On Aug 17, 2015 5:29 PM, "Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >From the point of view of a > wallet, it's not very secure to use Hearn-style SPV mode, and volunteers > running full nodes doesn't help things. Sybil attacking the IP address > space is pretty easy in comparison to aquiring hashing power sufficient > to create false confirmations, so any attacker able to do the former > will likely be running the full node you're connecting too anyway. > Ultimately, Hearn-style SPV is a close approximation to just trusting > anyone with a non-trivial amount of hashing power. (and getting that is > surprisingly easy, e.g. w/ SPV mining)
Can you explain how the spv node fails against an attacker with a non-trivial amount of hash power where a full node doesn't? To attack an spv wallet that is waiting for 6 or 10 confirmations, you would not only need to Sybil them but also summon a massive amount of hashing power to create a chain of headers (while forgoing the opportunity to mine valid blocks with that hash power). But could someone with that much hash power not Sybil a full node and give them a chain for valid blocks (but on an orphan fork)? The failure model doesn't seem specific to spv to me.
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