> > > But each of these things has a huge raft of assumptions built into it: > > -- hierarchical clustering ... OF WHAT KIND OF SYMBOLS? > -- hash coding ... OF WHAT KIND OF SYMBOLS? > -- sequence completion ... OF WHAT KIND OF SYMBOLS? > > In each case, Granger's answer is that the symbols are vaguely > behaviorist units playing an incredibly simplistic role in a simplistic > system. > > If we take his claims at face value, he has found library functions that > operate on junk that cannot possibly be "symbols" at a cognitive level. > > If he had simply said that he had found hiererchical clustering of > neural signals, or hash coding of neural signals, or sequence completion > circuits at the neural signal level, I would say good luck to him and > keep banging the rocks together. > > But he did not: he made claims about the cognitive level, and the only > way those claims could be meaningful and useful would be in a cognitive > level system that is manifestly broken.
Well, I don't fully agree with your final paragraph... Suppose we take Greenfield's hypothesis that a fundamental role in cognition, perception and action is played by transient neural assemblies, that form opportunistically based on circumstance, but that are centered around "cores" that are tightly-interconnected neural subnets ... Potentially, Granger's primitive mechanisms could act on sets of neural signals coding for these "cores", which then indirectly drive the cognitive activity that occurs mainly on the level of the transient assemblies that the cores induce... This is *not* what Granger says, but it seems generally plausible to me... BTW I am curious to hear something about what you think might be a correct cognitive theory ;-) -- Ben G ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=56347479-f61549
