> Hi, > > I'm writing to suggest and discuss the addition of paper wallet > functionality in bitcoin-core software, starting with a single new RPC > call: genExternalAddress [type]. >
AFAIK, client implementations such as your proposal are off-topic for this ML. Better use bitcoin-core-dev (ML or IRC) or Github (bitcoin/bitcoin) for such proposals. > On 09/29/2017 02:03 PM, Luke Dashjr wrote: > Paper wallets are a safety hazard, insecure, and generally not advisable. > I have to agree with Luke. And I would also extend those concerns to BIP39 plaintext paper backups. IMO, private keys should be generated and used (signing) on a trusted, minimal and offline hardware/os. They should never leave the device over the channel used for the signing I/O. Users should have no way to view or export the private keys (expect for the seed backup). Backups should be encrypted (whoever finds the paper backup should need a second factor to decrypt) and the restore process should be footgun-safe (especially the lost-passphrase deadlock). /jonas
signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP
_______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
