exists as something 
alone and something else in use." 

No, my position is something of the opposite. In my next posting I'll try 
to convey why I believe you can't "learn a language". Not just because it's 
too multiplex, but because there's no such entity as "a language", no 
integrated single thing in the mind-independent world that -- as the innocent 
would 

say -- "corresponds to" the phrase "the English language". Each of us has a 
blurry but often serviceable notion in mind when we say "language". We can 
stipulate a "definition" of 'language', but that's just a fiat about what 
notion I want you to entertain when I say "language". 

REPLY: So why are you joinging sides with Harris now? He agrees with your 
comment above.

William writes:
"As for the word faculty we probably should keep in mind the common uses of 
words
in England versus the U.S."

I think I do that, William. I've spent over three years of my life in 
England, and I doubt if a day went by without my musing explicitly or 
implicitly 

on Oscar Wilde's line, "We have really everything in common with America 
nowadays except, of course, language," or by the line attributed to many, 
"Britain and America are two nations divided by a common language." 

REPLY: OK, practice what you preach.


William writes:
"Harris might be aggrandizing his contributions but if that's a flaw, it is 
not a fatal one."

My gripe was not against bragging per se; it concerned what he was bragging 
about. Harris makes much of his claim that the "meaning" of an utterance 
depends on the context, the situation. He points out that what he calls "the 
meaning" of "Fire!" is different when said by the commander of a firing squad 
or said by someone in a theater who notices flames. (Put aside the 
blurriness of his use of 'meaning' there.)

I say his insight there is so obvious and so common that it's all but 
truistic. And yet Harris hardly he seems aware of how hackneyed it is. He goes 
on 

to emphasize the the importance and profundity of his vision:

'That is why integrationism pays far more attention to contextualization 
than any other approach to language.'

REPLY:  Alright, but keep in mind that this comment is taken from a Google 
entry 
that introduces Harris' theory to one and all.  Probably the majority of his 
Google audience is made up of those who had never heard of him or even Saussure 
.

I do feel Harris should stick strictly to "linguistics", and leave 
philosophy to others who are more equipped for it.

REPLY Harris was a colleague of Collingwood at Oxford.   The two men had 
similar 
theories, the former on language, the latter on aesthetics/art
wc

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