Jim, I'm sharing this with the rest of the group. I must have replied to only you in the first place, and so everything else has just been between us.
On Mon, Jan 12, 2015 at 4:52 PM, Jim Bromer <[email protected]> wrote: > When I said that a concept could be derived from other concepts I was > really thinking of the referents of the > conceptual data structures. I don't have a plan to use derived classes > for derived referents. I was just pointing that out because that is > the basis for a non- > > I was just pointing out that a concept may be derived from another > concept which may itself be derived from the first concept because > that is the basis for a coherentist model of knowledge (which is > saying that it is not a logical model of knowledge.) However a > coherent model does not have to be radical, it can be built with logic > and probability and other logical-mathematical systems. I am saying > that this is the reality so we should be thinking about it. > Jim Bromer > > > On Mon, Jan 12, 2015 at 5:46 PM, Jim Bromer <[email protected]> wrote: > > It took me a few minutes to understand what you meant by saying that > > what I was talking about sounded like a kind of reflection. A computer > > program is a Inductive-Deductive system. As long as the effects of a > > statement are constrained in some ways the program will behave as > > expected. So an input to a word processor does not have the same > > computational potential as the input to a programming language. I > > don't mean that programs are actually defined this way but that > > programs which are tested and improved on will tend toward something > > that is roughly equivalent to this. > > > > The question of whether the program is running within a well defined > > set of logical level of constraints would (for example) be relative to > > the vantage point of an engineer (like a reflection engineer). But > > this too is relative of course. If an analyst sets the bounds in one > > way then even a well tested subprogram might easily go beyond those > > bounds. (I meant that an obvious statement.) > > > > When I said that a concept could be derived from other concepts I was > > really thinking of the referents of the > > conceptual data structures. I don't have a plan to use derived classes > > for derived referents. I was just pointing that out because that is > > the basis for a non- > > > > I do think we can write working programs which represent relativist > > concepts. Actually, I think most programs with a lot of IO actually > > work that way regardless of how tightly they are engineered. I just > > don't think people recognize that the concepts they have their > > programs represent are relativistic and so they miss the clues on how > > this can be better used for AGI. > > > > For example, the concepts used in a statement have meaning based on > > previous uses. We can use words to direct other people to interpret > > these statements. So a single statement does not contain all the > > information that is needed to interpret it. (That is obviously true.) > > So a statement may have different interpretations based on previous > > knowledge and based on different directions on how it should be used. > > People can even set up systems of interpretations similar to the > > results of a probabilistic ordering on how a word or phrase is used > > (but people can even set up systems on how to interpret something > > through linguistic direction in conversation or by both referring to > > the same information. > > > > I just looked the term, "computable function," up > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computable_function and found that > > Enderton gave a list of characteristics of a computable function and > > the meaning of one of them was, > > "There must be exact instructions (i.e. a program), finite in length, > > for the procedure." > > This was interpreted as meaning, > > "Thus every computable function must have a finite program that > > completely describes how the function is to be computed. It is > > possible to compute the function by just following the instructions; > > no guessing or special insight is required." > > > > I am saying that some guessing or special insight is expected to be > > necessary. Although this may just be a referent discrepancy (how the > > words are used to refer to something), I think the discrepancy is so > > important that it should be emphasized. So the program would have to > > have something that effectively acted like computable function to > > interpret a statement well, but it wouldn't always interpret > > statements well (it can learn at an appropriate level) and there is an > > element of selection based on guessing (it has to figure some things > > out by making educated guesses.) > > > > So the referents and the emphasis of meaning (encoding) are the things > > that I am getting at. > > > > I didn't realize I sent my previous message to you rather than the agi > > list. The reply menu thing on gmail seems to try to send messages to > > individuals rather than groups and I don't always catch it since it > > doesn't always act that way and I expect it to act like most other > > email programs. > > > > > > Jim Bromer > > > > > > On Mon, Jan 12, 2015 at 10:51 AM, Aaron Hosford <[email protected]> > wrote: > >>> One of the issues that this opens up is that a concept may be derived > from > >>> a concept which is > >>> derived from it. > >> > >> > >> Derived in what sense? As in class inheritance? Or as in logical > derivations > >> (proofs)? > >> > >> > >>> So something that might seem like it is a reference to a fundamental > >>> element of reality (or of the imagination) might at other times be > >>> recognized to be a complex object composed of other parts. > >> > >> > >> It sounds like what you are talking about is a semantic version of > >> reflection. > >> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reflection_%28computer_programming%29) > At some > >> point, the code has to have a bottom -- a fundamental set of elements > that > >> it operates on -- to its representation, or it won't be computable. This > >> does not imply that these elements should be in some way fundamental to > >> reality, only that the software knows how to work with these primitive > >> constructs to build more complex ones. If we are able to construct > complex > >> representations that represent these primitive constructs, essentially > using > >> them to reason about themselves, and then apply the results of that > >> meta-level reasoning back to the original constructs, then we will have > what > >> amounts to virtualization of conceptual relativism; we can convert any > >> element that at face value is fundamental into something that is not, > and > >> back again. This leaves us in the position of having a computable system > >> that is nonetheless capable of completely reparsing its understanding > of any > >> arbitrary concept, however fundamental, to express it in terms of other > >> concepts. > >> > >> > >> On Sat, Jan 10, 2015 at 10:09 AM, Jim Bromer <[email protected]> > wrote: > >>> > >>> Aaron, > >>> Much of your description sounds reasonable to me. The major difference > >>> is that I see conceptual relativism as a description of reality - as > >>> best I see it. There is no such thing as a conceptual element even > >>> though we need to use data objects as if they were elemental at times. > >>> So something that might seem like it is a reference to a fundamental > >>> element of reality (or of the imagination) might at other times be > >>> recognized to be a complex object composed of other parts. For > >>> example, it might only be understood using different knowledge which > >>> means that the nature of the thing is really dependent on other kinds > >>> of referents. Or take a particle of a rock. It might seem like a > >>> fundamental element but it is not really. It is a complex system of > >>> events and reactions. So while in most thoughts the particle might be > >>> best treated as a simple referent, in other thoughts it can be treated > >>> as a key to better understanding much of the universe. > >>> > >>> This idea of conceptual relativism shows that concepts can be > >>> introduced with all sorts of potential complexities. Therefore, a > >>> computational system that is capable of handling them must be capable > >>> of dealing with complex referents even if they are treated as > >>> elemental. Your note that Entities can be both abstract or concrete > >>> is the sort of thing that is needed for conceptual relativism - that > >>> is, if thoughts are comprised of relativistic concepts as I believe > >>> the are. > >>> > >>> Of course our computational system has to deal with data objects as if > >>> they were elemental. But at the same time it has to be able to deal > >>> with the potential for greater complexity. One of the issues that this > >>> opens up is that a concept may be derived from a concept which is > >>> derived from it. Although this may make a dedicated logician or > >>> programmer a little uneasy, it is obvious that we deal with situations > >>> like that frequently. Often this kind of problem can be resolved by > >>> recognizing that there are common parts related to the two objects or > >>> that one or both of the concepts is illogical or that it is just > >>> paradoxical. But at other times it might be a perfectly reasonable > >>> situation that does not need to be resolved even if it seems like it > >>> might be further resolvable on further thought. > >>> Jim Bromer > >>> > >>> > >>> On Fri, Jan 9, 2015 at 4:47 PM, Aaron Hosford <[email protected]> > wrote: > >>> > When I design an object-oriented system, I first try to identify the > >>> > kinds > >>> > of objects that must be represented, and then I try to identify the > >>> > kinds of > >>> > interactions those objects can have. (There are of course multiple > >>> > iterations, with the kinds of interactions further informing and > >>> > reshaping > >>> > my original decisions regarding the kinds of objects to be > represented.) > >>> > Through this process, I gradually move from my abstract conception of > >>> > the > >>> > problem space towards a more concrete representation, which helps me > to > >>> > not > >>> > only better clarify my own understanding, but also to implement the > >>> > system > >>> > in workable code. > >>> > > >>> > I think we could benefit from applying this process to your ideas of > >>> > conceptual relativism, conceptual structure, reason-based reasoning, > >>> > etc. > >>> > Some of your ideas and observations resonate with my own, but you are > >>> > operating at such a level of abstraction that it is difficult to be > sure > >>> > we > >>> > are talking about the same things. What are the primitive components > of > >>> > your > >>> > theory? What are the primitive interactions they are capable of? In > >>> > order to > >>> > convert such abstract ideas into code, we have to move towards > >>> > concreteness. > >>> > Flying high into conceptual space helps us to identify common > patterns, > >>> > but > >>> > ultimately we must connect those concepts back to well-grounded ones > for > >>> > them to be usefully engaged. > >>> > > >>> > In my own system, I have some very specific components that work > >>> > together to > >>> > form concepts. I keep iteratively refining these components and their > >>> > interactions by writing and rewriting code for them, identifying > >>> > shortcomings, and starting over with a better foundation from the > >>> > knowledge > >>> > I have gained. Here is my current conceptual structure for conceptual > >>> > structures: > >>> > > >>> > Entities: These are objects and events, whether abstract or concrete. > >>> > They > >>> > are defined only implicitly by the glomming together of > manifestations, > >>> > to > >>> > be described below. > >>> > Manifestations: These are individual snapshots of entities at a given > >>> > time > >>> > and place. In natural language, they correspond to specific mentions > of > >>> > objects and events. In vision, they correspond to specific > perceptions > >>> > of > >>> > objects and events. In the thinking process, they may also be > generated > >>> > through reasoning based on expectations of existence/occurrence. They > >>> > can > >>> > also be hypothetically generated during speculation. Manifestations > >>> > clump > >>> > together to form entities based on similarity, locality, and other > >>> > topological factors. > >>> > Attributes: These are like tags that can be attached to > >>> > manifestations/entities to represent their unique features or states. > >>> > They > >>> > are typically represented in natural language with adjectives and > >>> > adverbs. > >>> > Kinds: These roughly correspond to classes in the object-oriented > >>> > paradigm, > >>> > serving to abstract common features among entities into a shared > >>> > template > >>> > that helps to shape expectations for the entities that are associated > >>> > with > >>> > them. > >>> > Relationships: These are like directed edges in a (multi)graph, > linking > >>> > two > >>> > (or more) entities together, tagged with some label to identify the > type > >>> > of > >>> > relationship between the objects. > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > The conceptual elements above can be snapped together to form more > >>> > complex > >>> > structures, building a model of a real or imagined situation or > story, > >>> > which > >>> > can then be used to simulate that scenario and make predictions about > >>> > its > >>> > past/present/future behavior using expectations generated from > supposed > >>> > or > >>> > observed probabilistic rules of interaction between the entities in > >>> > question. Like the object-oriented paradigm after which it was > initially > >>> > modeled (but has since diverged from), this system is capable of > >>> > building > >>> > models of arbitrary systems to any level of detail or abstraction. > >>> > Unlike > >>> > the object-oriented paradigm, this system is designed to avoid the > >>> > implicit > >>> > assumptions OO carries of absolute knowledge regarding the truth of > >>> > predicates and the identities/states/relationships of objects. > >>> > > >>> > Your concept of conceptual relativism, as I understand it from the > >>> > highly > >>> > abstract statements you have made about it, sounds to me like the > notion > >>> > that the meanings of the various elements of conceptual structure > should > >>> > be > >>> > determined by their interconnections with each other, as is the case > >>> > with my > >>> > system. In the case of my preceding attempt to make my abstract > >>> > conceptions > >>> > of conceptual structure more concrete, this is tantamount to saying > that > >>> > the > >>> > meaning of each component is defined by how the components are > snapped > >>> > together to form a cognitive model, and how the particular component > >>> > fits > >>> > into this larger integrated whole. Reason-based reasoning would take > the > >>> > form of a heuristic that attributes and relationships that are > >>> > unexpected > >>> > must be further analyzed until they become expected, with changes > being > >>> > made > >>> > to the surrounding model to make them more reasonable according to > the > >>> > system's learned rules for model consistency. (In other words, the > >>> > system > >>> > takes an inconsistent local configuration to be a cue for local > >>> > refinement > >>> > of the model.) > >>> > > >>> > Does this accurately capture the insights you have been attempting to > >>> > convey? If not, can you make your expressions of them more concrete? > How > >>> > would you modify my above characterization of conceptual structures > to > >>> > better suit your own theory? > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > On Mon, Jan 5, 2015 at 10:46 AM, Jim Bromer via AGI <[email protected] > > > >>> > wrote: > >>> >> > >>> >> I don't find myself doing many conceptual prototyping in my head > but I > >>> >> do think about things and I make adjustments to my 'theories' about > >>> >> things and these adjustments are integrated into the greater > >>> >> structures of the thoughts about these subjects. The structure is > not > >>> >> only based on sequential processes and general processes (as many of > >>> >> my simple 'theories' seem to be at first) but there are extensive > and > >>> >> meaningful connections to other 'theories' and knowledge (as can be > >>> >> seen in one of these messages.) So what I am saying is that the > >>> >> conceptual relations that might be used in a thought cannot be all > >>> >> prototyped by the programmer. > >>> >> Jim Bromer > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> On Sun, Jan 4, 2015 at 9:30 PM, Jim Bromer <[email protected]> > wrote: > >>> >> > I have to talk about some of the mechanisms. I can't help > myself. I > >>> >> > would expect the program, if I got it to some level of fundamental > >>> >> > feasibility, to handle numerous kinds of situations as long as the > >>> >> > knowledge it had built up was useable for those situations. The > >>> >> > question is how could it be able to support the kind of reasoning > >>> >> > that > >>> >> > I think should be possible? If I was able to teach the program > >>> >> > something about a simple world model it should be able to > >>> >> > subsequently > >>> >> > answer something about that model. And I also should be able to > use > >>> >> > generalizations and figures of speech that could be applied to > that > >>> >> > simple model but which could potentially be applied to situations > of > >>> >> > greater complexity as well. But the problem is (of course) that > as > >>> >> > it > >>> >> > learns more the number of possibilities should increase > sufficiently > >>> >> > to eventually slow it down and befuddle it. > >>> >> > > >>> >> > I am hoping to get back to working on a text-based program. > However, > >>> >> > if I was able to get it to work I think it would be simple to one > day > >>> >> > expand it to include some kind of visual processing as well. The > >>> >> > combination of imagery and text would be interesting. > >>> >> > > >>> >> > Although I will program it to initially look for superficial > >>> >> > relations > >>> >> > in the text and to recombine them in different ways, I want it to > be > >>> >> > able to derive concepts through trial and error. From there it > has to > >>> >> > build further knowledge partly based on the way the user (me) > reacts > >>> >> > to the program. So it would have a slight tendency to draw > >>> >> > conclusions > >>> >> > about the basic relations between words (and other parts of text) > by > >>> >> > the way the user responds to its expression of how it combines > them. > >>> >> > (The use of fundamental kinds of linguistic behavior to indicate > how > >>> >> > words might be related may need to be learned.) > >>> >> > > >>> >> > I believe that a simple piece of information, like a simple > concept, > >>> >> > has to be associated with hundreds or thousands of other simple > >>> >> > pieces > >>> >> > of information. I also believe that the analysis of some input > has to > >>> >> > be matched against an imaginative projection (including the > >>> >> > projection > >>> >> > of previously learned knowledge) in order to build a better > >>> >> > foundation > >>> >> > of what the meaning of the input is and how it should be responded > >>> >> > to. > >>> >> > This is a complexity problem so I also believe that extensive > >>> >> > indexing > >>> >> > also has to be developed for the acquired knowledge. The indexing > >>> >> > might, for example, be based on generalizations derived from the > >>> >> > knowledge that it had acquired. > >>> >> > > >>> >> > Ben's example of a child learning about a pet is a good one. Of > >>> >> > course > >>> >> > a text only AI/AGI program is not going to have the experiences a > >>> >> > child can have with a pet. However, the program can be exposed to > a > >>> >> > lot of information about pets. I think this extensive knowledge, > >>> >> > combined with trial and error interactions with a user-teacher > should > >>> >> > make the program capable of good concept formation even though it > >>> >> > will > >>> >> > be different from a child's. > >>> >> > > >>> >> > Human beings often seem to deal with opposing and contradictory > >>> >> > theories about the world with little bother. It is only when a > >>> >> > contradictory theory leads directly to some obstacle or the study > of > >>> >> > a > >>> >> > situation starts to highlight the conflict in theories does it > become > >>> >> > a problem. So I think this is a situation that can be described > best > >>> >> > with conceptual relativism. Even when we discover a contradiction > we > >>> >> > usually first explain it away as a variation that can occur. It > takes > >>> >> > some hard headedness to assume that an unexpected variation might > >>> >> > represent a contradiction in theories. > >>> >> > > >>> >> > I believe that reason-based reasoning is also important. So a > >>> >> > pet-like > >>> >> > object might be visually noticed in a room based on its features > and > >>> >> > actions. If the animal or object is seen frequently and it stands > >>> >> > out > >>> >> > against the background, a concept about it will be developed using > >>> >> > concepts about the features and actions of other pets. > >>> >> > > >>> >> > Finally, let me add one more thing. Concepts may represent or > refer > >>> >> > to > >>> >> > objects but they can also play functional roles. So while a > >>> >> > conceptual > >>> >> > function prototype might be sufficient to potentially represent > any > >>> >> > kind of conceptual relation, I believe it is more to the point to > say > >>> >> > that that the program must be capable of deriving conceptual > function > >>> >> > prototypes in response to the events it observes in the IO data > >>> >> > environment. Let me draw a parallel. The argument can be made that > >>> >> > any > >>> >> > program is a system of yes-no questions and responses. But that > >>> >> > doesn't mean that programmers could effectively use a programming > >>> >> > language that was designed solely on that principle. Similarly, I > >>> >> > believe that an AGI program has to be designed to implement the > >>> >> > eventual formation of conceptual function prototypes and to be > >>> >> > prepared to handle their application and development. Even if I am > >>> >> > unable to figure out how the program could soundly derive > functional > >>> >> > prototypes (dynamically) I can use the idea in imaginative > >>> >> > projections. The reason dynamic functional prototypes is so > important > >>> >> > is because if concepts become structurally (or abstractly) > >>> >> > specialized, which is part of my theory, then there will probably > be > >>> >> > a > >>> >> > need to new kinds of conceptual relations to generalize across > them. > >>> >> > I > >>> >> > think this makes sense and this kind of reasoning comes almost > >>> >> > directly from speculation about the consequences of conceptual > >>> >> > relativism as I see it. > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > Jim Bromer > >>> >> > > >>> >> > > >>> >> > On Sun, Jan 4, 2015 at 2:25 PM, Peter Voss <[email protected]> > wrote: > >>> >> >> I would find it useful if you could provide one or two specific > >>> >> >> examples of concepts being derived using existing concepts -- not > >>> >> >> the > >>> >> >> mechanics, but situations. > >>> >> >> > >>> >> >> Best, > >>> >> >> > >>> >> >> Peter > >>> >> >> > >>> >> >> -----Original Message----- > >>> >> >> From: Jim Bromer via AGI [mailto:[email protected]] > >>> >> >> Sent: Sunday, January 04, 2015 10:52 AM > >>> >> >> ... > >>> >> >> I was asked if the differences of my theories from the mainstream > >>> >> >> theories and the theories behind the AI / AGI Frameworks that are > >>> >> >> being > >>> >> >> devised are just a matter of semantics. I don't think they > are.... > >>> >> >> > >>> >> >> A true AGI program will need to derive concepts about its > >>> >> >> interactions > >>> >> >> with the IO data environment that it is exposed to. > >>> >> >> It is going to take other concepts to interpret a concept.... > >>> >> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> ------------------------------------------- > >>> >> AGI > >>> >> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now > >>> >> RSS Feed: > >>> >> https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/23050605-2da819ff > >>> >> Modify Your Subscription: > >>> >> > >>> >> > https://www.listbox.com/member/?&; > >>> >> Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > >>> > > >>> > > >> > >> > ------------------------------------------- AGI Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/21088071-f452e424 Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=21088071&id_secret=21088071-58d57657 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
