I've heard the PJCIS process will also be rushed. Calls for 'intentions to submit/reqests to appear' are open now for a few weeks only. *They are planning precisely 1 single day for public hearings. No more.*
There are three sitting weeks left in the year. There is an election to be called next year probably in May, and caretaker conventions which would prevent any further work on this bill from sometime in April. so the Government's need for an accelerated process is clear. All these points below need to be made in submissions to the PJCIS now, so that they can easily see they'll need more than 1 day to get through all the witnesses that want to appear and make these points. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/TelcoAmendmentBill2018 > The Committee is currently accepting submissions to this review. Submissions > should > be provided no later than *12pm, Friday, 12 October 2018.* If you intend to > make a > submission, please contact the Secretariat at tolab...@aph.gov.au > <mailto:tolab...@aph.gov.au> by Tuesday, 2 October 2018 to assist with > planning. > Hearings are expected to be held on Friday, 19 October 2018. Please - send an email now to tolab...@aph.gov.au to confirm you will (a) make a submission, and (b) wish to appear at the public hearing - and then work out what you want to say. Re-sending a submission previously sent to the Home Affairs sham consultation would be a good start - the committee may not be given the submissions sent in earlier this month to Home Affairs.. And clear your diaries for Friday 19th October - maybe in Canberra if there is to be only one day. I'm still waiting on confirmation of venue. Paul. On 25/09/2018 5:05 PM, Paul Wilkins wrote: > I'm thinking Dutton's decision to push ahead with an ill drawn bill wasn't > completely isolated from his and the government's need to change the news > cycle > around his au pair scrape. > > Which is not to say the cops don't have active activations they want these > powers > for, and as soon as possible. A big bust with Dutton's new powers would be a > shot in > the arm for the government's fortunes. > > However, the Bill doesn't deserve to pass, because it's not ready, and will > lead to > unhappy outcomes, particularly for service providers. Everyone has their > concerns, > these are mine: > > 1 - The multiplicity of agencies and agents who can authorise TANs and TARs. > > 1a - Warrant data and service provider data will reside with the issuing > agencies. > > Hence, the government needs to reconsider the whole approach, and instead, > have one > agency act as a clearing house for TCN/TAN/TARs, and act as custodian of > warrant > data and service provider confidential data. > > 2 - The lack of civil appeal process against TCN/TAN/TARs. > Grounds for appeal to either refuse or delay assistance should include: > Cost, security management, risk management, business management processes, > disruption to business, disparity of TCN/TAN/TAR with Privacy Act 1988. > > 2a - The real possibility TAN/TARs will be used by Law Enforcement to coerce > unlawful access/disclosure. > > 3 - The low bar required to issue TCN/TAN/TARs. The government's case for > these > powers is serious crime and terrorism. I don't know, but I imagine they > settled for > "serious crime as defined under the Crimes Act" because (again I'm guessing) > that's > the standard for physical warrants? It'd be good to be clear as to this point, > because cyber warrants and physical warrants are, I think we'll agree, > different in > kind. It's one thing to execute a physical warrant, which means you have to > give Law > Enforcement entry, but I feel 2 years sets the bar a little low to let Law > Enforcement go snooping about a data centre, or pushing bootloader updates to > your > phone. > > 4 - The lack of accountability. The reporting requirements are a rubber > stamp, and > leave the public none the wiser how these powers are being used, whether > they're > successful, and to what ends they're exercised. They will of course be used > by the > AFP to pursue journalist sources of government leaks. I'm not sure it's clear > all > leaks are against the public interest. There's that problem where the > government's > interests, and the public interest, are not always the same thing. > > 4a - There needs to be specific details as to the use of the power to enforce > silence as to the existence of TCN/TAN/TARs. I'm thinking this power to > suppress > shouldn't lie with Law Enforcement at all, but should rather form part of the > terms > of the accompanying computer/data warrants. > > 5 - The Emergency provisions make the police a power answerable to themselves > for 48 > hours. > > 6 - The definition of "computer" which extends to any data held on any > computer > connected on "the same network" - which can be read as extending to the > internet and > anything that connects to the internet. > > 7 - I think the drafting is flawed, where TCN/TAN/TARs restrict themselves to > a > target computer. I think it's arguable the Bill doesn't extend to compelling > access > to ancillary computers/network devices, needed to extract data from the > target computer. > > Kind regards > > Paul Wilkins > > On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 13:51, <tr...@ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au > <mailto:tr...@ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au>> wrote: > > On Tue, 25 Sep 2018, Paul Wilkins wrote: > > > Australia is bound under international law against arbitrary or unlawful > incursions of the right to privacy. That's black letter > > law. > > We are also bound under international law the 1951 Refugee Convention. The > Australian government removed references to the convention from the laws > of Australia, so the courts can no longer enforce it. See also this great > quote: > > The Court held that Australian courts are bound to apply Australian > statute law “even if that law should violate a rule of international law.” > > > http://ilareporter.org.au/2018/04/australias-disengagement-from-international-refugee-law-the-principle-of-non-refoulement-and-the-doctrine-of-jurisdiction-sophie-capicchiano-young/ > http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2015/1.html > p462 > > So as Mark said, these international "laws" mean nothing here unless > enacted by the Australian parliament. And specific bills, like the > Assistance and Access Bill can override them at will. > > -- > # TRS-80 trs80(a)ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au > <http://ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au> #/ > "Otherwise Bub here will do \ > # UCC Wheel Member http://trs80.ucc.asn.au/ #| what squirrels do > best | > [ "There's nobody getting rich writing ]| -- Collect and hide > your | > [ software that I know of" -- Bill Gates, 1980 ]\ nuts." -- Acid Reflux > #231 / > > > > _______________________________________________ > AusNOG mailing list > AusNOG@lists.ausnog.net > http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog
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