"if someone had physical access to backuppc server they could easily
logon as backuppc user by resetting the password"
How would that work? Unless you leave the backuppc user logged in, they
would still need to either know the password or use some sort of hack to
get access before being able to reset the password (such as rebooting
with a live cd and accessing the OS partition directly).
Always protect physical access to important computers. If someone has
physical access to your server, all bets are off. Also, if a user
account has passwordless ssh keys giving root access to any of your
systems, then you should make sure that the account has a strong
password (at the least), or that the ssh keys that give access do
require (strong) passwords.
Bowie
On 7/28/2016 9:01 AM, lanceh1412-busin...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
I hadn't really thought about the danger from a restore. I guess that
would require quite a bit of technical knowledge of backuppc to
engineer an attack on a server? It would require significantly less
knowledge to steal the ssh keys on an unencrypted server and then have
root access.
On Thursday, 28 July 2016, 13:11, Carl Wilhelm Soderstrom
<chr...@real-time.com> wrote:
On 07/28 10:53 , lanceh1412-busin...@yahoo.co.uk
<mailto:lanceh1412-busin...@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> Just trying to harden security. My concern is if someone had
physical access to backuppc server they could easily logon as backuppc
user by resetting the password and therefore gain access to the ssh
keys. Now I see it is possible to put the ssh keys in an encrypted
private directory (See EncryptedPrivateDirectory - Community Help
Wiki). This would mean that even if someone could reset the password
and logon as backuppc they wouldn't have access to the keys.
> Has anyone done this or would recommend this way or got any other
suggestions?
My logic for my setup is:
if someone has access to the BackupPC server, they have all the data
on all
the computers being backed up. At that point, the risk is whether they
could
modify data on the live server.
To avoid that risk, I don't allow the BackupPC server write access to the
machines being backed up, only read access. The restores aren't really
much
more inconvenient (I tend to use tar+netcat for restores on Linux
boxen, and
zipfile downloads on Windows boxen), and I feel like I have more
confidence
that I'm not going to accidentally clobber the wrong data.
--
Carl Soderstrom
Systems Administrator
Real-Time Enterprises
www.real-time.com
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