This is how I put it for an article in CommsDay yesterday, as an Internet Australia position: ------------------- The government is clearly trying to rush this through in a sham process with no real good-faith effort being made on consultation with external experts or the community.
Allocating just a single day for public hearings is extremely short-sighted, given the high interest and volume of submissions to the original Dept of Home Affairs consultation, including many highly respected international stakeholders. The PJCIS will not know how many submissions it will receive or requests to appear at public hearings until at least 2nd October and probably later - only then will the Committee be able to assess how many days of hearings it will need to hear from all stakeholders. The process is far too short to enable the many international experts from institutions such as MIT, Harvard and the Internet Architecture Board to plan travel to Australia to appear. It is also telling that the single scheduled hearing day is only one week after the close of submissions, leaving insufficient time for the Committee to read and fully evaluate all the submissions it is likely to receive - this will in turn reduce the value of the public hearings in assisting the Committee to delve into the many substantial problems with the proposed legisaltion. We request the Department accelerate the publication of all the submissions to its enquiry - it appears to only have published submissions from names beginning with A-E so far - and call on the government to allow the PJCIS all the time it will require to properly evaluate all the submissions it will receive, and schedule as many public hearing days as it needs to become fully informed of the consequences and dangers for the public and for the global communications infrastructure if this Bill proceeds unchanged. Regards, Paul. (I haven't actually seen the CommsDay article, if anybody subscribes could you please send it to me? :-)) On 27/09/2018 11:34 AM, Paul Wilkins wrote: > To my mind, treatment by Attorney General's of the consultation process holds > the > public and industry in contempt. With under 2 weeks between closure of > submissions > and transfer to PJCIS, how could they have even read all submissions, let > alone > given them due consideration? The bearest of amendments fiddling at the edges > serves > only so that Dutton can tell the House industry has been consulted, before > steamrolling an ill prepared Bill through the House. > > The Guardian article suggests Labor support is iffy. But I'm not even > convinced > Liberals are behind this, the push seems to emanate from Attorney General's. > > For anyone with serious concerns, looking to delay passage of the Bill to give > sufficient time to allow development of a considered well designed framework, > with a > workable and proportionate regime, I'd be writing to local members and > pointing out > where the Bill is premature, deficient and badly framed. > > Kind regards > > Paul Wilkins > > > On Thu, 27 Sep 2018 at 11:07, Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins...@gmail.com > <mailto:paulwilkins...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/27/australias-spyware-law-could-expose-phones-to-exploitation-business-group-warns > > Submission by Australian Information Industry Association > > <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/consultations/Documents/australian-information-industry.pdf> > > > On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 17:58, Paul Brooks <pbrooks-aus...@layer10.com.au > <mailto:pbrooks-aus...@layer10.com.au>> wrote: > > I've heard the PJCIS process will also be rushed. Calls for > 'intentions to > submit/reqests to appear' are open now for a few weeks only. > *They are planning precisely 1 single day for public hearings. No > more.* > > There are three sitting weeks left in the year. There is an election > to be > called next year probably in May, and caretaker conventions which > would > prevent any further work on this bill from sometime in April. so the > Government's need for an accelerated process is clear. > > All these points below need to be made in submissions to the PJCIS > now, so > that they can easily see they'll need more than 1 day to get through > all the > witnesses that want to appear and make these points. > > > https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/TelcoAmendmentBill2018 >> The Committee is currently accepting submissions to this review. >> Submissions should be provided no later than *12pm, Friday, 12 >> October >> 2018.* If you intend to make a submission, please contact the >> Secretariat >> at tolab...@aph.gov.au <mailto:tolab...@aph.gov.au> by Tuesday, 2 >> October >> 2018 to assist with planning. Hearings are expected to be held on >> Friday, >> 19 October 2018. > > Please - send an email now to tolab...@aph.gov.au > <mailto:tolab...@aph.gov.au> to confirm you will (a) make a > submission, and > (b) wish to appear at the public hearing - and then work out what you > want > to say. Re-sending a submission previously sent to the Home Affairs > sham > consultation would be a good start - the committee may not be given > the > submissions sent in earlier this month to Home Affairs.. > > And clear your diaries for Friday 19th October - maybe in Canberra if > there > is to be only one day. I'm still waiting on confirmation of venue. > > Paul. > > > On 25/09/2018 5:05 PM, Paul Wilkins wrote: >> I'm thinking Dutton's decision to push ahead with an ill drawn bill >> wasn't >> completely isolated from his and the government's need to change the >> news >> cycle around his au pair scrape. >> >> Which is not to say the cops don't have active activations they want >> these >> powers for, and as soon as possible. A big bust with Dutton's new >> powers >> would be a shot in the arm for the government's fortunes. >> >> However, the Bill doesn't deserve to pass, because it's not ready, >> and will >> lead to unhappy outcomes, particularly for service providers. >> Everyone has >> their concerns, these are mine: >> >> 1 - The multiplicity of agencies and agents who can authorise TANs >> and TARs. >> >> 1a - Warrant data and service provider data will reside with the >> issuing >> agencies. >> >> Hence, the government needs to reconsider the whole approach, and >> instead, >> have one agency act as a clearing house for TCN/TAN/TARs, and act as >> custodian of warrant data and service provider confidential data. >> >> 2 - The lack of civil appeal process against TCN/TAN/TARs. >> Grounds for appeal to either refuse or delay assistance should >> include: >> Cost, security management, risk management, business management >> processes, >> disruption to business, disparity of TCN/TAN/TAR with Privacy Act >> 1988. >> >> 2a - The real possibility TAN/TARs will be used by Law Enforcement to >> coerce unlawful access/disclosure. >> >> 3 - The low bar required to issue TCN/TAN/TARs. The government's >> case for >> these powers is serious crime and terrorism. I don't know, but I >> imagine >> they settled for "serious crime as defined under the Crimes Act" >> because >> (again I'm guessing) that's the standard for physical warrants? It'd >> be >> good to be clear as to this point, because cyber warrants and >> physical >> warrants are, I think we'll agree, different in kind. It's one thing >> to >> execute a physical warrant, which means you have to give Law >> Enforcement >> entry, but I feel 2 years sets the bar a little low to let Law >> Enforcement >> go snooping about a data centre, or pushing bootloader updates to >> your phone. >> >> 4 - The lack of accountability. The reporting requirements are a >> rubber >> stamp, and leave the public none the wiser how these powers are >> being used, >> whether they're successful, and to what ends they're exercised. They >> will >> of course be used by the AFP to pursue journalist sources of >> government >> leaks. I'm not sure it's clear all leaks are against the public >> interest. >> There's that problem where the government's interests, and the public >> interest, are not always the same thing. >> >> 4a - There needs to be specific details as to the use of the power to >> enforce silence as to the existence of TCN/TAN/TARs. I'm thinking >> this >> power to suppress shouldn't lie with Law Enforcement at all, but >> should >> rather form part of the terms of the accompanying computer/data >> warrants. >> >> 5 - The Emergency provisions make the police a power answerable to >> themselves for 48 hours. >> >> 6 - The definition of "computer" which extends to any data held on >> any >> computer connected on "the same network" - which can be read as >> extending >> to the internet and anything that connects to the internet. >> >> 7 - I think the drafting is flawed, where TCN/TAN/TARs restrict >> themselves >> to a target computer. I think it's arguable the Bill doesn't extend >> to >> compelling access to ancillary computers/network devices, needed to >> extract >> data from the target computer. >> >> Kind regards >> >> Paul Wilkins >> >> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 13:51, <tr...@ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au >> <mailto:tr...@ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au>> wrote: >> >> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018, Paul Wilkins wrote: >> >> > Australia is bound under international law against arbitrary or >> unlawful incursions of the right to privacy. That's black letter >> > law. >> >> We are also bound under international law the 1951 Refugee >> Convention. The >> Australian government removed references to the convention from >> the laws >> of Australia, so the courts can no longer enforce it. See also >> this great >> quote: >> >> The Court held that Australian courts are bound to apply >> Australian >> statute law “even if that law should violate a rule of >> international law.” >> >> >> http://ilareporter.org.au/2018/04/australias-disengagement-from-international-refugee-law-the-principle-of-non-refoulement-and-the-doctrine-of-jurisdiction-sophie-capicchiano-young/ >> >> http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2015/1.html >> p462 >> >> So as Mark said, these international "laws" mean nothing here >> unless >> enacted by the Australian parliament. And specific bills, like >> the >> Assistance and Access Bill can override them at will. >> >> -- >> # TRS-80 trs80(a)ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au >> <http://ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au> #/ "Otherwise Bub here will do \ >> # UCC Wheel Member http://trs80.ucc.asn.au/ #| what >> squirrels do >> best | >> [ "There's nobody getting rich writing ]| -- Collect >> and hide >> your | >> [ software that I know of" -- Bill Gates, 1980 ]\ nuts." -- >> Acid >> Reflux #231 / >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> AusNOG mailing list >> AusNOG@lists.ausnog.net <mailto:AusNOG@lists.ausnog.net> >> http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog > > > > > _______________________________________________ > AusNOG mailing list > AusNOG@lists.ausnog.net > http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog
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