Ben Goertzel wrote:
I saw the  main point of Richard's paper as being that the available
neuroscience data drastically underdetermines the nature of neural
knowledge representation ... so that drawing conclusions about neural
KR from available data involves loads of theoretical presuppositions
...

However, my view is that this is well known among neuroscientists, and
your reading of the Quiroga et al paper supports this...

You have still not answered my previous question about your claim that there are "essentially no neuroscientists" who say that spiking patterns in single neurons encode relationships between concepts.

And yet now you make another assertion about something that you think is "well known among neuroscientists", while completely ignoring the actual argument that Harley and I brought to bear on this issue.



Richard Loosemore




ben g

On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 1:33 PM, Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 8:34 PM, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
No, object-concepts and the like.  Not place, motion or action 'concepts'.

For example, Quiroga et al showed their subjects pictures of famous places
and people, then made assertions about how those things were represented.

Now that I have a bit better understanding of neuroscience than a year
ago, I reread relevant part of your paper and skimmed the Quiroga et
al's paper ("Invariant visual representation by single neurons in the
human brain", for those who don't want to look it up in Richard's
paper). I don't see a significant disagreement. They didn't mean to
imply obviously wrong assertion that there are only few cells
corresponding to each high-level concept (to quote: "the fact that we
can discover in this short time some images -- such as photographs of
Jennifer Aniston -- that drive the cells, suggests that each cell
might represent more than one class of images"). Sparse and
distributed representations are mentioned as extreme perspectives, not
a dichtomy. Results certainly have some properties of sparse
representation, as opposed to extremely distributed, which doesn't
mean that results imply extremely sparse representation. Observed
cells as correlates of high-level concepts were surprisingly invariant
to the form in which that high-level concept was presented, which does
suggest that representation is much more explicit than in the
extremely distributed case. Or course, it's not completely explicit.

So, at this point I see at least this item in your paper as a strawman
objection (given that I didn't revisit other items).

--
Vladimir Nesov
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://causalityrelay.wordpress.com/


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