Kudos for the only pragmatic point of view (IMHO) on this whole debate. Also given the kind of biases each one of us carry, my orientation would mostly be focused on economics and a little bit of politics. My two bits:
a. The central government "bribe" that should come about as a natural course of buying peace. While the central government's policies resulted in the problems that gave rise to militancy, the militants did not quite help the cause of the people by keeping them devoid of economic progress for so long for so little. This bribe should be for the people not the militants (unlike the last time around when the militants (SULFA) got the bonanza they are living up to this day). Just doing pure number crunching, this sum should be no less than 10 times the "bribe" given to Nagaland (Rs. 4000 crores). This amount therefore should be no less than Rs. 40,000 crores. b. Renegotiating the royalty on oil (and if possible all past oil outflow) to result in a further sizable inflow of money. I don't know the economics of this - perhaps someone can elucidate. c. The opportunity cost of militancy - for the people to make up lost time and lost opportunities with more funds to address more issues in far less time. This opportunity cost should also be sizable. d. To negotiate the SE Asia corridor initiative in a manner that as a national infrastructure build up it takes more priority over most other Indian issues for the next 5 years. To execute the SE Asia corridor in a manner that the BJP government formulated - actually, in a manner that it is beneficial optimally for the NE states. In fact to negotiatiate a NE development tax on all merchandise crossing either way into perpetuity. I am sure, in the economics of it, though I have not analyzed it so far, there is margin for both mainland India and the SE Asia nations to benefit over the status quo right now and yet this development tax can be paid. For reference, Pakistan will earn $ 800 million for the oil pipeline that will pass through it from Iran to India. And the road network for merchandise flowing through is no different. e. To use this as an opportunity to break up the politician - militant - current Marwari business nexus and bring changes in governance that will bring big business houses to invest in the state as well as enable local entrepreneurship to grow successfully. This nexus has monopolised business and entrepreneurship in the state in a manner inimical to the populace at large. And it can be broken by the government (both state and federal) carrying with them in their negotiations big business houses such as Wipro or Reliance Steel to come in, give them enough sops to make it attractive to invest in the state and throw on them enough social strictures (whom to give low end contracts etc. and whom not to). On politics, I am sure there are way more competent opinion givers. I am sure the Bangladeshi problem will be solved in a manner that does not get colored by the patronage that the current militants get or what certain political parties think are votebanks. > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Roy, Santanu" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: <assam@pikespeak.uccs.edu> > Sent: Wednesday, June 01, 2005 11:57 AM > Subject: [Assam] GOI-ULFA negotiations. > > > > Suppose for a moment we set aside the question of > our own views on the ULFA, its demands and the > history of its movement. > > > > Assume that at some point in time the > representatives of the govt of India and the ULFA > actually meet across the table for negotiations - > just like the Naga or Bodo insurgency leaders did. > You will agree that in that event - what will be > most important will be the actual nitty gritty of > the negotiation itself and that there is a > possibility that there will be a negotiated > settlement. History teaches us that such settlements > often look very different from the formal charters > of the organizations. > > > > In fact, there is little doubt that the > organization ULFA, its historical perspective and > its full set of demands are controversial - there is > no general consensus on them. In particular, a large > section (without trying to quantify how large) do > not actually sympathise with the ULFA or its demand > for sovereignty (just as a large section actually > do). > > > > However, on specific issues that the ULFA > initially stood for, popular opinion is often quite > close to ULFA's perspective. For example, my own > observation most people actually sympathise with the > fact that Assam is virtually in some sort of a > colonial socio-economic relationship with mainland > India - whether or not they think of it as a > deliberate imposition or simply an outcome of > history to which the Assamese have contributed. > Similarly, most people actually believe that Assam's > options of selling its natural resources to the > world market at fair prices are actually cut off. > That, de facto, Assam has had little access to its > geographical neighbors on the east through whom it > could have bought its imports at much cheaper price > than it currently does from rest of India. There are > many others - including those related to > preservation of socio-cultural rights of indigenous > people. > > > > Though I am not sure the ULFA is actually > interested in this, the strongest popular support > for ULFA during an actual negotiation will be on > issues about which there is relatively strong > convergence of opinion among the people of Assam. > The stronger the public opinion, the greater the > bargaining power of the ULFA on such issues. There > is, therefore, an important role for building public > opinion among the people of Assam on a core set of > issues for negotiation with the government of India. > > > > Let me clarify, I am not suggesting that the > people or their intellectuals formulate ULFA's > agenda. The ULFA is a partisan political > organization with its own aims to which we may or > may not subscribe. But "the people at large" can > nevertheless extract important advantages from any > negotiation by independently building consensus on > certain core demands that they may hope to see > reflected in any final settlement. And even though > it smacks of collective opportunism, to not do so, > would (almost by definition) be a historical > opportunity foregone. > > > > Santanu. > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Assam mailing list > > Assam@pikespeak.uccs.edu > > http://pikespeak.uccs.edu/mailman/listinfo/assam > > > > Mailing list FAQ: > > http://pikespeak.uccs.edu/assam/assam-faq.html > > To unsubscribe or change options: > > http://pikespeak.uccs.edu/mailman/options/assam > > > _______________________________________________ > Assam mailing list > Assam@pikespeak.uccs.edu > http://pikespeak.uccs.edu/mailman/listinfo/assam > > Mailing list FAQ: > http://pikespeak.uccs.edu/assam/assam-faq.html > To unsubscribe or change options: > http://pikespeak.uccs.edu/mailman/options/assam > __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! 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