I stand corrected. Kind regards
Paul Wilkins On Thu, 27 Sep 2018 at 12:40, Narelle Clark <narel...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Wrong agency - it's Home Affairs (Peter Dutton is the minister) not the > Attorney General's (Christian Porter) department. > > Narelle > > On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 11:35 AM Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> To my mind, treatment by Attorney General's of the consultation process >> holds the public and industry in contempt. With under 2 weeks between >> closure of submissions and transfer to PJCIS, how could they have even read >> all submissions, let alone given them due consideration? The bearest of >> amendments fiddling at the edges serves only so that Dutton can tell the >> House industry has been consulted, before steamrolling an ill prepared Bill >> through the House. >> >> The Guardian article suggests Labor support is iffy. But I'm not even >> convinced Liberals are behind this, the push seems to emanate from Attorney >> General's. >> >> For anyone with serious concerns, looking to delay passage of the Bill to >> give sufficient time to allow development of a considered well designed >> framework, with a workable and proportionate regime, I'd be writing to >> local members and pointing out where the Bill is premature, deficient and >> badly framed. >> >> Kind regards >> >> Paul Wilkins >> >> >> On Thu, 27 Sep 2018 at 11:07, Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/27/australias-spyware-law-could-expose-phones-to-exploitation-business-group-warns >>> >>> Submission by Australian Information Industry Association >>> <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/consultations/Documents/australian-information-industry.pdf> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 17:58, Paul Brooks <pbrooks-aus...@layer10.com.au> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> I've heard the PJCIS process will also be rushed. Calls for 'intentions >>>> to submit/reqests to appear' are open now for a few weeks only. >>>> *They are planning precisely 1 single day for public hearings. No more.* >>>> >>>> There are three sitting weeks left in the year. There is an election to >>>> be called next year probably in May, and caretaker conventions which would >>>> prevent any further work on this bill from sometime in April. so the >>>> Government's need for an accelerated process is clear. >>>> >>>> All these points below need to be made in submissions to the PJCIS now, >>>> so that they can easily see they'll need more than 1 day to get through all >>>> the witnesses that want to appear and make these points. >>>> >>>> >>>> https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/TelcoAmendmentBill2018 >>>> >>>> The Committee is currently accepting submissions to this review. >>>> Submissions should be provided no later than *12pm, Friday, 12 October >>>> 2018.* If you intend to make a submission, please contact the >>>> Secretariat at tolab...@aph.gov.au by Tuesday, 2 October 2018 to >>>> assist with planning. Hearings are expected to be held on Friday, 19 >>>> October 2018. >>>> >>>> >>>> Please - send an email now to tolab...@aph.gov.au to confirm you will >>>> (a) make a submission, and (b) wish to appear at the public hearing - and >>>> then work out what you want to say. Re-sending a submission previously sent >>>> to the Home Affairs sham consultation would be a good start - the committee >>>> may not be given the submissions sent in earlier this month to Home >>>> Affairs.. >>>> >>>> And clear your diaries for Friday 19th October - maybe in Canberra if >>>> there is to be only one day. I'm still waiting on confirmation of venue. >>>> >>>> Paul. >>>> >>>> >>>> On 25/09/2018 5:05 PM, Paul Wilkins wrote: >>>> >>>> I'm thinking Dutton's decision to push ahead with an ill drawn bill >>>> wasn't completely isolated from his and the government's need to change the >>>> news cycle around his au pair scrape. >>>> >>>> Which is not to say the cops don't have active activations they want >>>> these powers for, and as soon as possible. A big bust with Dutton's new >>>> powers would be a shot in the arm for the government's fortunes. >>>> >>>> However, the Bill doesn't deserve to pass, because it's not ready, and >>>> will lead to unhappy outcomes, particularly for service providers. Everyone >>>> has their concerns, these are mine: >>>> >>>> 1 - The multiplicity of agencies and agents who can authorise TANs and >>>> TARs. >>>> >>>> 1a - Warrant data and service provider data will reside with the >>>> issuing agencies. >>>> >>>> Hence, the government needs to reconsider the whole approach, and >>>> instead, have one agency act as a clearing house for TCN/TAN/TARs, and act >>>> as custodian of warrant data and service provider confidential data. >>>> >>>> 2 - The lack of civil appeal process against TCN/TAN/TARs. >>>> Grounds for appeal to either refuse or delay assistance should include: >>>> Cost, security management, risk management, business management >>>> processes, disruption to business, disparity of TCN/TAN/TAR with Privacy >>>> Act 1988. >>>> >>>> 2a - The real possibility TAN/TARs will be used by Law Enforcement to >>>> coerce unlawful access/disclosure. >>>> >>>> 3 - The low bar required to issue TCN/TAN/TARs. The government's case >>>> for these powers is serious crime and terrorism. I don't know, but I >>>> imagine they settled for "serious crime as defined under the Crimes Act" >>>> because (again I'm guessing) that's the standard for physical warrants? >>>> It'd be good to be clear as to this point, because cyber warrants and >>>> physical warrants are, I think we'll agree, different in kind. It's one >>>> thing to execute a physical warrant, which means you have to give Law >>>> Enforcement entry, but I feel 2 years sets the bar a little low to let Law >>>> Enforcement go snooping about a data centre, or pushing bootloader updates >>>> to your phone. >>>> >>>> 4 - The lack of accountability. The reporting requirements are a rubber >>>> stamp, and leave the public none the wiser how these powers are being used, >>>> whether they're successful, and to what ends they're exercised. They will >>>> of course be used by the AFP to pursue journalist sources of government >>>> leaks. I'm not sure it's clear all leaks are against the public interest. >>>> There's that problem where the government's interests, and the public >>>> interest, are not always the same thing. >>>> >>>> 4a - There needs to be specific details as to the use of the power to >>>> enforce silence as to the existence of TCN/TAN/TARs. I'm thinking this >>>> power to suppress shouldn't lie with Law Enforcement at all, but should >>>> rather form part of the terms of the accompanying computer/data warrants. >>>> >>>> 5 - The Emergency provisions make the police a power answerable to >>>> themselves for 48 hours. >>>> >>>> 6 - The definition of "computer" which extends to any data held on any >>>> computer connected on "the same network" - which can be read as extending >>>> to the internet and anything that connects to the internet. >>>> >>>> 7 - I think the drafting is flawed, where TCN/TAN/TARs restrict >>>> themselves to a target computer. I think it's arguable the Bill doesn't >>>> extend to compelling access to ancillary computers/network devices, needed >>>> to extract data from the target computer. >>>> >>>> Kind regards >>>> >>>> Paul Wilkins >>>> >>>> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 13:51, <tr...@ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018, Paul Wilkins wrote: >>>>> >>>>> > Australia is bound under international law against arbitrary or >>>>> unlawful incursions of the right to privacy. That's black letter >>>>> > law. >>>>> >>>>> We are also bound under international law the 1951 Refugee Convention. >>>>> The >>>>> Australian government removed references to the convention from the >>>>> laws >>>>> of Australia, so the courts can no longer enforce it. See also this >>>>> great >>>>> quote: >>>>> >>>>> The Court held that Australian courts are bound to apply Australian >>>>> statute law “even if that law should violate a rule of international >>>>> law.” >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://ilareporter.org.au/2018/04/australias-disengagement-from-international-refugee-law-the-principle-of-non-refoulement-and-the-doctrine-of-jurisdiction-sophie-capicchiano-young/ >>>>> http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2015/1.html >>>>> p462 >>>>> >>>>> So as Mark said, these international "laws" mean nothing here unless >>>>> enacted by the Australian parliament. And specific bills, like the >>>>> Assistance and Access Bill can override them at will. >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> # TRS-80 trs80(a)ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au #/ "Otherwise Bub >>>>> here will do \ >>>>> # UCC Wheel Member http://trs80.ucc.asn.au/ #| what squirrels do >>>>> best | >>>>> [ "There's nobody getting rich writing ]| -- Collect and >>>>> hide your | >>>>> [ software that I know of" -- Bill Gates, 1980 ]\ nuts." -- Acid >>>>> Reflux #231 / >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> AusNOG mailing >>>> listAusNOG@lists.ausnog.nethttp://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >> AusNOG mailing list >> AusNOG@lists.ausnog.net >> http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog >> > > > -- > > > Narelle > narel...@gmail.com >
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