Richard, The discussion is becoming more complicated than I expected. ;-)
There are three related, but different issues: (1) For AGI research, whether it is always a good idea to treat a complicated AI system as a Turing machine. My answer is "No", and the argument is given in http://nars.wang.googlepages.com/wang.computation.pdf . However, it is not what I want to discuss here. (2) For AGI research, whether it is always a good idea to treat a physical entity or event, like your cappuccino or a hurricane, as a Turing machine. My answer is also "No", but it is a different issue, which I would rather not discuss in the near future. (3) For AGI research, whether there is a qualitative difference between a conventional computer and a robot. This is the issue I plan to address in a new paper I'm working on. Some people (such as Brooks and Harnad) argue that the sensorimotor mechanism of a robot is necessary for AGI, and there is a fundamental difference between a robot and a laptop, since the latter, as a Turing Machine, is disembodied and ungrounded. I want to argue that this opinion is based on a misconception. My position statement is: If in a sense a laptop computer is a Turing machine, then in the same sense a robot is also a Turing machine. Of course a robot and a laptop have many differences, which are relevant to AGI, but irrelevant to this discussion. Pei On 10/2/06, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
All right, Pei: I'm going to turn the question back on you and ask more questions, by way of an answer. Suppose I had a computational system that consisted of large numbers of small units, each of which was approximately like a conventional processor, but with some of its activities governed by real-world noise sources, to make the overall behavior not-quite-turing. (In other words, a neuron! Or in other words again, a turing machine plus noisy inputs that were ultimately governed by quantum-scale noise). Now, suppose that the thing was best modelled and understood by us as an almost-turing-machine, because it was so close. Suppose further that this was part of an intelligent system, in which these processing units were playing a role down at a very low level (roughly equivalent to the neural level in our brain), and that there was a higher level (roughly equivalent to the conceptual or logical reasoning level in our brain) where there was once again an almost-turing level of description. Now, to an outside observer, there is a choice. They could go right down to the quantum-turing level (as David Deutsch did) and declare that the system is functionally equivalent to a Turing machine. Or they could go up to the unit level and say, well, it is almost a turing machine there. Or they could go up further and say that it is almsot turing there too. My point is: what conclusions does one want to draw from the turingness of something? If I can (in Ben's words) take my cappuccino here and say that it can be "approximated arbitrarily closely by a quantum Turing machine", the currency has been debased so much that I don't see it being any use. Richard Loosemore Pei Wang wrote: > Sergio, > > I'm asking about your (b). > > Put it in different words, my question is whether there is fundamental > difference between a robot and a conventional computer, such as my > laptop. I see that both you and Charles think there is a difference > (the sensorimotor capability), while Ben thinks there is no > theoretical difference, as far as the current discussion goes. > > My own answer is the same as Ben's, though for a different reason --- > I'd rather not involve concepts like quantum Turing machine. Before > arguing for my position, I'd like to see what arguments are out there. > ;-) > > Pei > > > On 10/2/06, Sergio Navega <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> From: "Pei Wang" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> > >> > We all know that, in a sense, every computer system (hardware plus >> > software) can be abstractly described as a Turing machine. >> > >> > Can we say the same for every robot? Why? >> > >> > Reference to previous publications are also welcome. >> > >> >> That's a quite interesting question. Unfortunately, I don't >> remember of any particular references (but I guess they might >> exist). I classify this question in three steps: >> >> a) The computational component of the robot >> This is as close as one may get to a turing machine, of course >> without enforcing the physically impossible infinite tape. >> >> b) The computational plus the bodily component >> (or just the bodily). Here we are not talking about turing-like >> devices. Physical idiosyncrasies of the mechanical components >> cannot be computed (it's a too complex problem). >> >> c) The system robot plus its environment >> This is as far of turing formalisms as one can get. And this is >> the situation most AI systems will have to face. >> >> Sergio Navega. ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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