> Op 30 sep. 2017, om 06:49 heeft Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev > <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> het volgende geschreven: > >> On 09/29/2017 02:03 PM, Luke Dashjr wrote: >> Paper wallets are a safety hazard, insecure, and generally not advisable. >> > > I have to agree with Luke. > And I would also extend those concerns to BIP39 plaintext paper backups. > > IMO, private keys should be generated and used (signing) on a trusted, > minimal and offline hardware/os. They should never leave the device over the > channel used for the signing I/O. Users should have no way to view or export > the private keys (expect for the seed backup). Backups should be encrypted > (whoever finds the paper backup should need a second factor to decrypt) and > the restore process should be footgun-safe (especially the lost-passphrase > deadlock).
I believe BIP39 does an excellent job at reducing the amount of bitcoin permanently lost. Stolen funds can at least in theory be retrieved at some future date. There's a trade-off between having a backup process that is secure and one that people actually use. I don't know the right answer, and tend to agree it's better left to individual wallets to decide. Sjors
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