Without block commitment mobiles would have to use trusted filter provider or implement a complex data hungry algorithm and still remain as insecure as with BIP 37.
Years of experience implementing wallets with BIP 37 taught us that an outpoint + output script filter is useful. Committing such a filter to the block can not be an error. We could roll this out on P2P prior to a soft fork adding the commitment, but I would not expect its use to pick up before that. Therafter BIP 37 could be rightfully decommissioned, herby offering both security and privacy enhancement at modest data cost. Tamas Blummer > On Jun 2, 2018, at 14:41, David A. Harding via bitcoin-dev > <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > On Fri, Jun 01, 2018 at 07:02:38PM -0700, Jim Posen via bitcoin-dev wrote: >> Without the ability to verify filter validity, a client would have to stop >> syncing altogether in the presence of just one malicious peer, which is >> unacceptable. > > I'm confused about why this would be the case. If Alice's node > generates filters accurately and Mallory's node generates filters > inaccurately, and they both send their filters to Bob, won't Bob be able > to download any blocks either filter indicates are relevant to his > wallet?
signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP
_______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
