Hi Eric, there are some other ways to impose cost on use without direct billing, e.g.:
- Burn Bitcoins to use the service, as you mentioned. This could work and would benefit remaining Bitcoin owner, but is unsustainable. - Pay high fees in self dealing transactions. This could work and would benefit miner. - Time lock own Bitcoins. This is forgoing control of an UTXO for a time period, which implies opportunity cost. This could be done with CLTV (OP_HODL). It damages the current owner but benefits no one. The problem is one might not have substantial UTXO to imply high enough opportunity cost. - Pay someone else to time lock. This is paying someone to lock an UTXO for a time span. Payment and time lock could be combined in the same transaction. - Transferable borrowed Bitcoin. This needs the covenant. This benefits those who consciously give up control for a time span. Its advantage is that since transferable it can be sold if no longer needed, thereby shortening the term of the original arrangement. It coul be re-rented for a shorter time period. Tamas Blummer > On Jul 4, 2019, at 18:43, Eric Voskuil <e...@voskuil.org> wrote: > > Hi ZmnSCPxj, > > Generalizing a bit this appears to be the same with one exception. The amount > of encumbered coin is relevant to an external observer. Of course the > effective dust limit is the maximum necessary encumbrance otherwise. > > In the case of simple tracking, the market value of the coin is not relevant, > all that is required is a valid output. Hence the devolution to 1 sat > tracking. In your scenario the objective is to establish a meaningful cost > for the output. > > A community of people using this as a sort of hashcash spam protection can > raise the amount of encumbered coin (i.e. advertising threshold price) > required in that context. The cost of this encumberance includes not only at > least one tx fee but market cost of the coin rental. > > At a 1 year advertisement term, 10% APR capital cost, and threshold of 1 > encumbered coin, the same is achieved by burning .1 coin. In other words the > renter (advertiser) has actually paid to the coin owner .1 coin to rent 1 > coin for one year. > > As with Bitcoin mining, it is the consumed cost that matters in this > scenario, (i.e., not the hash rate, or in this case the encumbered coin face > value). Why would the advertiser not simply be required to burn .1 coin for > the same privilege, just as miners burn energy? Why would it not make more > sense to spend that coin in support of the secondary network (e.g. paying for > confirmation security), just as with the burning of energy in Bitcoin mining? > > e > >> On Jul 3, 2019, at 23:57, ZmnSCPxj <zmnsc...@protonmail.com> wrote: >> >> Good morning Eric, >> >> >>>> and thanks to you and ZmnSCPxj we now have two additional uses cases for >>>> UTXOs that are only temporarily accessible to their current owner. >>> >>> Actually you have a single potentially-valid use case, the one I have >>> presented. The others I have shown to be invalid (apart from scamming) and >>> no additional information to demonstrate errors in my conclusions have been >>> offered. >> >> I presented another use case, that of the "Bitcoin Classified Ads Network". >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-July/017083.html >> >> Advertisements are "backed" by an unspent TXO. >> In order to limit their local resource consumption, nodes of this network >> will preferentially keep advertisements that are backed by higher UTXO >> values divided by advertisement size, and drop those with too low UTXO value >> divided by advertisement size. >> >> Thus, spammers will either need to rent larger UTXO values for their spam, >> paying for the higher rent involved, or fall back to pre-Bitcoin spamming >> methods. >> Thus I think I have presented a use-case that is viable for this and does >> not simply devolve to "just burn a 1-satoshi output". >> >> I still do not quite support generalized covenants as the use-case is >> already possible on current Bitcoin (and given that with just a little more >> transaction introspection this enables Turing-completeness), but the basic >> concept of "renting a UTXO of substantial value" appears sound to me. >> >> >> Regards, >> ZmnSCPxj
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