-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello,
Some background on this.... A very long while ago I posted to the bitcoin-development mailing list some ABIS concepts having to do with microdonations: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2013-December/00 3791.html https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-January/004 049.html And an interesting post (which led me to explore BCN) via nullc: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7765455 (posted 1 & 1/3 year ago). Anyway, some long while ago this discussion came up about "Incentives to run full nodes," and the last post in the thread was here: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-June/006083 .html Since that time, some new developments have come to light which the participants in that thread may find interesting; Please see in part, https://bytecoin.org/news/bytecoin-wallet-1.0.8-release-introduces-micro - -donations/ This presents a working implementation in BCN; the concept as implemented there is arguably viable in BTC as well. Please explore, play with, discuss, etc. Cheers, - - O odinn: > Potentially relevant... > > "Incentivizing the running of full nodes" > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-June/0060 28 > > .html > > (However, the issue to which I referred here is now closed) > > View whole thread: > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-June/thre ad > > .html#6028 > > On 08/17/2015 02:44 PM, Chris Pacia via bitcoin-dev wrote: > >> On Aug 17, 2015 5:29 PM, "Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev" >> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>> wrote: From the >> point of view of a >>> wallet, it's not very secure to use Hearn-style SPV mode, and >>> volunteers running full nodes doesn't help things. Sybil >>> attacking the IP address space is pretty easy in comparison to >>> aquiring hashing power sufficient to create false >>> confirmations, so any attacker able to do the former will >>> likely be running the full node you're connecting too anyway. >>> Ultimately, Hearn-style SPV is a close approximation to just >>> trusting anyone with a non-trivial amount of hashing power. >>> (and getting that is surprisingly easy, e.g. w/ SPV mining) > >> Can you explain how the spv node fails against an attacker with a >> non-trivial amount of hash power where a full node doesn't? To >> attack an spv wallet that is waiting for 6 or 10 confirmations, >> you would not only need to Sybil them but also summon a massive >> amount of hashing power to create a chain of headers (while >> forgoing the opportunity to mine valid blocks with that hash >> power). > >> But could someone with that much hash power not Sybil a full >> node and give them a chain for valid blocks (but on an orphan >> fork)? The failure model doesn't seem specific to spv to me. > > > >> _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev >> mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > - -- http://abis.io ~ "a protocol concept to enable decentralization and expansion of a giving economy, and a new social good" https://keybase.io/odinn -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJWEMsvAAoJEGxwq/inSG8CcU8IAMJ+ZYMFzjETUDEZNyUnVd3v SJCNauufTOcqxLzQoGIj4Y66PDnk9doRy/KJUGhKNtg4vjxiEk+GGHRH02ktvnQB 6MGuDCJS+MLeGi2W2QMr1NdHl09kRo306F5ZgjtZnOqX0mhwhOrIUylpoevcBnSQ maJ5hpmxqyhxozEyYyu50HwcMQrXeWKZ8G0VSkTqmY5wf0s98MGrFLWSujwsva0e p4hvG6YgBH85ne7dnBSH/sySreJpRMA0aac/+1j9U3LVvMTsmuaPc71aGI791o/y +KV+UZ8bgHldfi+NSK8wA4eRi4JQrt+ruE63XlfYl29gWINqsGeVtpW/W3jeDnI= =KDER -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
