IPv6 has “Temporary” outbound IPs for different outbound sessions. These temp 
IPv6 IPs expire over time and change.
I had four or five at one time on my mac for existing TCP sessions that were 
still open, but new traffic wouldn’t be allowed to talk to them.
There's also a fixed inbound IPv6 address, but the possibility of guessing the 
single IPv6 IP on a /64 subnet of 18 quintillion IPv6 IPs is a bit harder.
Well, a lot harder than script kiddies just scanning each port on each public 
IPv4 IP. 
So I guess it’s more like security through obscurity, but still nothing beats a 
properly configured firewall. 



> On Oct 22, 2016, at 9:39 AM, Ken Hohhof <af...@kwisp.com> wrote:
> 
> Takeaway quote:  the Internet is “vulnerable to toasters”.
>  
> I’ve got to suspect most of these cheap Chinese webcams (i.e. 90% of them) 
> and other devices are only accessible via a public IP address because of 
> UPnP.  And apparently they are forwarding not just HTTP and HTTPS through the 
> router but also telnet and SSH.  Death to  UPnP!  We don’t enable it when 
> customers lease routers from us.  These cams should be using some sort of 
> proxy in the cloud to relay the video, not port forwarding on the customer’s 
> router.
>  
> I also suspect a lot of these are outside the US.  At the risk of opening up 
> the dreaded “NAT is not a firewall” and “IPv6 is great/terrible” debates, how 
> does IPv6 not increase the IoT threat?  What is the typical setup for an IPv6 
> enabled customer with toasters and webcams that get public IPs?  Does the 
> router from the ISP or supplied by the customer still implement a stateful 
> firewall so that inbound traffic is blocked unless a connection has been 
> established by outbound traffic or a port forwarding rule?  Or are there IPv6 
> toasters with web and CLI access wide open?  Does UPnP still exist with IPv6? 
>  Maybe it’s no more of a problem with IPv6, but then I still wonder, why are 
> so many IoT devices accessible via telnet to exploit the hardcoded default 
> passwords?  Maybe it’s not our customers buying cheap webcams at Costco, 
> maybe it’s really businesses putting their security cameras directly on 
> public IP addresses?
>  
>   <>
> From: Af [mailto:af-boun...@afmug.com] On Behalf Of Jaime Solorza
> Sent: Saturday, October 22, 2016 9:57 AM
> To: Animal Farm <af@afmug.com>
> Subject: Re: [AFMUG] Another large DDoS, Stop Being a Dick
>  
> 'Smart' home devices used as weapons in website attack
> http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37738823 
> <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37738823>
>  
> On Oct 22, 2016 8:14 AM, "Mike Hammett" <af...@ics-il.net 
> <mailto:af...@ics-il.net>> wrote:
>> Here's a tested config that works with standard IP Firewall. Once I get a 
>> chance, I'll make and test a version that uses raw.
>> 
>> /ip firewall address-list
>> add address=x.x.x.x/yy comment="My IPs" list=Public_Networks
>> add address=x.x.x.x/yy comment="Upstream /30" list=Public_Networks
>> add address=x.x.x.x/yy comment="Customer ABC's ARIN allocation" 
>> list=Public_Networks
>> 
>> /ip firewall filter
>> add action=drop chain=forward comment="Block Spoofed Traffic" 
>> out-interface=[upstream interface] src-address-list=!Public_Networks
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -----
>> Mike Hammett
>> Intelligent Computing Solutions <http://www.ics-il.com/>
>>  <https://www.facebook.com/ICSIL> 
>> <https://plus.google.com/+IntelligentComputingSolutionsDeKalb> 
>> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/intelligent-computing-solutions> 
>> <https://twitter.com/ICSIL>
>> Midwest Internet Exchange <http://www.midwest-ix.com/>
>>  <https://www.facebook.com/mdwestix> 
>> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/midwest-internet-exchange> 
>> <https://twitter.com/mdwestix>
>> The Brothers WISP <http://www.thebrotherswisp.com/>
>>  <https://www.facebook.com/thebrotherswisp>
>> 
>> 
>>  <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCXSdfxQv7SpoRQYNyLwntZg>
>> From: "Mike Hammett" <af...@ics-il.net <mailto:af...@ics-il.net>>
>> To: af@afmug.com <mailto:af@afmug.com>
>> Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 12:17:13 PM
>> Subject: Re: [AFMUG] Another large DDoS, Stop Being a Dick
>> 
>> /ip firewall address-list
>> add list="Public-IPs" address=x.x.x.x/yy disabled=no comment="My IPs"
>> add list="Public-IPs" address=x.x.x.x/yy disabled=no comment="Downstream 
>> customer X IPs"
>> 
>> /ip firewall filter
>> add action=drop chain=forward comment="Drop spoofed traffic" disabled=no 
>> out-interface="To-Upstream" dst-address-list=!"Public-IPs"
>> 
>> That was largely composed off of the top of my head and typed on my phone, 
>> so it may not be completely accurate.
>> 
>> 
>> You should also do it on customer-facing ports not allowing anything to come 
>> in, but that would be best approached once Mikrotik and the per interface 
>> setting for unicast reverse path filtering. You would then said customer 
>> facing interfaces to strict and all other interfaces to loose. They accepted 
>> the feature request, just haven't implemented it yet.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -----
>> Mike Hammett
>> Intelligent Computing Solutions <http://www.ics-il.com/>
>>  <https://www.facebook.com/ICSIL> 
>> <https://plus.google.com/+IntelligentComputingSolutionsDeKalb> 
>> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/intelligent-computing-solutions> 
>> <https://twitter.com/ICSIL>
>> Midwest Internet Exchange <http://www.midwest-ix.com/>
>>  <https://www.facebook.com/mdwestix> 
>> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/midwest-internet-exchange> 
>> <https://twitter.com/mdwestix>
>> The Brothers WISP <http://www.thebrotherswisp.com/>
>>  <https://www.facebook.com/thebrotherswisp>
>> 
>> 
>>  <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCXSdfxQv7SpoRQYNyLwntZg>
>> From: "Mike Hammett" <af...@ics-il.net <mailto:af...@ics-il.net>>
>> To: af@afmug.com <mailto:af@afmug.com>
>> Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 11:21:35 AM
>> Subject: [AFMUG] Another large DDoS, Stop Being a Dick
>> 
>> There's another large DDoS going on now. Go to this page to see if you can 
>> be used for UDP amplification (or other spoofing) attacks:
>> 
>> https://www.caida.org/projects/spoofer/ 
>> <https://www.caida.org/projects/spoofer/>
>> 
>> Go to these pages for more longer term bad behavior monitoring:
>> 
>> https://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/ <https://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/>
>> https://radar.qrator.net/ <https://radar.qrator.net/>
>> 
>> 
>> Maybe we need to start a database of ASNs WISPs are using and start naming 
>> and shaming them when they have bad actors on their network. This is 
>> serious, people. Take it seriously.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -----
>> Mike Hammett
>> Intelligent Computing Solutions <http://www.ics-il.com/>
>>  <https://www.facebook.com/ICSIL> 
>> <https://plus.google.com/+IntelligentComputingSolutionsDeKalb> 
>> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/intelligent-computing-solutions> 
>> <https://twitter.com/ICSIL>
>> Midwest Internet Exchange <http://www.midwest-ix.com/>
>>  <https://www.facebook.com/mdwestix> 
>> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/midwest-internet-exchange> 
>> <https://twitter.com/mdwestix>
>> The Brothers WISP <http://www.thebrotherswisp.com/>

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