On Jan 18, 2013, at 1:55 PM, saul ostrow <[email protected]> wrote:
> I have come to understand that Kent believed representations > are the recall of those sensory experiences - the object that we associate > them with is only intuited and then named by language representation - as > such language (semiotic systems) reference or signify the bundles of > experiences - thus representation refers to our experiences associated with > some stimuli and not the stimuli itself (which is only known as an > intuition) -Hegel's phenomenology in turn seeks to differentiate between > experience -and the psychology induced by its representation (that which > is objectified) in turn we begin to believe that there are things in the > world that correspond to our representation of them - This explanation seems to embrace the habits or methods of recursion and abbreviations in conscious representations (i.e., not the way the brain represents experience to itself, but how we are consciously aware of those representation, such as by using language). For example, the degree of "naturalness" or "realism" in a portrayal varies widely in a range from the high visual fidelity of super-realism to the extremely minimized techniques of, say, Rodin's Balinese dancers or Modigliani and others. The form of the image--whether mimetic or schematic--is sufficient to evoke the memory of the stimuli, e.g., what it felt like to see a body or a landscape or room interior. I have been trying to work out for myself an explanation of how images work by a "linguistic" method rather than by a "depictive" mode, that is by a mode in which the artist or viewer sees a curve in an image and recognizes that it correlates to the outline or shape of a shoulder, and another curve correlates to the hip, etc., instead of a mode in which the viewer sees a figure and recognizes that it in its entirety corresponds to a person. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Michael Brady
