People learn to share certain interpretations within their own culture and 
across other cultures in both place and like.  Some such 'agreements' could be 
limited to two people who signal to each other about something they are sharing 
--as when one hunter waves to another that he has a clear shot at the deer on 
the meadow.  To casual onlooker such a signal might be interpreted differently. 
  Other agreements cover a broader span but are still limited to say, a group 
of 
fifty.  And, obviously, you can see how this can be expanded to identify an 
agreement among millions or tens of millions, or more. We can also notice 
likenesses in objects or habits that are not a part of our 'agreement' context 
and when that happens we surmise or interpret as best we can.  That's where 
your 
arrowheads come in. They have similarities to modern implements so make 
reasoned 
guesses.  Yet a trained archaeologist may know that some pointy flints are not 
arrowheads but engravers or awls, etc.  None of this requires that ay object 
has 
something inherent that will guarantee one interpretation over another.  That's 
why it's more sensible to say something is 'about' something else.  The word 
'about' is a stand-in for culturally shared interpretations of a few to many, 
that's all. 
wc


----- Original Message ----
From: Michael Brady <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
Sent: Sun, December 9, 2012 11:59:15 AM
Subject: Re: Kate's excellent queries; Barthes; etc

On Dec 9, 2012, at 12:25 PM, William Conger <[email protected]> wrote:

> Why do so many folks insist that inanimate things 'contain' meaning or can
> 'communicate' meaning?  This must be a carry-over from our primitive,
magical
> past history.

But we've talked about this before, and it recalls the first chapter of
Danto's "Transfiguration of the Commonplace." Upon seeing a square of canvas
stretched across a wooden frame and painted red, the viewer ponders what it
"means" (in Danto's phrasing, what it is "about"). There is something evient
in the object that strongly conveys to the viewer that (a) it was made
intentionally, and (b) that there are characteristics in its physical
appearance that can be connected to a "meaning" or intention. The meaning
isn't contained in the object, but the object's form can reliably evoke that
meaning ("notion in someone's head," or NISH) if one is receptive (understands
the language, e.g.)

Consider things unearthed in paleolithic digs. I'm not thinking of the Venus
of Willendorf or abstruse inscriptions carved in ivory but of rudimentary
stone arrowheads and hand-axes. I've seen photos of them. The arrowheads look
like random chips of stone and the axes look like ovoid rocks with a pointed
end. I do not see the "evidence" of workmanship in many of them but trained
archaeologists do and claim that these objects are intentionally made, not
just rubble in a gravesite. The objects contain the physical properties that
call forth an interpretation by a viewer. No animist magic.



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Michael Brady

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