I hadn't really thought about the danger from a restore. I guess that would
require quite a bit of technical knowledge of backuppc to engineer an attack on
a server? It would require significantly less knowledge to steal the ssh keys
on an unencrypted server and then have root access.
On Thursday, 28 July 2016, 13:11, Carl Wilhelm Soderstrom
<chr...@real-time.com> wrote:
On 07/28 10:53 , lanceh1412-busin...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
> Just trying to harden security. My concern is if someone had physical access
> to backuppc server they could easily logon as backuppc user by resetting the
> password and therefore gain access to the ssh keys. Now I see it is possible
> to put the ssh keys in an encrypted private directory (See
> EncryptedPrivateDirectory - Community Help Wiki). This would mean that even
> if someone could reset the password and logon as backuppc they wouldn't have
> access to the keys.
> Has anyone done this or would recommend this way or got any other suggestions?
My logic for my setup is:
if someone has access to the BackupPC server, they have all the data on all
the computers being backed up. At that point, the risk is whether they could
modify data on the live server.
To avoid that risk, I don't allow the BackupPC server write access to the
machines being backed up, only read access. The restores aren't really much
more inconvenient (I tend to use tar+netcat for restores on Linux boxen, and
zipfile downloads on Windows boxen), and I feel like I have more confidence
that I'm not going to accidentally clobber the wrong data.
--
Carl Soderstrom
Systems Administrator
Real-Time Enterprises
www.real-time.com
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